Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff German Wilmer Saenz Mencia (Saenz), a Peruvian citizen, came to Utah to work for Phillip, Chance, Dustin and Preston Allreds’ sheep ranch. His work was authorized by an H-2A sheepherding visa, and he was paid the minimum wage for H-2A sheepherders: $750 per month plus food and lodging. He filed suit against the Allreds because he claimed this pay was inadequate because the work he performed did not qualify as sheepherding. Instead he argued he was entitled to the hourly wage for H-2A ranch hands, which he sought to recover in contract and quantum meruit. Additionally, he argued the work he performed did not qualify for the “range production of livestock” exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) minimum wage, and therefore asserted a minimum wage claim against the Allreds. The district court rejected these claims, denied Saenz’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Allreds. As grounds for its decision, the district court concluded Saenz’s claims were estopped because he did not object to his non-sheepherding work while the Allreds could have done something about it. Further, the court found that more than half of Saenz’s work qualified as “range production of livestock,” and Saenz was accordingly exempt from the FLSA minimum wage and the H-2A wage for ranch hands. Saenz appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of summary judgment to Saenz and the grant of summary judgment to the Allreds. "[N]either the FLSA exemption nor the Special Procedures are satisfied simply because most of an employee’s duties fall within a sheepherder’s job description. To assume they are, and to rule Mr. Saenz a sheepherder on that basis, is to misapply the relevant provisions in at least three ways. […] under the undisputed facts, Mr. Saenz spent a large majority of his time working away from the range, supervised by superiors who could have recorded his hours, performing duties that were often incidental to sheepherding but were not sheepherding themselves. He was a ranch hand, not a sheepherder, and the FLSA exemption and H-2A Special Procedures do not apply." Further, the Court concluded the Allreds were both actually and on constructive notice of Saenz's work conditions, and as such, concluded their grounds for affirming their summary judgment motion failed. View "Saenz Mencia v. Allred" on Justia Law

Appellant FB Acquisition Property I, LLC appealed a district court order affirming the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan for Appellees and Debtors Larry and Susan Gentry. The Gentrys were the sole shareholders, officers, and directors of Ball Four Inc., a sports complex in Adams County, Colorado. In 2010, Ball Four filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition, and a year later, the Gentrys filed this Chapter 11 proceeding. This appeal involved aspects of both bankruptcies. In 2005, Ball Four received a $1.9 million loan from FirsTier Bank to expand its sporting facilities and pay off a previous loan. After four years of struggling with construction defects, underfunding of the project, and an economic downturn, Ball Four stopped making interest payments to FirsTier. Ball Four proposed a plan of reorganization that provided the bank’s allowed claim would be repaid in full, plus interest, and that FirsTier would retain its lien on Ball Four’s property until the claim was paid. Before Ball Four’s Chapter 11 plan was approved in 2011, the Colorado Division of Banking closed FirsTier and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed as receiver. Later, the FDIC conveyed all rights under the original promissory note to 2011-SIP 1 CRE/CADC Venture, LLC (SIP). Neither FirsTier, FDIC, nor SIP objected to the Ball Four Plan, and it was confirmed in August 2011, and Ball Four’s case was closed in 2013. In October 2010, a month after Ball Four filed for bankruptcy, FirsTier sued the Gentrys in Colorado state court to collect on the guaranties. In November 2011, the Gentrys filed this Chapter 11 case. The Gentrys filed the necessary disclosures and an amended plan. The amended plan provided that the Gentrys’ liability on the 2005 loan would be satisfied by Ball Four under its confirmed plan. Despite SIP’s objections, the bankruptcy court confirmed the Gentry Plan in 2013. Because the bankruptcy court's feasibility finding of the Gentrys' plan was based on a permissible view of the evidence, the Tenth Circuit concluded the bankruptcy court’s finding of feasibility was not clearly erroneous. However, the Court found the district court erred with regard to limiting the Gentrys' liability as guarantors to the amount Ball Four owed. In light of the Tenth Circuit's ruling, the matter was remanded back to the bankruptcy court in the event the guaranty issue impacted the plan feasibility assessment. View "In re: Gentry" on Justia Law

