Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Hiram Marceleno pleaded guilty to one count of reentry of a removed alien. In this direct appeal, Marceleno claimed the district court erred by denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial. View "United States v. Marceleno" on Justia Law

Kody Brown, Meri Brown, Janelle Brown, Christine Brown, and Robyn Sullivan (“the Browns”) form a “plural family.” Kody Brown is legally married to Meri Brown and “spiritually married” to the other three women, whom he calls “sister wives.” When the family became the subject of a TLC reality television show in 2010, the Lehi Police Department opened an investigation of the Browns for violating Utah’s bigamy statute, Utah Code Annotated section 76-7-101. The Browns then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in federal district court against the Governor and Attorney General of the State of Utah and the Utah County Attorney. Claiming the Statute infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Browns sought declaratory relief and a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of the Statute against them. The Tenth Circuit concluded after review of this matter that the district court erred by proceeding to the merits: "[f]ollowing adoption of the [Utah County Attorney’s Office] UCAO Policy, the Browns’ suit ceased to qualify as an Article III case or controversy. Their suit was moot before the district court awarded them relief, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to decide the Browns’ claims." View "Brown v. Buhman" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kyaw Myat Htun was a citizen of Burma who has lived in the United States for several years and sought asylum and other forms of relief that would allow him to remain in the country. The immigration judge (IJ) initially granted Htun’s asylum application but later reopened the removal proceedings and denied the application. Based on newly discovered evidence, the IJ concluded Htun lacked credibility and the circumstances did not warrant an exercise of discretion in favor of Htun’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s ruling and dismissed Htun’s appeal. Htun petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the BIA’s decision. Finding "substantial evidence supporting the BIA's decision that Mr. Htun is not eligible for withholding of removal," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Board's decision. View "Htun v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In the early morning of November 11, 2007, Sofia Roberts caused a motor-vehicle accident that killed five people (including herself) and severely injured two others. She was driving a Chrysler 300 that she had obtained from the Marc Heitz Auto Valley automobile dealership (Heitz) a few days earlier. The Chrysler had been delivered to Heitz by Bob Moore Auto Group (Moore) earlier that day. Her estate was sued by the estates of Brant Winton and Rebecca Burgess (two of the others killed in the accident) and two survivors, Daniel Cosar and Marcus Moore (collectively, the Victims). The suits were settled for $3,000,000 each for the survivors and the Winton estate and $5,000,000 for the Burgess estate. Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), the insurer on Roberts’s personal automobile-liability policy, contributed its policy limit of $50,000. The judgment limited execution to other applicable insurance policies. Three insurance carriers (for the Heitz or Moore dealerships), Universal Underwriters Insurance Company (Universal), Phoenix Insurance Company (Phoenix), and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (National) (collectively, the Insurers), then sued the Victims at a federal district court in Oklahoma under diversity jurisdiction, seeking declaratory judgments that their policies did not cover Roberts for the accident. The district court granted summary judgment to the Insurers. The Victims appealed, arguing Heitz still owned the Chrysler at the time of the accident and that Universal is therefore responsible under the “garage” and “umbrella” coverages of its policy for Heitz. Alternatively, the Victims argued that Moore owned the vehicle at the time of the accident and that Phoenix and National were liable under their policies for Moore. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed the district court’s judgments. View "Universal Underwriters Ins Co. v. Winton" on Justia Law

In 2015, two men were distributing pamphlets on the plaza outside the Courthouse (Plaza). The pamphlets contained information about "jury nullification." Both men were arrested and charged with jury tampering in violation of Colorado law. Plaintiffs, like the men who were arrested, wanted to distribute literature relating to and advocating for jury nullification to individuals approaching the Courthouse who might be prospective jurors. Fearing they too would be subject to arrest, Plaintiffs brought suit against the City and County of Denver and Robert White, Denver’s police chief, to establish their First Amendment right to engage in this activity. On the same day they filed suit, Plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to restrain Defendants from taking action to prevent Plaintiffs from distributing jury nullification literature on the Plaza. This case was an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction, enjoining in part the enforcement of an administrative order (Order) issued by Defendant-Appellant Judge Michael Martinez, acting in his official capacity as Chief Judge of the Second Judicial District of Colorado. The Order prohibited all expressive activities within an area immediately surrounding the Courthouse. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court enjoined enforcement of a portion of the Order as against Plaintiffs. The Judicial District appealed. "[T]he government’s power to control speech in a traditional public forum is circumscribed precisely because the public has, through the extent and nature of its use of these types of government property, acquired, in effect, a 'speech easement' that the government property owner must now honor." Based on the arguments made and evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing, the Tenth Circuit held the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion in part. View "Verlo v. Martinez" on Justia Law

This case spanned 140 years of land surveys and transfers. Pertinent to this matter, in 1907, federal lands within "Section 33" (a portion of the land at issue here) were made part of the San Juan National Forest. In 1925, the BLM issued an oil and gas permit in "Lot 6" of that section. The BLM later issued oil and gas permits for Lot 6 in 1964 and 1977. From 1893 until 1951, each time the property described in the "Overocker patent" was conveyed, the deeds used the original land description ("aliquot," dating back to the 1880s): the “south half of the north-east quarter and the north half of the south-east quarter of section thirty three” of Township 36. In 1951, James and Lois Heidelberg conveyed the Overocker land to Angelo Dallabetta by warranty deed with the same aliquot description. In 1967, Dallabetta conveyed the land to defendant-appellant Laverne St. Clair and his first wife by warranty deed, which described the land by metes and bounds. In 1976, St. Clair conveyed the property to himself and his second wife by warranty deed using the metes and bounds description (Mr. St. Clair passed away in late 2015; his estate was named a party to this action). In 1984, St. Clair purchased land from Dallabetta’s estate that was not included in the Overocker patent description. The First National Bank represented Dallabetta’s estate in the transaction. In conveying the land, the First National Bank also agreed to include a quit claim deed to Lot 6. In 2000, Forest Service personnel discovered road construction, fence posts, brush hogging, and vegetation clearance in Lot 6. In 2011, the Government sued Mr. St. Clair for trespass on Lot 6. The complaint requested that he be ejected and pay for the damage he caused by constructing a road and making the other alterations to Lot 6 land. Following a bench trial, the district court held St. Clair liable for trespass, ordered him ejected, and imposed damages for alterations he had made upon the land. St. Clair appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. St. Clair" on Justia Law

