Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A marketing and e-commerce company based in Nevada provided services for the Kanye 2020 presidential campaign at the request of a group of Arizona-based political consultants (the Lincoln defendants). The company began work without a written contract, relying on assurances that terms would be formalized later. It created campaign materials, built a website, and managed digital operations, but was never paid for its work. The company sued Kanye 2020 and the Lincoln defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.The District of Wyoming found it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Lincoln defendants and transferred those claims to the District of Arizona under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, citing concerns about potential statute of limitations issues. The court dismissed the claims against Kanye 2020 for failure to state a claim, but did so without prejudice. Kanye 2020 moved for reconsideration, seeking dismissal with prejudice, but the Wyoming court declined, stating it no longer had jurisdiction after the transfer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory transfer order. The court affirmed the dismissal of the contract claims against Kanye 2020, finding the complaint failed to plausibly allege the existence of an oral or implied contract or unjust enrichment, as there were insufficient communications or notice to Kanye 2020 regarding payment expectations. However, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to consider Kanye 2020’s motion for reconsideration. The case was remanded for the district court to determine whether the dismissal of the claims against Kanye 2020 should be with prejudice. View "SeedX v. Lincoln Strategy" on Justia Law

Paul D. Russell, a civilian employee at the Irwin Army Community Hospital in Fort Riley, Kansas, alleged that his female supervisor, Major Tamara Tran, discriminated against him and other male employees, creating a hostile work environment based on gender. Russell cited several incidents, including gender-segregated meetings, differential treatment in access to the supervisor, public criticism, changes to his job title, exclusion from leadership communications, and an attempt to appoint a less qualified female employee as acting chief during Tran’s maternity leave. An internal Army investigation found that Tran had discriminated on the basis of gender, violating Army policy, but cleared Russell of any wrongdoing.After exhausting administrative remedies, Russell filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, claiming a violation of Title VII due to a hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Army, finding that Tran’s actions, while motivated by gender bias, were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to meet the legal standard for a hostile work environment under Title VII. The court noted that the internal investigation’s findings did not address the required severity or pervasiveness analysis.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Russell argued that the district court applied an overly stringent standard in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, but the Tenth Circuit held that Muldrow did not alter the established requirement that hostile work environment claims must show conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive. The Tenth Circuit also found that Russell had waived his argument regarding the weight of the internal investigation report. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the severity or pervasiveness standard remains controlling for hostile work environment claims under Title VII. View "Russell v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

While serving a federal sentence in Bureau of Prisons custody, the defendant was temporarily housed at a federal facility in Oklahoma. There, he used a distress alarm to summon a correctional officer and, when the officer arrived, exposed himself and masturbated in view of the officer through his cell door window. This was not the first such incident; the defendant had previously been disciplined for similar acts of public masturbation on four occasions at another federal prison. The government charged him with indecent exposure under Oklahoma law, assimilated through federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma presided over the case. Before trial, the government sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior acts, including disciplinary logs and incident reports, to show intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake. The district court conducted the required analysis and admitted the logs and incident reports under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and after balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. The first trial ended in a mistrial, but at retrial, the evidence was again admitted, and the jury convicted the defendant. The district court sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant challenged the admission of the prior-acts evidence and the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant had waived his argument under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and forfeited his argument under Rule 803(6), and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence under Rule 403. The court also found no plain error in admitting the evidence as business records and concluded that the district court properly applied the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Bartlesville, Oklahoma police officers responded to a domestic disturbance call at the home of Willis Gay Jr., who reported his son Thomas Gay was behaving erratically and possibly under the influence of drugs. Willis informed the officers that Thomas was unarmed but had made furtive movements toward his back pocket. Upon entering the home, the officers observed Thomas holding an innocuous object and appearing disoriented. Officer Lewis immediately pointed his Taser at Thomas and, after a single command, tased him. Officer Pitts drew her firearm. Thomas retreated into a bedroom, where Officer Lewis tased him again, but the Taser failed to incapacitate him. A brief struggle ensued, and as Thomas moved toward the bedroom door, making a motion toward his back pocket, Officer Pitts shot him twice, resulting in his death within minutes of the officers’ arrival.The Estate of Thomas Gay sued the officers in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied the motion, finding that disputed facts could allow a reasonable jury to conclude the officers violated Thomas’s clearly established constitutional rights. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Thomas was unarmed and not holding any object when shot, and that the officers’ actions were not objectively reasonable.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the district court’s factual determinations, as the record did not blatantly contradict those findings and no legal error was committed. The court further held that, under clearly established law, the officers’ use of force was objectively unreasonable, precluding qualified immunity. View "Burke v. Pitts" on Justia Law

