Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-Appellants Stephen Maresca, Heather Martin-Maresca, and their three children were driving back from a family hike when they were arrested in a “felony stop” carried out by Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Deputies J. Fuentes, G. Grundhoffer, and four other officers. Deputy Fuentes initiated the stop because she mistakenly believed that the Marescas were driving a stolen vehicle. The Marescas sued, alleging that the officers violated the Marescas’ Fourth Amendment rights both by unlawfully arresting them and by using excessive force in doing so. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had not violated clearly established Fourth Amendment standards. After review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit concluded: (1) the Marescas were entitled to summary judgment against Deputy Fuentes on their unlawful arrest claim because they were arrested without probable cause as the result of Deputy Fuentes’ unreasonable conduct; (2) Deputy Grundhoffer was entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim against him because he was entitled to rely on information conveyed to him by Deputy Fuentes; and (3) disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for Fuentes, Grundhoffer, or the Marescas on the excessive force claim. The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Maresca v. County of Bernalillo" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alfonzo De Niz Robles filed an administrative application for an adjustment of status after and in reliance on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in “Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales (Padilla-Caldera I, 426 F.3d 1294 (2005)). His petition languished so long that it still stood waiting for a decision four years later, after the BIA handed down “In re Briones, (24 I.&N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007). The Tenth Circuit decided “Padilla-Caldera II.” When the BIA finally did take up petitioner’s petition in 2013, it decided to apply its decision in Briones retroactively to his case, using it to hold him categorically ineligible for an adjustment of status and subject to removal. On appeal. Petitioner sought to overturn that decision. “[I]n the end, the BIA’s decision to apply Briones retroactively to Mr. De Niz Robles finds no support in our examination of the principles underlying the law of retroactivity, in Supreme Court or circuit precedent, or in relevant authority from other jurisdictions.” View "De Niz Robles v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Weinman was the Chapter 7 Trustee for Adam Aircraft Industries (“AAI”). Defendant Joseph Walker was an officer of AAI and served as its president and as a member of its Board of Directors. Throughout his employment, Walker had neither a written employment contract nor a severance agreement with AAI. In February 2007, the Board decided it wanted to replace Walker as both president and as a board member. Since AAI did not want Walker’s termination to disrupt its ongoing negotiations for debt financing, AAI suggested that Walker could voluntarily “resign” in lieu of termination and could also continue to support the company publicly. Subsequently, Walker agreed, and the parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) outlining the terms of Walker’s separation, and they also embodied these terms in two Separation Agreements and Releases. About a year after terminating Walker, AAI declared bankruptcy. It then sued in bankruptcy court to avoid further transfers to Walker, to recover some transfers previously made to Walker, and to disallow Walker’s claim on AAI’s bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court denied AAI’s claims. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirmed this ruling in its entirety. AAI appealed part of the ruling, arguing that its obligations and transfers to Walker were avoidable under the Code on two alternative bases. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BAP's decision. View "Weinman v. Walker" on Justia Law

Albuquerque Police Officer Brian Pitzer shot Russell Tenorio when responding to an emergency call. Tenorio sued Pitzer under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that Pitzer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. The district court denied Pitzer’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was evidence that Pitzer violated clearly established law under two theories: (1) when Pitzer shot Tenorio he “did not have probable cause to believe that [Tenorio] presented a threat of serious physical harm to [Pitzer] or another person'” and (2) Pitzer and his fellow officers recklessly created the situation that resulted in the use of deadly force. Pitzer appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence would support a violation of clearly established law under the first theory. The Court therefore did not address the second theory, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tenorio v. Pitzer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Karry Thomas worked for Defendant-Appellee Berry Plastics Corporation from 2003 to 2010. Over the course of Thomas’s seven-year employment, eight different Berry supervisors initiated at least thirteen disciplinary actions against him. These actions ranged in severity from verbal coaching and written warnings to suspensions and final warnings. Thomas initially challenged his termination through Berry’s Termination Review Process, arguing that his termination was not warranted because he was not at fault for the reason given, a print-quality issue. After meeting with Thomas and reviewing his full disciplinary history, the Termination Review Panel (comprised of two independent Berry managers) affirmed the termination decision. Thomas thereafter filed suit for wrongful discharge, alleging, inter alia, that he was terminated in retaliation for opposing race discrimination in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Berry moved for summary judgment. Although Thomas initially argued his Printing Manager possessed retaliatory animus that infected his termination decision, Thomas eventually invoked the “cat’s-paw” theory of recovery, arguing that it was an intermediate supervisor who reported to the Printing Manager, who possessed the retaliatory animus that infected the termination decision. The district court ultimately granted Berry’s motion for summary judgment, and Thomas appealed. Finding that Thomas failed to meet his burden of proof, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Berry. View "Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corporation" on Justia Law

Adams 12 Five Star Schools terminated Gina Holub’s employment as an internal auditor for the School District. She brought an action against the District and two of its officials, Superintendent Chris Gdowski and Chief Financial Officer Shelley Becker. Holub raised First Amendment and state law claims, alleging defendants terminated her employment in retaliation for her attempts to uncover and report fraudulent budgeting practices. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all of Holub’s claims. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Holub argued the district court erred in concluding that when she discussed her concerns with two School District board members, she spoke as an employee rather than a citizen and thus her speech was not protected by the First Amendment. The Tenth Circuit concluded that because Holub’s responsibilities as an internal auditor for the District included discovering and reporting accounting and budgeting issues, her comments to the Board members concerning her budget findings were made pursuant to her official duties and were not protected. Furthermore, the Court found the record contained no controverted material facts to support Holub’s claim that her termination resulted from an ongoing effort to conceal her budget findings. View "Holub v. Gdowski" on Justia Law