Several Albuquerque residents sued Mayor Richard Berry in his official capacity as Mayor of Albuquerque in state court over the City’s redistricting plan enacted after the 2010 census. This case arose out of an award of attorneys’ fees imposed as a sanction on attorneys who brought a voting-rights lawsuit on the residents' behalf against the Mayor. After dismissing the case, the district court found the attorneys unreasonably multiplied proceedings in what it called a meritless case and sanctioned them under 28 U.S.C. 1927. They argued the award was an abuse of discretion. The Mayor cross-appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by declining to award fees under several other provisions the Mayor raised as grounds for sanctions. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that most of the attorneys’ arguments lacked merit. However, the Court vacated the award of fees and remanded for the trial court to consider whether a different trigger for the imposition of sanctions was appropriate. View "Baca v. Berry" on Justia Law

This appeal grew out of a suit brought on behalf of an 11-year-old girl (“J.P”), who was a student in a class for children with special needs. One day, deputy sheriff J.M. Sharkey, who was working as a school resource officer, saw J.P. kick a teacher. Because the kick constituted a crime, Deputy Sharkey arrested J.P., handcuffed her, and transported her to a juvenile detention center. These actions led J.P.’s mother (identified as “J.H.”) to sue Deputy Sharkey and Bernalillo County claiming violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court dismissed the due process claims and granted summary judgment to Deputy Sharkey and the county on the claims involving the Fourth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act. J.H. appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "J.H. v. Bernalillo County" on Justia Law

Defendant Blake Snowden pleaded guilty to unlawfully obtaining information from a protected computer and to intercepting emails. In calculating his offense level under the sentencing guidelines, the district court applied a 16-level enhancement after finding that these crimes caused losses exceeding a million dollars. The resulting guideline sentencing range was 41–51 months’ imprisonment. The court ultimately imposed a 30-month sentence. Defendant argues that the district court erred in calculating loss and thereby arrived at an unduly high guideline sentencing range. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that if there was any error, it was harmless because it did not affect the sentence: the trial court, after thoroughly exploring the matter, explained why the sentence was proper under 18 U.S.C. 3553 and unequivocally stated that it would impose the same sentence even if 30 months exceeded the correct guideline range. On one ground, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed: the district court ordered restitution in the amount of $25,354. Both parties agreed that this was an oversight that should have been corrected on remand to $24,174. View "United States v. Snowden" on Justia Law