Late one night in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Jason Roybal led police officers on a low-speed chase in a stolen car. After stopping, Roybal leaned out of his vehicle and fired a BB gun at the officers. The officers responded by firing their guns. Roybal then exited his car, dropped the BB gun, and fled on foot toward a civilian-occupied vehicle. The officers shot and killed Roybal as he was running away. The personal representative of Roybal’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, specifically claiming that Roybal was unarmed and fleeing when he was shot.The case was initially filed in New Mexico state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting qualified immunity and arguing that the complaint omitted key facts, such as Roybal firing a BB gun and running toward an occupied car. They also asked the district court to consider dash- and body-camera footage. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that it could not consider the videos at this stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly refused to consider the video evidence at the motion-to-dismiss stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a violation of Roybal’s clearly established right to be free from excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the officers’ conduct was not justified by the circumstances described, and the right at issue was clearly established by precedent. View "Fuqua v. Santa Fe County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after years of being teased and picked on by his housemates, fatally stabbed one of them during a night of drinking and verbal taunting. The defendant, a member of the Choctaw Nation, lived with several relatives in Oklahoma. On the night in question, the group engaged in typical banter and name-calling, with the victim and another housemate calling the defendant derogatory names, including in the Choctaw language. After retreating to his room, the defendant emerged with a knife, confronted the victim, and, following a struggle, stabbed him multiple times, resulting in the victim’s death. The defendant admitted to the stabbing during a 9-1-1 call, expressing remorse and attributing his actions to the ongoing verbal abuse.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The defendant did not dispute that he killed the victim but argued that he acted in the heat of passion, seeking a conviction for voluntary manslaughter rather than first-degree murder. The district court, over the government’s objection, instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. At the government’s request, and over the defendant’s objection, the court also instructed the jury that “words alone” cannot negate malice aforethought and create heat of passion. The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the “words alone” instruction was legally correct and whether it improperly affected the jury’s deliberations. The court held that the instruction accurately reflected longstanding legal principles: mere words, no matter how aggravating or insulting, are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute adequate provocation for heat of passion manslaughter under federal law. The court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Sockey" on Justia Law

Mary Timmins worked as general counsel and litigation counsel for the Green Mountain Water and Sanitation District in Colorado. During her employment, she discovered that certain members of the District’s Board were engaging in conduct she believed to be corrupt and potentially unlawful, including violating open meetings laws, improperly communicating with a state-employed attorney, and destroying public records relevant to ongoing litigation. After repeatedly warning the Board internally without effect, Timmins disclosed her concerns to reporters and private citizens, alleging that the Board members were acting against the interests of the District and its residents. She was subsequently terminated from her position.Timmins filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the District and three Board members, asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation. The district court dismissed her claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that her speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it was made pursuant to her official duties as a public employee. The court reasoned that her statements to the press and private citizens were essentially identical to those made in her official capacity and stemmed from her work responsibilities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that Timmins’s speech to reporters and private citizens was not made pursuant to her official duties, as her job did not ordinarily require her to make such disclosures outside the chain of command. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Timmins’s amended complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, declining to address alternative grounds for affirmance at this stage. View "Timmins v. Plotkin" on Justia Law

Eva Daley, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States as a child without inspection. As an adult, she was convicted of second-degree murder in California, but that conviction was later vacated and replaced with a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. After serving nearly fifteen years in prison, Daley was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) upon her release and transferred to a facility in Colorado. She applied for asylum and related relief, but after over a year in detention without a bond hearing, she filed a habeas corpus petition challenging her continued detention.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted Daley’s habeas petition, ordering the government to provide her with an individualized bond hearing. Following the court’s order, an immigration judge held a bond hearing and released Daley on bond after 450 days in ICE custody. Daley then moved for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and the district court awarded her $18,553.92 in fees. The government appealed the fee award, arguing that the EAJA does not authorize fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s fee award de novo, focusing solely on statutory interpretation of the EAJA. The Tenth Circuit held that habeas actions challenging immigration detention are “civil actions” within the meaning of the EAJA, based on common law history, judicial precedent, and statutory text. The court concluded that the EAJA unambiguously authorizes attorneys’ fees in such cases and affirmed the district court’s award of fees to Daley. View "Daley v. Choate" on Justia Law

Custodia Bank, a Wyoming-chartered, nonmember bank with a business model focused on digital assets, applied for a master account with the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (FRBKC). Although FRBKC acknowledged Custodia’s statutory eligibility for such an account, it ultimately denied the application, citing concerns that Custodia’s crypto-focused operations posed undue risk to the Federal Reserve’s payment systems. Custodia then filed suit against both FRBKC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, arguing that federal law required the Federal Reserve to grant master account access to all eligible institutions, regardless of risk.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming initially allowed Custodia’s statutory entitlement claims to proceed, while dismissing constitutional claims. After FRBKC formally denied Custodia’s application, Custodia amended its complaint to focus on statutory entitlement under the Monetary Control Act and related statutes. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the relevant statutes did not create a nondiscretionary duty to grant master accounts to all eligible applicants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that the plain language of the Federal Reserve Act and the Monetary Control Act grants Federal Reserve Banks discretion to approve or deny master account applications from eligible entities. The court found that neither the statutes nor subsequent amendments mandated automatic access for all qualifying institutions. The court also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Custodia’s claims against the Board for lack of final agency action. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. View "Custodia Bank v. Federal Reserve Board of Governors" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers in New Mexico were conducting surveillance at a motel to apprehend a fugitive when they observed the defendant, who was not the original target, and another man exit the building. The other man carried a bag with the barrel of a rifle protruding, which he placed in the back seat of an SUV. The defendant was seen cleaning the SUV and, according to an officer’s testimony, picked up and repositioned the rifle. Later, the defendant was arrested at a convenience store while carrying a backpack, which, upon search, was found to contain two loaded handguns. A subsequent search of the SUV, conducted with a warrant, uncovered the rifle and ammunition.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that the officers had probable cause for the warrantless arrest based on the officer’s credible testimony. At trial, the court gave an investigative-techniques jury instruction over the defendant’s objection, and the jury found the defendant guilty on both counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition. The defendant appealed, challenging the denial of the suppression motion, the sufficiency of the evidence for one count, the propriety of the jury instruction, and, for the first time in his reply brief, the search of the backpack.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in crediting the officer’s testimony and that there was probable cause for the arrest. The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find actual or constructive possession and knowledge of the firearm. The court also found no plain error in the jury instructions and declined to consider the new suppression argument regarding the backpack, as it was raised for the first time in the reply brief. View "United States v. Eddings" on Justia Law