In 1998, Cameron Jones was convicted of interference with commerce by threat or violence, and of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. In 2007, he was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and sentenced to 71 months in prison and five years of supervised release. The court also ordered the prison sentence to run consecutively to the 24-month term of incarceration imposed as a result of the revocation of supervised release in the 1998 case. In 2014, Jones was released from prison and began serving his five-year term of supervised release for the 2007 conviction. Approximately one month after his release, a member of the Rolling 60s Crips gang was murdered. Two days after the murder, the United States Probation Office filed a petition to revoke Jones’s supervised release, alleging Jones violated three conditions of his probation. The petition asserted Jones violated these conditions by murder, possessing a firearm, and associating with the victim, a convicted felon. The district court revoked Jones’s supervised release. It relied on hearsay evidence from the Government’s only witness at the revocation hearing. On appeal, Jones argued: (1) Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) required the district court to apply a balancing test to determine whether hearsay evidence may be considered for revocation; (2) the district court abused its discretion because it did not apply the Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing test; and (3) this error was reversible. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Jones and reversed and remanded to the district court for a new revocation hearing. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Jerry Perea died in 2011 after an incident involving Officers David Baca and Andrew Jaramillo. Merlinda Perea called 911 and told the operator that her son, Perea, was on “very bad drugs” and that she was afraid of what he might do. Baca and Jaramillo were sent to perform a welfare check. The officers were informed that they were responding to a verbal fight and that no weapons were involved. They were also informed that Perea suffered from mental illness and may have been on drugs. The officers located Perea pedaling his bicycle. The officers used their patrol cars to force Perea to pedal into a parking lot. Jaramillo left his vehicle to pursue Perea on foot. After a brief chase, Jaramillo pushed Perea off his bicycle. The officers did not tell Perea why they were following him or why he was being seized, and they never asked Perea to halt or stop. After pushing Perea off his bicycle, Jaramillo reached for Perea’s hands in an attempt to detain him. Perea struggled and thrashed while holding a crucifix. After Perea began to struggle, Baca told Jaramillo to use his taser against Perea. The district court denied Baca and Jaramillo qualified immunity against a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, and they appealed. After reviewing the district court record in this matter, the Tenth Circuit held that the officers’ repeated tasering of Perea after he was subdued constituted excessive force, and that it was clearly established at the time of the taserings that such conduct was unconstitutional. The Court affirmed the denial of the officers request for qualified immunity. View "Perea v. Baca" on Justia Law

Defendant Eric Alexander was convicted by a jury of one count of failing to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). It was undisputed that Alexander was a sex offender as defined by federal law. After being paroled, Alexander registered as a sex offender in the City of Santa Ana, California. In doing so, Alexander did not list a fixed address and instead registered as a transient. Though registering as a transient required Alexander to “re-register every [thirty] days,” it was undisputed that Alexander failed to do so. In April 2013, Alexander “violated the conditions of his parole by absconding from parole supervision, having access to a firearm, [providing] false identification to a police officer, and [having] access to ammunition or [a] firearm.” Later that year, Alexander traveled by bus to Las Cruces, New Mexico. Cynthia Williams picked up Alexander from the bus station and took him to her apartment. According to Williams, Alexander arrived in Las Cruces with only a backpack of clothing and personal items. Leticia Bullard, Williams’ sister, lived in the same apartment complex and encountered Alexander several times during the time he was staying at Williams’ apartment. On approximately September 17, 2013, Bullard learned about Alexander’s status as a sex offender. She then contacted a law enforcement officer. That in turn led to officers from the United States Marshals Service arresting Alexander at Williams’ apartment complex on September 23, 2013, for parole violations. On January 3, 2014, a criminal complaint was filed against Alexander in federal district court in New Mexico charging him with one count of failing to register under SORNA. Alexander appealed his SORNA conviction, arguing court error in instructing the jury. The Tenth Circuit agreed that there was an erroneous and prejudicial jury instruction given at Alexander's trial. The conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Amber Lompe was exposed to high levels of carbon monoxide (CO) from a malfunctioning furnace in her apartment at the Sunridge Apartments in Casper, Wyoming. Plaintiff brought a diversity action in the Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming against Sunridge Partners LLC (Sunridge) and Apartment Management Consultants, L.L.C. (AMC), the owner and the property manager. The jury found both Defendants liable for negligence and awarded plaintiff compensatory damages totaling $3,000,000 and punitive damages totaling $25,500,000, of which the jury apportioned $3,000,000 against Sunridge and $22,500,000 against AMC. Defendants challenged the jury’s award of punitive damages, arguing the district court erred in failing to grant their motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) as to punitive damages. Alternatively, they contended the district court’s jury instructions on punitive damages were erroneous and the amount of punitive damages awarded against each Defendant was excessive under common law and constitutional standards. After review, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was insufficient to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury as to Sunridge, and the amount of punitive damages awarded against AMC was grossly excessive and arbitrary in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court vacated the award of punitive damages against Sunridge and reduce the punitive damages awarded against AMC from $22,500,000 to $1,950,000. View "Lompe v. Sunridge Partners LLC" on Justia Law