In 2012, appellant Charles D. Leone II resigned his position as a principal of Madison Street Partners, LLC (“MSP”). Pursuant to the terms of MSP’s Operating Agreement, fellow principals Steven Owsley and Drew Hayworth elected to buy Leone’s interest in MSP. The agreement required the purchase price to be set at fair market value, as determined in good faith by MSP’s managers, Owsley and Hayworth. After receiving valuations from two independent valuation firms, the Managers proposed a purchase price of $135,850, which Leone rejected. Leone then sued the Managers in federal district court, contending the proposed purchase price was far below market value and asserted claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Managers moved for summary judgment on both claims, arguing Leone’s claims were barred by their good faith reliance upon the value set by the independent valuation firms. The district court granted the motion. On appeal, Leone argued: (1) the district court misapplied the law regarding express and implied good faith obligations; (2) the district court incorrectly held that bad faith requires a tortious state of mind; and (3) he presented sufficient evidence of bad faith to survive summary judgment. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Leone indeed presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment: “three different types of ‘good faith’ were at play in this case: the express contractual provision, an implied covenant of good faith, and the statutory safe harbor for good faith reliance on experts’ opinions. Regardless of which one applies, the Managers bore the burden as movants for summary judgment to establish there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to their defense of good faith reliance on outside valuations. Although the Managers are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of good faith in relying on the outside valuations, Mr. Leone has raised genuine issues of material fact to rebut that presumption. Without the presumption and given the existence of fact issues regarding the Managers’ good faith, we conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Managers on their affirmative defense.” View "Leone v. Owsley" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellants Iqbal Makkar and Gaurav Sehgal ran the “Gitter Done,” a small town convenience store in northeastern Oklahoma. Questions surfaced about a certain incense they carried on their shelves. The men spoke with state law enforcement officers, offered to have the officers test the incense to determine its legality, and offered as well to stop selling the product until the results came in. Ultimately they were indicted and convicted for violating the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act (Analogue Act), conspiracy, and money laundering. In this appeal defendants argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, and for excluding evidence of their cooperation with law enforcement. “The government’s instructional inference invited the jury to infer the presence of one essential element from another, effectively collapsing two independent statutory inquiries into one. … the fact that one drug produces a similar effect to a second drug just doesn’t give rise to a rational inference - let alone rationally suggest beyond a reasonable doubt - that the first drug shares a similar chemical structure with the second drug. And it most certainly does not give rise to a qualifying inference that the first drug shares a similar chemical structure with a third drug - as the government was, in fact, allowed to argue to the jury in this case.” The government argued this error was harmless, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed and vacated both defendants’ convictions. View "United States v. Makkar" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury indicted inmate Mark Jordan for the 1999 murder of David Stone and three related assaults. Stone died after he was stabbed three times with a shank in the recreation yard at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado (“USP Florence”). In 2005, a jury found him guilty on all counts. In 2012, Sean Riker, another inmate who was present in the prison recreation yard that day, confessed to stabbing Stone and agreed to provide Jordan’s counsel a DNA sample. Jordan’s DNA expert then linked Riker’s DNA to DNA found on the murder weapon. Based on Riker’s confession and the new DNA analysis, Jordan moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 due to newly discovered evidence. After the conclusion of the Rule 33 hearing, the district court denied Jordan’s motion for a new trial. On appeal, Jordan argued: (1) the district court should not have admitted and considered new government evidence; and (2) even if Rule 33 permits new government evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause each should have barred admission of Stone’s dying declarations. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Ramon Cespedes, a native and citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States as a nonimmigrant tourist in 2011. His status was adjusted to conditional lawful permanent resident in 2012. Later he was charged in Utah state court with domestic violence; and in 2013, that court issued a protective order against him under Utah’s Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. In late 2013, Cespedes pleaded guilty to attempted violation of a protective order. He did not dispute that he was convicted of violating a protective order entered under the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act or that the provision of the order that he was convicted of violating was the provision stating that “the defendant shall not contact . . . the protected party.” A few months later, the Department of Homeland Security brought a charge to remove Cespedes under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). In a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), Cespedes argued that his violation of the protection order did not come within the federal statute. The IJ rejected his argument and ordered him removed from the United States. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ. The issue presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review was whether violation of an order prohibiting contact with a potential victim satisfied the statute. The Tenth Circuit held that it did, and affirmed the BIA. View "Cespedes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Delray Quiver pled guilty to assaulting, resisting, and injuring a federal officer. At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for Quiver’s “use” of a “dangerous weapon” (the officer’s Taser) during the assault. Quiver appealed the application of the enhancement. As the officer tried to subdue Quiver to arrest him, Quiver managed to turn over and punch the officer in the face, breaking his glasses. During the ensuing struggle, Quiver took control of the Taser and drive-stunned the officer’s leg. Quiver’s pressing the Taser against the officer’s thigh left two burn marks. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Taser, even in stun-mode, was a dangerous weapon. The Court also concluded that in Quiver momentarily taking control of the Taser, he “used” it against the officer. For these simple reasons, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the four-level enhancement applied. View "United States v. Quiver" on Justia Law