Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in which they raised various claims relating to their arrests and now-vacated convictions for prostitution. The district court, with a magistrate judge presiding by consent of the parties, dismissed most of Plaintiffs’ claims as barred by the statute of limitations and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ surviving claims of malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs appealed only the grant of summary judgment on their malicious prosecution claims against one Defendant, David Young. Young was employed by the City of Albuquerque as a civilian fleet manager for the police department. He also served as a voluntary reserve officer for the police department. In separate incidents occurring in 2007 and 2008, Plaintiffs were each arrested by Young on charges of prostitution after a brief conversation in his unmarked vehicle. Young then filed criminal complaints and prosecuted misdemeanor prostitution cases against Plaintiffs in municipal court. Each Plaintiff pled guilty to the charges against her. In 2011, an attorney filed a petition for relief from judgment on behalf of Plaintiffs and nine other women who had pled guilty to prostitution after being arrested and prosecuted by Young, arguing he abused and misrepresented his position and authority as an agent of the City of Albuquerque when making the arrests. Instead of filing a response to the petition, the city entered into a stipulation with the petitioners agreeing that the requested relief should be granted. The state district court entered a set aside petitioners’ guilty pleas, vacating and dismissing with prejudice their judgments and sentences. Plaintiffs then filed this federal 1983 action in which they alleged, among other claims, that Young subjected them to malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. After dismissing Plaintiffs’ other claims as barred by the statute of limitations, the federal district court determined Young was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims because they had not met their burden of demonstrating that their criminal cases were terminated in a way that indicated their actual innocence of the charges against them. "Although we sympathize with Plaintiffs’ concerns about possible abuses of police power and authority, we are not persuaded that these concerns require (or permit) us to vary from our settled law on malicious prosecution." The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "M.G. v. Young" on Justia Law

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Appellant Ivan Bennett Willis was charged with aggravated sexual abuse committed in Indian country. Willis admitted he had sex with a seventeen-year-old acquaintance, K.M., and that the events occurred in Indian country. But Willis contended K.M. consented to the encounter. Thus, the only issue at trial was whether Willis used force against K.M. After a two-day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Willis appealed, challenging multiple evidentiary rulings by the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Robert Holloway of four counts of wire fraud and one count of tax fraud. The charges against Holloway were the result of a scheme he created through his company, US Ventures, that defrauded over 250 investors and caused losses in excess of $15 million. Holloway began soliciting investors in 2005 by guaranteeing incredible returns in futures markets due to a mathematical algorithm he had created. When Holloway failed to realize the gains he promised, he started defrauding his investors by stating that his trading was profitable even though he lost substantial amounts of money, using money from new investors to pay other investors, and fabricating reports to investors stating that his daily returns were between 0 to 1.15% and that his trading never resulted in a loss. He also diverted investor funds for his own personal use. The district court sentenced Holloway to 225 months of imprisonment on all five counts. On appeal, Holloway argued: (1) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice; (2) the district court allowed impermissible victim impact testimony; (3) denied him his constitutional right to confront witnesses; and (4) improperly enhanced his sentence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Holloway" on Justia Law

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Pro se plaintiffs-appellees Kent and Tonya Mayfield brought this action against Deputy Jim Bethards under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming he violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by entering their property without a warrant with the intention of killing their two pet dogs. In the Complaint, the Mayfields alleged a witness observed that although neither dog acted aggressively, both officers began firing on the dogs once on the Mayfields’ property. Deputy Clark fired on Suka, the Mayfields’ brown dog, but missed as she fled to the back of the house. Deputy Bethards shot Majka, the Mayfields’ white Malamute Husky, three times, killing her on the front porch. The deputies then unsuccessfully searched for Suka behind the house, where she had disappeared into a wooded section of the Mayfields’ property. The Complaint further alleged that upon returning to the front yard, the deputies first moved Majka’s body in an apparent attempt to obscure that she had been shot on the Mayfields’ property and then tried to hide her body in a row of trees. Deputy Bethards raised a qualified-immunity defense and moved to dismiss the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court denied his motion and Deputy Bethards appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Mayfield v. Bethards" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, shareholders of ZAGG Inc., a publicly held Nevada corporation, filed a shareholder-derivative action seeking damages, restitution, and other relief for ZAGG. They alleged that past and present officers and directors of ZAGG violated section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, breached their fiduciary duties to ZAGG, wasted corporate assets, and were unjustly enriched. The district court dismissed the suit on two alternative grounds: (1) Plaintiffs filed suit before presenting the ZAGG Board of Directors (the Board) with a demand to bring suit and they failed to adequately allege that such demand would have been futile; and (2) the complaint failed to state a claim. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal on both of the district court's alternative grounds. Because the Tenth Circuit denied the challenge to the first ground, it did not address the second. View "Pikk v. Pedersen" on Justia Law

