Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Keith Courtney was convicted by jury of three counts of wire fraud, for which he received a 24-month prison sentence followed by three years’ supervised release and ordered to forfeit $1,601,825.84, the full value of the fraudulent wire transfers at issue in the underlying case. In addition, the court imposed $493,230.88 in restitution. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) the forfeiture order must be reduced by the amount the lenders received from the properties through mortgage payments and the sale of the properties; and (2) he should have been allowed to inform the jury of the possible sentence and its power to acquit him if they believed the conviction would be unjust. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with defendant on his first contention and reversed, and affirmed on the second. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Courtney" on Justia Law

Ashley Stephens, an agent with the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, received several tips that defendant-appellant Ralph Carloss, a previously convicted felon, was unlawfully in possession of a firearm, possibly a machine gun, and was selling methamphetamine. In order to investigate these tips, Agent Stephens, along with Tahlequah, Oklahoma police investigator Elden Graves, went one afternoon to the home where Carloss was staying to talk with him. There was no evidence of any fence or other enclosure around the house or yard, but there were several “No Trespassing” signs placed in the yard and on the front door. Specifically there was a “No Trespassing” sign on an approximately three-foot-high wooden post located beside the driveway, on the side farthest from the house, and another sign tacked to a tree in the side yard, both stating “Private Property No Trespassing.” In this direct criminal appeal, Carloss contended that the two police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by knocking on his front door seeking to speak with him. Ordinarily a police officer, like any citizen, has an implied license to approach a home, knock on the front door, and ask to speak with the occupants. Carloss, however, claimed that “No Trespassing” signs posted around the house and on the front door of his home revoked that implied license. After review of this matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded, to the contrary, that under the circumstances presented here, those “No Trespassing” signs would not have conveyed to an objective officer that he could not approach the house and knock on the front door seeking to have a consensual conversation with the occupants. "Nor did the officers exceed the implied license to knock on the front door by knocking too long." The Court also upheld the district court’s factual finding that Carloss voluntarily consented to the officers entering the house. Therefore, the district court’s decision to deny Carloss’ motion to suppress evidence that the officers discovered as a result of their consensual interaction with Carloss after he responded to their knocking, was affirmed. View "United States v. Carloss" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Humberto Llantada pleaded guilty to charges arising from a drug conspiracy in 2014. The district court sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment, followed by terms of supervised release ranging from one to five years, and imposed a number of special conditions that would apply when he was released. He challenged those conditions on vagueness grounds. He also challenged the district court’s refusal to award him a sentence reduction because of his relatively minor role in the conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence and conditions: "Our decision in 'United States v. Munoz,( ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 502863 (10th Cir. 2016)) resolves most of the challenges to the special conditions imposed in this case. […] The conditions of supervised release imposed here are sufficiently clear to inform a parolee of what conduct will result in a return to prison." View "United States v. Llantada" on Justia Law

Three Albuquerque Police Department officers shot plaintiff-appellant Stephan Cordova after he raised a gun in their direction. Cordova survived and was charged with assault, although the charges were later dismissed on speedy trial grounds. Cordova then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming primarily: (1) that the charges of assault were brought in bad faith; (2) that the police unreasonably prevented interaction with his family when he was in a hospital recovering from his wounds; and (3) the police used excessive force by firing on him without an adequate warning. The district court allowed only the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims to go to trial, where a jury returned a verdict for the officers. The Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court’s conclusions. View "Cordova v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

Sierra Club brought a citizen suit seeking civil penalties against Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company “(OG&E)” for alleged violations of the Clean Air Act. Sierra Club claimed that in March and April 2008, OG&E, the owner and operator of a coal-fired power plant in Muskogee, modified a boiler at the plant without first obtaining an emission-regulating permit as required under the Act. Because Sierra Club filed its action more than five years after construction began on the plant, the district court dismissed its claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on statute of limitations grounds. The court also dismissed Sierra Club’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because these remedies were predicated on the unavailable claim for civil penalties. Finding no error in the district court's conclusions, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Sierra Club v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

In early 2010, when Christopher Cain was driving the BNSF Railway Company pickup truck back, he rear-ended a produce truck stopped at a red light. Cain said that the brakes failed and he couldn't avoid hitting the other truck. Cain filled out, signed, and filed BNSF’s Employee Personal Injury/Occupational Illness Report (Report), identifying as his injuries a skinned knuckle and a bruised knee. Cain never sought medical treatment for those injuries. So that it could comply with its requirements under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (Act), BNSF required its injured employees to complete this report and to notify their supervisors of any treatment received for work-related injuries. During BNSF’s subsequent investigation of the accident, Cain claimed that he had been in shock when he filled out the Report and had no memory of doing so. Cain said that chest pains worsened after the accident. Cain eventually sought medical treatment, and was later diagnosed with a rib fracture and excess fluid surrounding his lungs. Cain called the supervisor to tell him that Cain needed the next two work days off to have excess fluid drained from Cain’s lungs. The supervisor asked Cain if this medical condition related to the accident and noted later that “Cain was adamant that this had nothing to do with his on duty automobile accident.” A few months later, Cain filed an updated Report with BNSF about his January accident. As part of his doing so,his supervisors who discouraged him from filing the updated Report, noting that he was told that filing the updated Report “wasn’t going to go well for [Cain].” BNSF ultimately suspended Cain for 30 days, and later put him on probation for three years. Six days after issuing its suspension, BNSF terminated Cain's employment. In November 2010, after Cain’s union unsuccessfully sought back wages under the collective-bargaining agreement, Cain filed a complaint under FRSA with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). BNSF Railway petitioned for review of the Administrative Review Board’s decisions: (1) affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) finding that BNSF violated the FRSA when it fired Cain; and (2) the ALJ’s imposing punitive damages for the violation. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s and the Board’s holding that Cain met his prima facie case and that BNSF failed to counter this with clear and convincing evidence that it would have fired Cain had it known of his delayed reporting before he filed his updated Report. In view of the ALJ’s findings of fact and credibility, the Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to award punitive damages. The Court reversed the actual award, however, and remanded for the Board to provide a reasoned explanation for the punitive damages it awarded, and then to evaluate that award under "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.," (463 U.S. 29 (1983)). View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Administrative Review Bd." on Justia Law

Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams appealed a district court order enjoining him from enforcing Colorado's issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements against the Coalition for Secular Government (Coalition), a nonprofit corporation that was planning to advocate against a statewide ballot initiative in the 2014 general election. Under Colorado law, the Coalition's activities triggered various issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements. Once a person or group of persons qualified as an issue committee under this definition, a substantial set of registration and disclosure requirements apply. Since 2008, the Coalition has either registered or considered registering as an issue committee in four general elections: 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. As the 2012 election neared, the Coalition filed in federal district court a declaratory-judgment suit against Scott Gessler, the then-Colorado Secretary of State. Among other relief, the Coalition requested the court to declare that the Coalition's "expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration as an issue committee." Because a certain constitutional amendment (the "personhood amendment") failed to qualify for the general-election ballot, the Coalition had neither registered as an issue committee nor published an updated policy paper. After the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause," (327 P.3d 232 (Colo. 2014)), the Coalition renewed its preliminary-injunction motion in federal district court. By then, the personhood amendment had qualified for the 2014 general-election ballot, and Dr. Diana Hsieh (Coalition founder) and her co-author again wanted to update and expand the policy paper urging readers to vote "no" on the latest iteration of the personhood ballot initiative. The district court consolidated the hearing on the preliminary-injunction motion with a hearing on the merits of the case. As Dr. Hsieh testified at the hearing, the Coalition planned to raise about $1,500 in 2014 to fund the policy paper but still opposed registering as an issue committee. By October 3, 2014, the day of the preliminary-injunction hearing, the Coalition had already received pledges totaling about $2,000. On October 10, 2014, the district court "ORDERED and DECLARED that [the Coalition]'s expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration or disclosure as an 'issue committee' and the Secretary is ENJOINED from enforcing" Colorado's disclosure requirements against the Coalition. The Secretary appealed the district court's order granting the Coalition declaratory and injunctive relief, presenting as grounds for appeal: (1) whether Colorado's $200 threshold for issue-committee registration and reporting violated the First Amendment; and (2) could Colorado require issue-committee registration and disclosure for a group that raises and spends $3,500 to influence an election on a statewide ballot initiative? The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado's issue-committee regulatory framework was unconstitutional as applied to the Coalition. Therefore it did not address the facial validity of the $200 threshold. View "Coalition for Secular Govt v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Diana Schaffer appealed a district court order granting summary judgment on her 42 U.S.C. 1983 malicious prosecution claims in favor of Defendants-Appellants Ashley Hollingshead, B. Gail Cameron, and Salt Lake City Corp. (“the City”). Schaffer argued that Hollingshead and Cameron, two City parking enforcement officers, falsely reported to the police that Schaffer hit them with her truck after they issued her a parking ticket. The two elements of a Section 1983 claim were: (1) deprivation of a federally protected right by (2) an actor acting under color of state law. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the parking enforcement officers did not act under color of state law in reporting the parking incident to the police. View "Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner Fabian Rangel-Perez challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) characterization of his Utah misdemeanor conviction as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The BIA concluded that Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction for unlawful sexual activity with a minor fell within the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies that includes “sexual abuse of a minor” offenses. Rangel-Perez argued that his prior Utah conviction is not an “aggravated felony” under the INA because the INA’s generic “sexual abuse of a minor” offense required proof of both mens rea and a four-year age differential between the victim and the perpetrator, yet neither was an element of the Utah statute under which he was convicted. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Rangel-Perez that the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies for “sexual abuse of a minor” included only offenses that require proof of at least a “knowing” mens rea or scienter. Therefore, Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction was not a “sexual abuse of a minor” offense under the INA. Thus, the Court reversed the BIA’s decision to treat Rangel-Perez’s prior conviction as an “aggravated felony” and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Rangel-Perez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Smith was convicted by jury on eight counts of distributing child pornography and one count of possessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment. Defendant raised two grounds for appeal: (1) that the eight counts of distribution were multiplicitous, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on double jeopardy; and (2) the district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) at sentencing when it adopted the presentence-report (PSR) account of his pending child-rape charge over his pro se objection without making a finding based on the preponderance of the evidence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: Defendant did not raise the double-jeopardy issue below and he has not shown plain error; and the district court’s refusal to address a pro se objection by a defendant represented by counsel was not an abuse of discretion and, in any event, was harmless. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law