Defendant Albert Alexander pleaded guilty in 2012 to violating California Penal Code section 266c, which prohibited inducing another to engage in sexual conduct by misrepresentations creating fear. As required by California law, he registered as a sex offender in that state. But he did not register as a sex offender in Oklahoma when he moved, and he was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma for failing to register. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his California section 266c conviction did not trigger SORNA’s registration requirement. He argued that section 266c covered only consensual sexual conduct and so falls within SORNA’s exception from the definition of sex offense for an “offense involving consensual sexual conduct . . . if the victim was an adult . . . .” When the motion was denied, he entered a conditional plea of guilty. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendant challenged: (1) his classification as a tier III sex offender when the district court imposed sentence; and (2) the denial of his motion to dismiss. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, rejecting defendant's argument that a violation of section 266c did not qualify for tier III, and holding that sexual conduct induced by the misrepresentations required under section 266c was not consensual within the meaning of the term in SORNA. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Upon release from jail, petitioner-appellant Scott Eizember went to his ex-girlfriend's hometown to lie in wait for her. She had tipped off authorities about his violation of a protective order. Eisember noticed an elderly couple leaving a house across the street from the ex-girlfriend's home. After the couple left, Eizember broke in. But A.J. and Patsy Cantrell didn't stay away as long; when they returned home they found Eizember pointing their own shotgun at them. Mr. Cantrell saw an opportunity to grab the gun away from Eizember; a shot hit Eizember in the hand, but also struck and killed Mrs. Cantrell. In what followed, Eizember wrestled the gun away from Mr. Cantrell and proceeded to beat him with it until he fell unconscious. Eizember headed across the street, shotgun in hand, toward the ex-girlfriend's house. Her son saw him coming and tried to run, but before he could, Eizember shot him in the back. Eizember turned on Montgomery's grandmother and beat her too. Montgomery recovered enough to run out of the house and into his pickup truck with Eizember leaping into the truck bed. Eventually Montgomery crashed into a pole, jumped out, and ran for help. Eizember headed in the other direction and managed to hitch a ride. For the next eleven days Eizember hid in wooded areas around Depew, until eventually stealing a car, then hitchhiking further away. Dr. Sam Peebles and his wife stopped and offered him a lift. Eizember turned his pistol on the couple and ordered them to drive him to Texas. The journey lasted hours. During a roadside break in Texas, Dr. Peebles drew his own revolver and shot Eizember. Eizember wrested the revolver away and bludgeoned Dr. Peebles with the pistol he'd stolen back in Oklahoma. Eizember tried to shoot Mrs. Peebles. When the pistol wouldn't fire, he struck her in the head instead and ran off. At a nearby convenience store, the clerk heard he'd been shot and called the police. It was only then that the authorities arrested Eizember, taking him first to a hospital to recover, and, in time, to Oklahoma for trial. There, a jury there found Eizember guilty of: first-degree murder, second-degree felony murder, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, shooting with intent to kill, and first-degree burglary. Eizember was sentenced to death. Eizember managed to obtain a certificate of appealability permitting him to raise a number of issues to the Tenth Circuit. But finding no basis upon which to grant relief, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. View "Eizember v. Trammell" on Justia Law

Christine B., the mother of student "A.F.," filed suit claiming that the Espanola Public Schools failed to address appropriately her daughter's disabilities in the educational program it formulated for her. Before any hearing could be held, Christine sought to mediate her dispute. In the end, the parties signed a settlement agreement. As a result of the settlement, Christine B. asked the administrative agency to dismiss her Individuals with Disability Education Act (IDEA) claims with prejudice. Despite the satisfactory result she received through mediation, Christine B. filed suit again, though not pursuant to IDEA, but under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The allegations in her federal court complaint and those in her original IDEA administrative complaint were nearly identical: both alleged that A.F. suffered from the same disabilities and both contended that the school district failed to take her disabilities into account in her educational program. Agreeing with the school district that Christine B. failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the district court dismissed her lawsuit. Christine B. appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. View "A.F. v. Espanola Public Schools" on Justia Law

From 2002 to 2007, Defendant-appellant Jerold Sorensen, an oral surgeon in California, concealed his income from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and underpaid his income taxes by more than $1.5 million. He used a “pure trust” scheme, peddled by Financial Fortress Associates (“FFA”), in which he deposited his dental income into these trusts without reporting all of it to the IRS as income. Over the years, he also retitled valuable assets in the trusts’ names. In 2013, after a series of proffers, the government charged him with violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a) for corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the due administration of the internal-revenue laws. A jury convicted him of the charged offense. On appeal, Sorensen argued his conduct amounted to evading taxes so it was exclusively punishable under a different statute; that the prosecution misstated evidence in its closing rebuttal argument; and (7) cumulative error. Furthermore, he argued the district court erred: (2) by refusing his offered jury instruction requiring knowledge of illegality; (3) by giving the government’s deliberate-ignorance instruction; (4) by instructing the jury that it could convict on any one means alleged in the indictment; and (5) by refusing to allow him to provide certain testimony from a witness in surrebuttal. Finding no merit to any of these contentions, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Sorensen's conviction. View "United States v. Sorensen" on Justia Law