Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellee Jacob Ind had been incarcerated in Colorado state prisons since 1992. At the time he filed this lawsuit on in 2009, he was in administrative segregation at the Colorado State Penitentiary ("CSP") subject to a limit of two personal books imposed by the Colorado Department of Corrections ("CDOC"). Appellee filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming the book limit was a substantial burden on his sincerely-held religious beliefs in violation of his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"). In 2011, appellee was transferred out of administrative segregation and into the general population, where he was allowed 15 personal books. The CDOC moved to dismiss the case as moot. Although the magistrate judge recommended the motion be granted, the district court concluded appellee would likely be returned to segregation in the future and denied the motion. Following a bench trial, the court held CDOC's two-book policy violated appellee's rights under RLUIPA and directed that, in the event appellee returned to administrative segregation at CSP, CDOC would be enjoined from enforcing the policy against him. CDOC appealed, arguing again that the case was moot. After review, the Tenth Circuit held that appellee's transfer from administrative segregation to the general population indeed mooted his claim, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction. View "Ind v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Steven Burns challenged the amount of restitution that the district court ordered him to pay. Burns, a custodian at the Rock Springs, Wyoming post office, pled guilty to one count of possessing stolen mail. Burns admitted that from December 1, 2013, through January 25, 2014, he possessed letters, packages, mail, and articles and things contained therein, that had been stolen from post office boxes in the Rock Springs Post Office, knowing that those items had been stolen. The district court sentenced Burns to one year probation and ordered him to pay $3,090.58 in restitution under the Mandatory Victims’ Rights Act (“MVRA”). Burns argued: (1) the district court clearly erred in finding that he took all of the items on which the district court based the amount of restitution; and (2) that the controlling case law required a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts underlying a restitution award. The Tenth Circuit rejected both of these contentions on review of Burns' appeal, and affirmed the restitution order. View "United States v. Burns" on Justia Law

Charles Jernegan committed suicide at the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma (“Jail”). His mother, Plaintiff-Appellee Carolyn Cox, brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Defendant-Appellant Tulsa County Sheriff Stanley Glanz. Sheriff Glanz moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity. The district court denied the Sheriff’s motion (without mentioning qualified immunity) based on the existence of genuinely disputed material facts. In this interlocutory appeal, Sheriff Glanz argued to the Tenth Circuit that extant caselaw at the time of Jernegan’s suicide did not clearly establish that he could be held liable as a supervisor under the circumstances of this case: Jernegan denied having a suicidal intent during booking and no Jail staff members detected a basis for referring him for additional mental-health screening based on their interactions with him. The Sheriff also argued that none of the policies or procedures he had implemented at the Jail could be characterized as the moving force behind any alleged violation of Jernegan’s constitutional rights. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under the facts of this case, the district court erred in denying the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on Cox's individual-capacity claim. As for Cox's official-capacity claim, the Court concluded that the district court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment was indisputably not a final decision amenable to interlocutory review: "Our assumption of jurisdiction over the court’s resolution of the official-capacity claim would therefore only be appropriate if we invoked our discretionary power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over this claim. Sheriff Glanz, however, has not relied upon this generally disfavored doctrine; furthermore, we discern no legally cognizable basis for exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case." The Sheriff's appeal of the denial of his motion for summary judgment on Cox's official-capacity claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Cox v. Glanz" on Justia Law

