Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, James Black was convicted by jury of conspiring to distributing cocaine, using a telephone in committing or in causing the facility, and possessing with intent to distribute. The convictions stemmed from charges made in the government’s Fifth Superseding Indictment in a longstanding, multi-defendant case that began in November 2007. Between the First Superseding Indictment (in which Black was first charged) and the jury trial, the government filed another four superseding indictments and twice dismissed the case: once to pursue an interlocutory appeal and once to avoid dismissal of the cocaine-conspiracy charge. After the jury’s verdict, the district court sentenced Black to 30 years’ imprisonment. Black appealed, arguing that the district court plainly erred in calculating the United States Sentencing Guidelines advisory range at 360 months’ imprisonment to life. Black also argued that the government’s 23-month delay in bringing him to trial, together with the delay between the filing of the second-to-last indictment and Black’s trial, denied him his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the government didn’t violate Black’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. But because the Court concluded that the district court plainly erred in calculating Black’s advisory Guidelines range, Black’s sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Black" on Justia Law

Zia Shadows, LLC operated a mobile-home park in Las Cruces, New Mexico, under a special-use permit from the City. In late 2000, a dispute over water-rights fees arose between Zia Shadows and the City, and principal Alex Garth protested these fees and lodged written and oral complaints with the City Council. This appeal arose out of that zoning dispute. Zia Shadows and its principals, Alex and William Garth (collectively, Zia Shadows), filed suit in federal district court, alleging the City’s delays in approval of a zoning request (and the conditions ultimately attached to the approval) violated Zia Shadows’ rights to due process and equal protection. Zia Shadows also alleged the City’s actions were taken in retaliation for Zia Shadows’ public criticisms of the City. The district court granted summary judgment to the City on Zia Shadows’ due-process and equal-protection claims, and a jury found in favor of the City on Zia Shadows’ First Amendment retaliation claim. Zia Shadows argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit: (1) that the district court erred in granting summary judgment; (2) the district court abused its discretion both in its instruction of the jury and its refusal to strike a juror; and (3) the jury’s verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding Zia Shadows failed to establish the requisite elements of its due-process and equal-protection claims and did not demonstrate reversible error in either the proceedings or verdict at trial. View "Zia Shadows, LLC v. City of Las Cruces" on Justia Law

CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (“CEEG”), a Chinese company, agreed to sell solar energy products to LUMOS, LLC, a U.S. company. After receiving certain shipments, LUMOS filed a warranty claim alleging workmanship defects, and refused to remit the balance due. After two years of "fitful" negotiations, CEEG filed an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the parties’ agreements. Although the parties had communicated exclusively in English to that point, CEEG served LUMOS with a Chinese-language notice of the proceedings, and LUMOS did not immediately realize what the notice was. After the arbitration panel ruled in its favor, CEEG moved for the district court to confirm the award. LUMOS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Chinese-language notice caused it to miss the deadline to participate in appointing the arbitration panel. The district court granted the motion, finding that the notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise LUMOS of the arbitration proceedings. The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed. View "CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science v. Lumos" on Justia Law

Matthew Hale was convicted of obstruction of justice and soliciting the murder of a federal judge. After filing an unsuccessful motion for collateral relief, he filed a habeas corpus application, arguing: (1) because the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish guilt under the solicitation and obstruction statutes, he was “actually innocent;" and (2) he claimed that possible juror misconduct, which he learned about after his section 2255 motion had been denied, may have deprived him of his right to an impartial jury. The district court denied the "section 2241" application under 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) for lack of statutory jurisdiction, and Hale appealed. Finding that Hale’s application was barred under the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of section 2255(e) in "Prost v. Anderson," (636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011)), the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Hale v. Fox" on Justia Law

In December 2007, a driver rear-ended Donald Etherton’s vehicle. He injured his back in the accident. Etherton filed a claim with his insurer, Owners Insurance Company (“Owners”), seeking uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage up to his policy limit. After months of back and forth, Owners offered to pay an amount significantly lower than the policy limit. Etherton sued, alleging claims for (1) breach of contract and (2) unreasonable delay or denial of a claim for benefits. A jury found in Etherton’s favor on both claims. The district court entered judgment for Etherton, awarding $2,250,000 in damages. Owners appealed, arguing the trial court erred: (1) by denying Owners' motion for a new trial based on the allegedly erroneous admission of expert testimony; (2) by denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law based on Owners' purported reasonableness; and (3) in granting Etherton's motion to amend the judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in all respects. View "Etherton v. Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Cody Little was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and of possessing a stolen firearm. Little appealed, challenging how the jury was instructed at trial. After review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Little's contention that constructive possession required proof of intent to exercise dominion and control over an object following the Supreme Court’s opinion in "Henderson v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015)). However, because the evidence presented at trial compelled the conclusion that Little intended to exercise control over the weapons, the Court held that district court’s error in omitting the intent element from its jury instruction was harmless. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court permissibly issued instructions regarding aiding and abetting and possible guilt of others, and that a deliberate indifference instruction was harmless. However, the Court found that the district court erroneously relied on the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause in calculating Little’s offense level. The Court affirmed the convictions, but remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Little" on Justia Law

