Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Delray Quiver pled guilty to assaulting, resisting, and injuring a federal officer. At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for Quiver’s “use” of a “dangerous weapon” (the officer’s Taser) during the assault. Quiver appealed the application of the enhancement. As the officer tried to subdue Quiver to arrest him, Quiver managed to turn over and punch the officer in the face, breaking his glasses. During the ensuing struggle, Quiver took control of the Taser and drive-stunned the officer’s leg. Quiver’s pressing the Taser against the officer’s thigh left two burn marks. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Taser, even in stun-mode, was a dangerous weapon. The Court also concluded that in Quiver momentarily taking control of the Taser, he “used” it against the officer. For these simple reasons, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the four-level enhancement applied. View "United States v. Quiver" on Justia Law

Western Union Company and its subsidiary, Western Union Financial Services, Inc. (collectively, Western Union), appealed the district court’s award of $40 million in attorney fees to class counsel after the settlement of a putative class action against Western Union. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action to challenge Western Union’s practice of failing to timely notify customers of failed money transfers and of holding customer money for years while accruing interest and charging administrative fees. While litigation over procedural hurdles to class certification was ongoing, the parties agreed to a settlement of the class claims against Western Union. “Generally, a settling defendant in a class action has no interest in the amount of attorney fees awarded when those fees are to be paid from the class recovery rather than the defendant’s coffers.” Western Union argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that it had standing to challenge the attorney-fee award in this case because it claimed it would be injured by a diminution of the Class Settlement Fund (CSF) if Class Counsel was awarded an excessive attorney-fee award. Western Union argued its interest in the CSF (and the potential effect of the attorney-fee award on the size of that fund) established its standing to challenge the fee award. The Tenth Circuit concluded any potential injury to Western Union was too attenuated from the award of attorney fees to Class Counsel to support Western Union’s standing. Because Western Union lacked standing to challenge the attorney-fee award, the Tenth Circuit lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "Tennille v. Western Union" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose from a sting operation designed to determine if police officers in the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department’s (KCKPD) “SCORE” Unit were stealing from residences while executing search warrants. As a result of the sting operation, three officers were indicted and pled guilty to federal crimes. The remaining officers brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting violations of their Fourth Amendment rights for arrests without probable cause. The individual Defendants-Appellants appealed the district court’s denial of their motions for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. The entity Defendant-Appellant (Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City) also appealed, arguing that should the Tenth Circuit determine a constitutional violation did not occur, it should reverse and render judgment in its favor. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the basis that the law was not clearly established at the time of the arrests in question. The Court dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Callahan v. Unified Govt of Wyandotte" on Justia Law

In July 2005, defendant-appellant Laura Wetzel-Sanders pled guilty to one count of bank robbery. For purposes of sentencing, she was deemed a career offender based upon a 2000 Kansas state conviction for criminal threat (for which she received a seven-month sentence) and a 2002 federal conviction for bank robbery (for which she received an 18-month sentence). On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendant argued that she was sentenced on materially incorrect information: that after the Court’s decision in “United States v. Brooks,” (751 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2014)), defendant’s state criminal threat conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of applying the career-offender guideline. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that this appeal was defendant’s third successive section 2255 motion, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s order on the merits and dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Wetzel-Sanders" on Justia Law

Walter Flaugher pled guilty in 2006 to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced to 57 months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. In 2014, the U.S. Probation Office filed a petition to revoke his supervised release, alleging several violations. Flaugher stipulated to one of the violations, use of methamphetamine. The district court revoked his supervised release, resentenced him to another 12 months and 1 day in prison, and imposed 3 years of supervised release. Over his counsel’s objections, the court also imposed a condition to the supervised release, requiring Flaugher to be subject to a search of his house, car or person, by a probation officer. On appeal, Flaugher argued that 18 U.S.C. 3583(d) prohibited district courts from imposing warrantless-search conditions except in cases involving felons required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). He challenged the condition because he was not required to register under SORNA. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Flaugher" on Justia Law

