Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiff-appellant Phillip Mocek was arrested for concealing his identity after filming airport security procedures and being questioned on suspicion of disorderly conduct. He then sued agents of the Transportation Security Administration, officers of the Albuquerque Aviation Police Department, and the City of Albuquerque for alleged constitutional violations. He asserted that he was arrested without probable cause and in retaliation for protected speech. He further contended that the officers and City abused process under New Mexico law. The district court dismissed each of his claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Furthermore, it was not clearly established that a plaintiff could maintain a retaliatory arrest claim for an arrest arguably supported by probable cause. Mocek also failed to state claims for malicious abuse of process or municipal liability. View "Mocek v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

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In 2013, a grand jury charged Defendant Christopher Craig with three separate counts as part of a twenty-seven-count indictment containing nine other codefendants. The first count charged Defendant with conspiring to: manufacture, possess with intent to distribute, and distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana; and maintain a drug involved premises. The other two counts charged Defendant with using a communication facility to commit this conspiracy. After Defendant pleaded guilty to these charges, the district court at sentencing calculated his total offense level as 43 after applying a murder cross-reference under United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) section 2D1.1(d), a leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 3B1.1(a), and an obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 3C1.1. Combined with his category III criminal history, this corresponded to a sentence of life imprisonment for the conspiracy count and 48 months’ imprisonment for the two communications facility counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in applying these enhancements and imposing the life sentence on him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "United States v. Craig" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-appellant Shawron Lounds appealed a district court's order granting summary judgment to her former employer Lincare, Inc. on her claims of a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lounds began working at that office as a customer-service representative in September 2011. She is African-American and, throughout the duration of her employment with Lincare, was the Wichita office’s only African-American employee. The record reflects Lounds recounting specific discussions with her co-workers and direct supervisors that Lounds alleged were racially and culturally insensitive, to the extent that she felt "bombarded" by them. Lounds notified her human resources department. Twenty days after she sent notice of her grievances to HR, she was disciplined for "excessive absenteeism." Lounds believed the discipline was in retaliation for her complaints regarding her co-workers. She would ultimately be fired a little over a year after she was hired. Lincare cited absenteeism as its grounds for termination. After the close of discovery and a full round of briefing, the district court granted summary judgment to Lincare. The court first determined that no reasonable jury could have found the alleged race-based harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain a hostile work environment claim under section 1981. It then opined, concerning the retaliation claim that “the alleged retaliatory actions against [Ms. Lounds] either were not ‘materially adverse’ or were not caused by [her] protected activity.” The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, finding Lounds carried her burden on summary judgment to create a jury question relating to whether the alleged harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe. Further, the Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the hostile work environment claim. The Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the retaliation issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lounds v. Lincare" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Cristian Eduardo Obregon de Leon (“Obregon”), native of Guatemala and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted under Oklahoma law of various offenses, including possession of stolen vehicles and receipt of stolen property. He was subsequently placed into removal proceedings and deemed removable for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found that he was statutorily ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) because he had previously adjusted to lawful permanent residence status. Obregon challenged both of these determinations in his petition for review of the BIA’s decision. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Board’s determination that Obregon was removable because his conviction for possession of stolen vehicles constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. However, Obregon was statutorily eligible to apply for a discretionary waiver under section 1182(h). The case was remanded back to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Obregon de Leon v. Holder" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Plaintiffs Delbert Soseeah, Maxine Soseeah and John Borrego filed this action against defendants Sentry Insurance, Dairyland Insurance Company, Peak Property and Casualty Insurance Company, and Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin (collectively Sentry) claiming, in part, that Sentry failed to timely and properly notify them and other Sentry automobile insurance policyholders of the impact of two New Mexico Supreme Court decisions regarding the availability of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage under their respective policies. The complaint alleged that Delbert Soseeah, after being injured in a motor vehicle accident, made a claim for UM/UIM benefits under two policies of automobile insurance issued by Sentry to Mrs. Soseeah. According to the complaint, Mrs. Soseeah “never executed a valid waiver of UM/UIM coverage under the” two policies and, consequently, Mr. Soseeah “demanded that . . . Sentry reform” the two policies “to provide stacked uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage limits equal to the limits of the liability coverage on each of the vehicles covered by the” policies pursuant to the two New Mexico Supreme Court decisions. Sentry purportedly refused to reform the policies and rejected Mr. Soseeah’s claim for UM/UIM benefits. The complaint alleged that Sentry, by doing so, violated New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act (UPA), violated a portion of New Mexico’s Insurance Code known as the Trade Practices and Frauds Act (TPFA), breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breached the terms of the two policies. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Sentry subsequently sought and was granted permission to appeal the district court’s class certification ruling. Because plaintiffs failed to establish that all members of the general certified class suffered the common injury required by Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the general class. Because the district court’s certification ruling did not expressly address the Rule 23 factors as they applied to each of the identified subclasses, the Court did not have enough information to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in certifying two subclasses. Consequently, the Court directed the district court on remand to address these issues. View "Soseeah v. Sentry Insurance" on Justia Law