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Bigler Jobe Stouffer was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first-degree murder and shooting with intent to kill. The jury sentenced him to death for the murder charge. After his direct appeal and state post-conviction proceedings were unsuccessful, Stouffer filed for habeas relief in federal court, alleging a juror had improperly communicated with her husband about the case during the penalty phase of trial. In the preceding case, the Tenth Circuit held the district court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Stouffer’s claim of jury tampering. The case was therefore remanded to the district court to conduct a hearing and rule on Stouffer’s claim. Based on evidence presented at a day-long evidentiary hearing, the district court determined Stouffer’s right to an impartial jury had not been violated and denied his habeas application. Stouffer appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Stouffer v. Duckworth" on Justia Law

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After the Hatch Chile Company sought to trademark the term “Hatch” for its exclusive use, a chile producing rival, El Encanto, objected. El Encanto argued before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB," a division of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)), El Encanto argued that “Hatch” can’t be trademarked both because it refers to a place and because Hatch Chile used the term in a misleading manner. To prove its case of deception, El Encanto sought to show that Hatch Chile’s products regularly include chiles that weren't even from the Hatch Valley. El Encanto sought documents from Hatch Chile's packers and suppliers over where the Hatch peppers came from. Hatch Chile responded with a motion for a protective order; the packer, Mizkan Americas, Inc., moved to quash El Encanto's subpoena. Hatch Chile and Mizkan argued that before documents could be subpoenaed, a deposition had to be held. Because El Encanto's subpoena failed to seek a deposition, Hatch Chile argued the order had to be quashed. El Encanto replied that it didn’t want to waste everyone’s time with a deposition: documents would suffice to answer its pretty simple question. The district court agreed and granted Mizkan's motion to quash. El Encanto appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed: "consistent with any of the various statutory interpretations and regulations cited to us, a party to a TTAB proceeding can obtain nonparty documents without wasting everyone’s time and money with a deposition no one really wants." View "El Encanto, Inc. v. Hatch Chile Company, Inc." on Justia Law

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At the heart of this appeal were The Boeing Company’s alleged violations of FAA regulations arising from aircraft Boeing sold or leased to the government. Three former employees of Boeing (referred to as relators) in this qui tam action, brought suit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Boeing and one of its suppliers, Ducommun, Inc. The relators claimed Boeing falsely certified that several aircraft it sold to the government complied with all applicable Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, even though it knew parts manufactured by Ducommun and incorporated into the aircraft didn’t conform to FAA-approved designs. The district court granted Boeing’s and Ducommun’s respective motions for summary judgment on the relators’ FCA claims, finding no genuine dispute of material fact as to the falsity, scienter, and materiality elements of those claims. The district court also denied the relators’ motion to strike two FAA investigative reports, which the court then relied on in granting the motions for summary judgment. The relators then appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court properly admitted the FAA reports under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the relators failed to establish the scienter element of their FCA claims. View "Smith v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law

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Pro se plaintiff-appellant LaTonya Davis brought this action against four Lakewood Police Department officers and the City of Lakewood (the “City”). She alleged that the officers used excessive force in arresting her for a misdemeanor offense. Police stopped Davis’ car, which had a license plate with a handicapped symbol, for driving with a suspended license. Officer Todd Clifford called for additional assistance; several police cars arrived and officers began pounding Davis’ car with their batons, demanding she exit the vehicle. Fearing for her safety, Davis asked the officers for assurances that they would not hurt her, and they responded by smashing her car window, pulling her through the broken window by her hair and arms, and throwing her on the glass-littered pavement. Davis claimed the City was culpable in failing to properly train and supervise the officers. She appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, which held the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that the City was not liable. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. Specifically, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to two of the officers, Clifford and Sergeant Todd Fahlsing. "If proven, their alleged use of force against a misdemeanant who did not pose an immediate threat to herself or others would be excessive under clearly established law." The Court affirmed as to all other defendants because Davis waived any challenge with respect to those defendants. View "Davis v. Clifford" on Justia Law

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Defendant Almundo Cruz Singer pleaded guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter in Indian country, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seventy-five months, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Singer’s offense of conviction stems from his involvement in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 9, 2014, in Church Rock. Marvin Ahasteen and his wife were walking from their Church Rock residence that day to eat lunch at the Fire Rock Casino, which is located on the north side of New Mexico State Highway 118. The couple jogged across the lanes of State Highway 118 and, as they did so, Mrs. Ahasteen "jogged in front of her husband" and "reached the [north] side of the highway." At that moment, Mrs. Ahasteen "heard her husband exclaim 'oh sh[it]' and turned to see him hit by a white car driving westbound” on State Highway 118. Mr. Ahasteen was decapitated as a result of the accident, his "left leg was dismembered at the proximal tibia and fibula," and his "body parts, blood and clothing were scattered over a distance of approximately 274 feet,” As a result of the force of impact, "all of [Mr. Ahasteen’s] clothes were removed, aside from his underwear that came down to his knees and his right sock." Singer appealed, challenging the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Singer" on Justia Law