Within a month after plaintiff-appellant Raymond Zisumbo complained to his supervisor at Ogden Regional Medical Center (ORMC) about alleged race discrimination in the workplace, ORMC investigated Zisumbo for submitting apparently fraudulent letters to his supervisor months earlier. After confirming that at least one of the letters was falsified, ORMC terminated Zisumbo’s employment. Zisumbo sued ORMC for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing under Utah law. After years of litigation, procedural wrangling, and a previous appeal to the Tenth Circuit, only Zisumbo’s Title VII claims for unlawful termination remained to be tried to a jury. The jury found in favor of ORMC on Zisumbo’s discrimination claim but in favor of Zisumbo on his retaliation claim. In cross-appeals and a third parallel appeal, the parties raised numerous issues: Zisumbo challenged the district court’s decisions denying his request to amend his complaint, the granting of summary judgment to ORMC on his good faith and fair dealing claim, and denying in part his request for reinstatement, front pay, and back pay, as well as his request for attorneys’ fees. ORMC appealed the denial of its renewed, post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the denial of its request to further reduce Zisumbo’s Title VII remedies. Finding no reversible error as any party alleged, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Zisumbo v. Ogden Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a scheduling order issued by the magistrate judge that included a report of the parties’ discovery conference, the initial date agreed for disclosures was April 6, 2011. It was undisputed that plaintiff Sun River had a "D&O" insurance policy, which potentially covered securities-related counterclaims asserted by defendants, thus requiring Sun River to disclose the policy pursuant to the scheduling order. No disclosure of the policy was made until eighteen months later, only after counsel for defendants repeatedly pressed the issue based on other information raising suspicions of an undisclosed policy, and then filed a motion to compel its production. By that time coverage under this “claims made” policy had lapsed. When the omission came to light, defendants moved for an order sanctioning Sun River under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) by dismissing Sun River’s claims against defendants and entering a default judgment for defendants on their counterclaims against Sun River. The magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, taking testimony from Sun River's former attorneys, in-house counsel James Pennington and outside counsel (and counsel-of-record) Stephen Csajaghy regarding events surrounding their failure to timely disclose the policy. The magistrate judge ultimately recommended that the motion for sanctions be granted insofar as it sought a default judgment against Sun River on defendants’ counterclaims, but denied insofar as it sought dismissal of Sun River’s claims against defendants, which were not affected by the operative nondisclosure. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge about counsel’s performance with respect to disclosure of the D&O Policy, but concluded that Sun River should not be held responsible in the matter. Instead, the district court decided counsel were culpable for the disclosure violation and should be held personally liable for the attorney fees expended by defendants in pursuing the motion for sanctions. The attorneys moved for reconsideration, arguing: (1) Rule 37(c) did not authorize sanctions on counsel; (2) counsel acted with substantial justification, precluding the imposition of sanctions; (3) any sanction should have been imposed on Sun River, Pennington’s employer at the time of the initial nondisclosure, rather than on counsel; and (4) due process precluded the imposition of a sanction on Csajaghy, who had withdrawn and was not present at a July 2013 pretrial conference when the district court redirected the focus of the requested sanction from Sun River to counsel. The district court reaffirmed the sanction against both counsel and reduced it to judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed as to the sanction against Pennington, and affirmed it against Csajaghy. While the district court found that the failure to disclose the insurance policy was not substantially justified, it did not find that Pennington acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Csajaghy’s unfounded assumption about Pennington’s review of the D&O Policy was insufficient to establish a substantial justification for his failure to disclose the policy. View "Sun River Energy v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In 2003, Paul LeCompte pled guilty in state court to a sex offense involving a minor female and was required to register as a sex offender. In 2010, after having traveled in interstate commerce, LeCompte failed to register. In 2011, he pled guilty in federal court to failing to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"). As part of the sentence on this conviction, the district court imposed several conditions, including one prohibiting any association with minors except in the presence of an adult approved by the U.S. Probation Office ("Probation"). In 2014, a probation officer visited LeCompte's home and found him sitting outside with several adults (none of them approved by Probation) and his then-girlfriend's three-year-old granddaughter. Because LeCompte had associated with a minor in the absence of an approved adult, Probation filed a petition to revoke LeCompte's supervised release. LeCompte moved to dismiss, challenging the supervised release condition as applied. The district court denied his motion, revoked his supervised release, and sentenced LeCompte to a prison term. It also imposed six standard sex offender conditions. LeCompte appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. He also challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the six sex offender conditions imposed. Upon review, the Tenth circuit concluded the district court's as-applied analysis was inadequate and incomplete. The denial of the motion to dismiss was reversed and the case remanded for further consideration. View "United States v. LeCompte" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kefelegne Alemu Worku was an Ethiopian man who entered the United States after assuming the identity of an Eritrean man, Habteab Berhe Temanu. Using Berhe's identity, Worku lived in the Denver area for years and eventually became a U.S. citizen. Immigration authorities learned that Worku was using a false identity and suspected that he had tortured Ethiopian prisoners in the 1970s. After an investigation and trial, Worku was convicted of: (1) unlawful procurement of citizenship or naturalization; (2) fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents, and (3) aggravated identity theft. Worku was sentenced to 22 years, relying in part on a finding that he had committed these crimes to conceal violations of human rights in Ethiopia. On appeal, Worku argued (1) the immigration-related convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause; (2) the conviction for aggravated identify theft was improper because Worku had permission to use Berhe's identity; (3) the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because there was no evidence that Worku had come to the United States to conceal violations of human rights and the witnesses identifying him as an Ethiopian torturer had done so because of improperly suggestive photo arrays; and (4) the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Finding no merit to any of these contentions, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Worku" on Justia Law