Blue Mountain Energy appealed a Benefits Review Board decision affirming an award of black lung benefits to Terry Gunderson. An administrative law judge (ALJ) originally denied benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), and Gunderson appealed to the Board and then to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit remanded for further proceedings because the ALJ did not sufficiently explain the basis for the denial. The ALJ again denied benefits, and the Board vacated and remanded the ALJ’s decision because it did not comply with the Tenth Circuit’s remand. On the second remand, the ALJ awarded benefits, and the Board affirmed. Blue Mountain petitions for review, arguing that the ALJ violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Specifically, Blue Mountain contended the ALJ gave the preamble to the regulations redefining compensable pneumoconiosis in 20 C.F.R. 718.201 the force and effect of law, even though the preamble had not been subject to APA notice and comment. Blue Mountain also contended its rights under the APA were violated when the ALJ refused to reopen the proceedings to allow it to submit evidence challenging the medical literature cited in the preamble. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error as Blue Mountain argued, and affirmed. View "Blue Mountain Energy v. Director OWCP" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Shelton Jackson appealed the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and death sentence. In 1997, Jackson was charged with the murder of Monica Decator in Tulsa, Oklahoma and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. Jackson raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether the state court’s submission to the jury of an allegedly invalid sentencing aggravator unconstitutionally skewed the jury’s deliberations during the penalty phase of his trial; (2) whether his defense lawyers provided constitutionally deficient representation during the penalty phase; and (3) whether the combined effect of these two errors warrants habeas relief even if, viewed individually, each error is harmless. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Jackson v. Warrior" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of allegations that AKC, a child with autism, suffered abuse at school by her special-education teacher, Vickie Cantrell. AKC’s parents, Ted and Bella Carroll, filed suit in federal district court against Cantrell, the school district, and others, seeking damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and a variety of state-law theories. The district court dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims, concluding the Carrolls had not exhausted their administrative remedies before filing suit as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the IDEA). The district court then dismissed the Carrolls’ complaint, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. The Carrolls appealed. The single issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court erred in determining the Carrolls’ federal claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Because the Court concluded the Carrolls’ complaint alleged educational injuries that could have been redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative remedies, it agreed with the district court that exhaustion of those remedies was required before the Carrolls could file suit. View "Carroll v. Lawton Independent School" on Justia Law

The Government appealed the district court's grant of defendant-appellee Zachary Krueger motion to suppress evidence seized in Oklahoma pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate judge in Kansas. Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) learned that child pornography was being distributed over the internet from an IP address registered to Krueger, a Kansas resident. An HSI agent thereafter obtained a warrant from a United States magistrate judge in the District of Kansas to search Krueger’s Kansas residence for items such as computers and cell phones that may be used to depict child pornography visually. Upon executing the warrant, the agent discovered that Krueger was not home and that his computer and cell phone were not in the residence. Krueger’s roommate, who was present at the time, indicated that Krueger was in Oklahoma City visiting a friend, and that Krueger may have taken his computer and cell phone with him to Oklahoma. Based on this information, the Kansas-based HSI agent asked an Oklahoma-based HSI agent to verify Krueger’s whereabouts and execute a second warrant, obtained from a different United States magistrate judge in the District of Kansas. This warrant authorized law enforcement to search both the Oklahoma residence and Krueger’s automobile parked outside the Oklahoma residence for electronic devices belonging to Krueger or in his possession. Krueger was present when the agents executed the second warrant, and they seized (among other things) Krueger’s computer and external hard drive. In granting Krueger’s motion to suppress this evidence, the district court concluded that suppression was necessary because: (1) the warrant violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, which generally limits a federal magistrate judge’s warrant-issuing authority to the district where he or she sits; and (2) Krueger established that he was prejudiced by the Rule 41 violation. On appeal, the Government argued that reversal was necessary because the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining that Krueger established prejudice. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the suppression order. View "United States v. Krueger" on Justia Law

Jerold Fisher entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to submitting fraudulent tax returns to the Internal Revenue Service. In return, the Government promised, among other things, not to charge Fisher with any further crimes arising out of the same underlying conduct. Following the plea agreement and before sentencing, the district court found Fisher had breached the plea agreement and released the Government from its no-new-charges obligation. The Government then indicted Fisher on related structuring charges. The court subsequently reversed itself and reinstated the plea agreement, but the Government did not dismiss the new indictment. At sentencing on the tax fraud charge, Fisher asked the district court to find that the Government: (1) had breached the plea agreement by failing to dismiss the structuring charges; and (2) had engaged in vindictive prosecution. The court sentenced Fisher to 41 months in prison without ruling on either of those requests. Fisher appealed, arguing the district court erred by declining to decide his governmental breach claim. Because that claim was moot, the Tenth Circuit concluded it lacked jurisdiction over it. To the extent Fisher tried to raise a similar argument regarding his vindictive prosecution claim, the Tenth Circuit concluded he forfeited that claim and waived it through inadequate briefing. View "United States v. Fisher" on Justia Law