In June 2012, a hailstorm damaged Plaintiff KCOM’s motel. Soon a dispute arose between KCOM and its insurer, defendant Employers Mutual Casualty (EMC), over the extent of the damage. In October 2012, following receipt of an inspection report, KCOM submitted a proof of loss of $631,726.87. EMC admitted coverage but not the amount of loss. Dissatisfied, KCOM invoked the insurance contract’s appraisal provision. KCOM claimed there were issues with the appraisal process, prompting it to ultimately file suit against EMC, alleging breach of contract, unreasonable delay and denial of benefits, and bad faith breach of the insurance contract. The threshold question presented for the Tenth Circuit's review in this state law diversity action was whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s non-final order denying confirmation of a property loss appraisal. The Court concluded it did not, and dismissed the appeal. View "KCOM, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Ronald Maiteki appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his former employer, Marten Transport Ltd., on his claim that Marten violated the reinvestigation provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Marten had a duty under federal regulations to conduct background checks on drivers. It receives information from and provides information to HireRight, a consumer reporting agency (CRA) that publishes "Drive-A-Check" (DAC) reports on truck drivers’ driving records. When describing Maiteki's work record to HireRight after his employment ended, Marten used code 938, which stands for "Unsatisfactory Safety Record," meaning that the driver did not meet the company’s safety standards. Maiteki alleged that other companies declined to employ him after Marten’s information appeared on his DAC report. He disputed the information, telling HireRight that "Unsatisfactory Safety Record" was incorrect because he “has no accidents/incidents listed on the report.” Marten conducted an internal investigation, and stood by its report to HireRight regarding Maiteki's driving record. Maiteki sued, alleging, among other claims, that Marten’s reinvestigation was inadequate and the response was false. Marten moved for summary judgment on the FCRA claim, which the district court granted. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that Maiteki did not carry his burden to show that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Marten’s reinvestigation was unreasonable. The Court therefore found that the district court appropriately granted summary judgment to Marten on Maiteki's FCRA claim. View "Maiteki v. Marten Transport" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(F), which makes certain "service establishments" public accommodations for purposes of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Title III, in turn, generally prohibits public accommodations from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. Brent Levorsen suffered from various psychiatric disorders, including borderline schizophrenia. For years, Levorsen has donated plasma in exchange for money in an effort to supplement his limited income. And in May 2013, he attempted to do just that at a Salt Lake City branch of Octapharma Plasma, Inc. When an Octapharma employee learned that Levorsen suffers from borderline schizophrenia, the employee became concerned that Levorsen might have a schizophrenic episode while donating and dislodge the collecting needle, possibly injuring himself or someone else. The employee thus advised Levorsen that he was ineligible to donate plasma. Levorsen then provided Octapharma with a signed form from his psychiatrists, who both indicated that Levorsen is medically suitable to donate plasma twice a week. When Octapharma maintained its refusal to allow Levorsen to donate, he brought this action under Title III of the ADA. The district court concluded that plasma-donation centers (PDCs) aren’t service establishments because, unlike section 12181(7)(F)’s enumerated examples, PDCs don’t provide a service to the public in exchange for a fee. The Tenth Circuit found this "superficial distinction" irrelevant. Under the plain language of section 12181(7)(F), a PDC was a "'service establishment' for two exceedingly simple reasons: It’s an establishment. And it provides a service." Because the district court erred in concluding otherwise, and in dismissing the underlying action on that basis, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma" on Justia Law

Jason Merida, the former executive director of construction for the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (the Nation), was convicted after a fifteen-day jury trial on six counts of a seven-count indictment. The indictment alleged Merida conspired to receive cash and other remuneration from subcontractors performing work on construction projects for the Nation, embezzled in excess of $500,000 by submitting and approving false subcontractor invoices, and willfully failed to report income on his 2009 and 2010 federal tax returns. Merida testified in his own defense at trial and, on cross-examination, prosecutors impeached his testimony using the transcript of an interview the Nation’s attorneys had conducted with him as part of a separate civil lawsuit, before the initiation of these criminal proceedings. Merida objected to the use of the transcript and moved for mistrial, arguing the transcript was protected by the attorney-client privilege and its use prejudicially damaged his credibility with the jury. The district court denied his motion for a mistrial and the jury convicted Merida on all but one count. Merida timely appealed the trial judge’s denial of his motion for mistrial. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Merida" on Justia Law