In May 2011, Mark Feltz, an undercover agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, learned that A.J. Aldridge was willing to sell methamphetamine and firearms. Feltz arranged to purchase a gun and one ounce of methamphetamine. Feltz contacted a supplier, Robert Blankenship, and arranged to pay for two ounces of methamphetamine. They agreed to complete the transaction at a liquor store in Englewood, Colorado. Blankenship indicated he would send a relative to deliver the methamphetamine. After Feltz arrived at the liquor store, Michael Spaulding pulled into the parking lot in a GMC truck. Feltz entered the truck and completed the transaction. Spaulding was subsequently arrested and charged, along with Aldridge and Blankenship, with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and distribution of methamphetamine. Spaulding and the government entered into a plea agreement. Spaulding agreed to plead guilty to distributing methamphetamine and to cooperate with the government in investigating and prosecuting crimes committed by him and his co-defendants. In exchange for his guilty plea and cooperation, the government agreed to (1) recommend a three-level decrease to Spaulding's offense level for acceptance of responsibility, and (2) move for a downward departure for substantial assistance. Rather than imposing a sentence in the seventy-seven to ninety-six month range recommended by the government, the district court imposed a sentence of 137 months, the top of the advisory guidelines range set out in the PSR. When the government asked the district court to reconcile its grant of a section 5K1.1 motion with a sentence at the top of the pre-departure advisory sentencing range, the district court stated it had accepted the motion, but was "not following [the government's] recommendation." In support of its chosen sentence, the district court cited Spaulding's lengthy criminal history. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in review of Spaulding's appeal of the sentence he received, surmised this case presented a significant jurisdictional question: whether 18 U.S.C. 3231 allowed a district court, absent government objection, to set aside a criminal judgment that contains a term of imprisonment at any time and for any reason. Or, instead, was a district court empowered to set aside such a judgment only in the situations listed in 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)? The Tenth Circuit concluded that section 3231 did not, standing alone, confer upon a district court jurisdiction to set aside a previously imposed criminal judgment that contains a term of imprisonment. Instead, district courts have jurisdiction to alter such criminal judgments only to the extent "expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." Because it did not act pursuant to statutory authority or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, the district court acted without jurisdiction when it vacated Michael Spaulding's original judgment of conviction. Accordingly, all of the actions and proceedings taken in this case after that point were void. The matter was, therefore, remanded to the district court to (1) vacate the judgment it entered on August 27, 2013, and (2) reenter the judgment imposed on December 6, 2012. View "United States v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

In this case, the parents of an autistic child withdrew him from the Douglas County School District because they believed his educational progress was inadequate. They later sought reimbursement of tuition and related expenses pursuant to federal law that required public schools to reimburse parents if the school could not meet the student's educational needs. The District’s denial of reimbursement was upheld after a due process hearing in administrative court, and that determination was also upheld in federal district court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient support in the record to affirm the findings of the administrative law judge that the child received some educational benefit while in the District’s care and that is enough to satisfy the District’s obligation to provide a free appropriate public education. View "Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District" on Justia Law

Johnny Ray Davis was convicted of first-degree murder, for which he received a life sentence. After his state-court challenges to his conviction and sentence failed, Davis filed a pro se federal habeas petition alleging that: (1) his life without parole sentence violated the Constitution due to a “new standard [that had] been set in the U.S. Supreme Court” invalidating sentencing schemes mandating life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders; (2) his counsel was ineffective at trial and on appeal; and (3) as “a juvenile offender, [his] sentence of life without parole” was unconstitutional. The district court concluded that the last two issues were time-barred and that the first issue lacked merit because the case Davis claimed created a new standard, "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)), was inapposite. The court thus denied habeas relief and denied a COA. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: "while Miller certainly reiterated the relevance of youth at sentencing as a general matter, Davis’s argument at best relies on an extension of Miller’s logic. Two dispositive conclusions follow from that: (1) because this version of Davis’s argument does not assert the new right actually recognized in Miller, it suffers from the same timeliness flaw as his petition’s other contentions; and (2) because the state post-conviction trial court rejected this argument, [. . .]deference applies, and we cannot say declining to extend Miller was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court." View "Davis v. McCollum" on Justia Law