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Petitioners Neil and Andrea Feinberg and Kelly McDonald run Total Health Concepts (THC), a Colorado marijuana dispensary. Colorado has legalized the sale of marijuana, but this permissible use runs in defiance of federal criminal law. Officials at the IRS have refused to recognize business expense deductions claimed by companies like THC on the ground that their conduct violates federal criminal drug laws. Petitioners have challenged the IRS’s policy after the agency disallowed their business expense deductions. Among other things, petitioners argued that the agency lacked authority to determine whether THC trafficked in an unlawful substance and, as a result, they suggested that their deductions should have been allowed like those of any other business. As the litigation progressed, the IRS issued discovery requests asking the petitioners about the nature of their business. Petitioners resisted these requests, asserting that their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination relieved them of the duty to respond. The IRS responded to petitioners’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment by moving to compel production of the discovery it sought. Ultimately, the tax court sided with the IRS and ordered petitioners to produce the discovery the agency demanded. Because the tax court proceedings were still ongoing and no final order existed that would give the Tenth Circuit jurisdiction over this appeal, petitioners sought a writ of mandamus. The Tenth Circuit concluded after review that petitioners did not carry their burden for mandamus relief, and denied their petition. View "In re: Feinberg" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose out of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition filed by Jeffrey Lavenhar. Jeffrey’s ex-wife, Laurie Lavenhar, filed a proof of claim in Jeffrey’s bankruptcy proceeding for $347,400, claiming this amount was owed to her as a domestic support obligation, and it was entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(1). First American Title Insurance Company, one of Jeffrey's creditors, filed an objection to Laurie’s proof of claim, asserting that the entirety of the domestic support obligation underlying Laurie’s proof of claim was obtained as a result of collusion between Jeffrey and Laurie in state-court divorce proceedings. First American also sought relief from the automatic stay so it could seek a state-court declaration that the judgment upon which Laurie’s claim was based was obtained by fraud on the court. In an order designed to prevent the state-court proceedings from intruding on the prerogatives of the Chapter 7 Trustee, the bankruptcy court granted First American’s motion to lift the stay. The district court affirmed that order on appeal. Laurie appealed, arguing the bankruptcy court erred in granting First American’s motion to lift the stay. According to Laurie, First American lacked standing to litigate the validity of any component of the state-court judgment because the power to control property of the bankruptcy estate belonged solely to the Trustee. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error in the bankruptcy court's judgment, and affirmed the narrowly tailored order lifting the stay. View "Lavenhar v. First American Title Insurance" on Justia Law

Posted in: Bankruptcy
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Defendant-appellant Toby Martinez was convicted of mail fraud and conspiracy, which required the district court to order Martinez to pay restitution. At sentencing, the district court ordered Martinez to pay restitution through monthly installments. Nonetheless, the court later allowed the government to garnish Martinez’s retirement accounts, which exceeded what he owed in installments at the time. Martinez and his wife Sandra contested the garnishments, arguing in part that the government could not enforce payments that were not yet due under Martinez’s court-ordered payment schedule. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Mr. and Ms. Martinez and concluded that the district court erred by allowing the garnishments to proceed. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

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Wilber Ernesto Castillo, a citizen of El Salvador, appeals his sentence for violating 8 U.S.C. 1326, which prohibits reentry into the United States by a previously removed alien. In 2004, Castillo was convicted in California state court for second-degree robbery, a violation of California Penal Code section 211. He was removed from the United States in 2007. In July 2009, Castillo reentered the United States without inspection. Castillo was convicted in 2011 for shoplifting and in 2014 for disorderly conduct. After his 2014 arrest, agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement interviewed Castillo. Based on his admissions that he had been removed from the United States and then reentered without inspection, the government charged Castillo with a violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Castillo argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that his sentence was miscalculated because the district court incorrectly considered the California robbery conviction to be a “crime of violence” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under section 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court correctly considered Castillo’s California robbery conviction to be a crime of violence, it affirmed. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

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Appellant/cross-appellee OXY USA Inc. appealed the grant of summary judgment to appellees/cross-appellants, a class of plaintiffs represented by David and Donna Schell, and Ron Oliver, on the question of whether their oil and gas leases required OXY to make "free gas" useable for domestic purposes. OXY also appealed: the district court’s certification of plaintiffs' class; the denial of a motion to decertify; and an order to quash the deposition of an absent class member. Plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court's: denial of their motion for attorneys' fees; denial of their motion for litigation expenses; and denial of an incentive award. Notably, plaintiffs also moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. OXY opposed dismissal for mootness, but argued that if the Tenth Circuit found mootness, the Court should vacate the district court’s decision. Appellees/cross-appellants were approximately 2,200 surface owners of Kansas land burdened by oil and gas leases held or operated by OXY, executed separately from approximately 1906 to 2007. The leases contained a "free gas" clause. The clauses weren't identical, but all, in substance, purported to grant the lessor access to free gas for domestic use. All of the plaintiffs who have used free gas obtain their gas from a tap connected directly to a wellhead line. In addition, some members of the plaintiff class (including about half of the current users of free gas) received royalty payments from OXY based on the production of gas on their land. In August 2007, OXY sent letters warning free gas users that their gas may become unsafe to use, either because of high hydrogen sulfide content or low pressure at the wellhead. These letters urged the lessors to convert their houses to an alternative energy source. On August 31, 2007, leaseholders David Schell, Donna Schell, Howard Pickens, and Ron Oliver filed this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, seeking a permanent injunction, a declaratory judgment, and actual damages based on alleged breaches of mineral leases entered into with OXY for failure to supply free usable gas. After review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit held that that OXY’s sale of the oil and gas leases at issue here mooted its appeal; therefore, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the cross-appeal had not been mooted by this sale, and affirmed the district court’s judgment as to the denial of attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and an incentive award. View "Schell v. OXY USA" on Justia Law