Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant David Craig was convicted of possessing a stolen firearm for which he was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. After his release from prison, he violated various conditions of his supervised release. He stipulated to several violations, and the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 14 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release. On appeal, he contended the district court denied him the right to allocute, as afforded him by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. Under the then-current Rule 32.1, the trial court was required to give the defendant the opportunity to make a statement and present any mitigating information. Reading further in the context of defendant's argument on appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether Rule 32.1 required a trial court to affirmatively extend to the defendant a personal invitation to make a statement. If yes, then the trial court record in this case would have established that the district court erred. While number of federal courts of appeals have held that Rule 32.1 did contain such a requirement, many reached the conclusion that the failure to let a defendant allocute might constitute "plain" error if "clear or obvious" under "well-settled law." Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit interpreted Rule 32.1 to require a personal invitation to allocute, the Tenth Circuit concluded any potential error in not addressing defendant personally was not "plain." Furthermore, the Court concluded that any potential error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding: defense counsel explicitly acknowledged that defendant both understood the district court’s proposed sentence and had no intention to challenge its severity. After careful consideration of defendant's argument on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed his conviction. View "United States v. Craig" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Zander was convicted of two counts of mail fraud, two counts of wire fraud, one count of money laundering, and three counts of willful failure to file federal tax returns. The fraud and money laundering counts at issue in this appeal all arose out of Defendant’s scheme to divert federal grant money intended for the Paiute Indian Tribe for his own personal use. Defendant began working for the Tribe as a tribal planner in 1998, and he subsequently became the Tribe’s trust resource and economic development director. As a director, Defendant worked independently with minimal supervision. In about 2004 or 2005, Defendant suggested the Tribe seek federal grant money to fund the development of an Integrated Resource Management Plan (IRMP) for each of the Tribe's bands. The agency approved and awarded the following five IRMP development grants. Instead of hiring an outside consultant and facilitator to help develop IRMPs for each band, Defendant created false invoices and purchase orders for four fictitious companies and represented to the Tribe that these companies had provided consulting and facilitating services for the IRMP development projects. Based on these representations, the Tribe issued checks made out to these nonexistent companies and, at Defendant’s direction, either mailed the checks to post office boxes that were actually owned or controlled by Defendant or gave them to Defendant to hand-deliver to the purported companies. Defendant was sentenced to sixty-eight months of imprisonment and ordered to pay $202,543.92 in restitution to the Tribe. On appeal, he challenged his convictions on the mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering counts. He also challenged the length of his sentence and the amount of restitution awarded to the Tribe. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the trial court miscalculated defendant's sentence and restitution amount. It reversed and remanded for recalculation. The Court affirmed in all other respects, finding no reversible error. View "United States v. Zander" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant John Snyder was stopped for a traffic offense and, upon approaching the vehicle, the investigating officer smelled the odor of burnt marijuana. Officers then searched his car and discovered a firearm under the driver's seat, which Snyder admitted was his. Snyder was convicted for unlawful possession of the firearm and because of a number of previous felony convictions, received a lengthy 180-month sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA) mandatory minimum sentencing provision. On appeal, Snyder argued: (1) his vehicle was searched without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the ACCA's residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, and applying it to increase his sentence violated due process. The Tenth Circuit concluded: (1) the smell of burnt marijuana was sufficient to establish probable cause for a vehicle cabin search; and (2) the residual clause of the ACCA was controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in "Johnson v. United States," which held that the statute's residual clause was void for vagueness. As a result, the Court remanded for the district court to vacate Snyder's sentence, and to re-sentence him. View "United States v. Snyder" on Justia Law

In 2006, Kimberly Sharp was living homeless in Kansas with her two children. One day while she was with three homeless men at a camp site, David Owen approached the group and harangued them for being homeless. An altercation ensued. Two of the homeless men dragged Owen into the woods and tied him to a tree, where he was later found dead. While investigating the death, police interviewed Sharp. During the interview, she confessed to playing a role and accompanied officers to the camp site to re-enact the events. The police videotaped the interview and re-enactment. She was subsequently charged in state court with first-degree felony murder and kidnapping. Sharp moved to suppress her confessional statements, arguing they were involuntary because the police promised leniency and help finding shelter for her and her children to live. The court denied the motion, concluding her statements were voluntary based on its factual finding that Sharp was not operating under any promises. A jury later found Sharp guilty, and she was sentenced her to life in prison (with a chance of parole after 20 years) on the murder conviction and 61 months in prison on the kidnapping conviction, to run concurrently. She appealed the denial of her motion to suppress. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the record supported the trial court’s finding that Sharp was not operating under any promises. She then filed for habeas relief, arguing her confessions were not voluntary and were admitted in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court denied her petition and granted her a certificate of appealability (“COA”). On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Sharp challenged the state supreme court’s factual findings and again sought habeas relief. the Tenth Circuit concluded Sharp overcame the deferential constraints of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), as to the court’s fact-finding. Thus reviewing this matter de novo, the Court determined Sharp’s confessional statements following a promise of no jail time were involuntary, the state trial court erred by admitting them at trial in violation of Sharp’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the error was harmful. The district court was reversed and Sharp’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to her convictions, subject to the state’s right to retry Sharp within a reasonable time, was granted. View "Sharp v. Rohling" on Justia Law

Defendants Pedro Garcia and Gonzalo Ramirez were convicted of conspiring with other members of their criminal gang to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). They were also convicted of committing various violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR), and multiple firearm counts. They challenged their convictions, arguing that: (1) the government violated "Brady v. Maryland" (373 U.S. 83 (1963)) by failing to disclose promises made to a key cooperating witness; (2) the government put on false evidence at trial in violation of "Napue v. Illinois" (360 U.S. 264 (1959)); (3) the jury was incorrectly instructed that the jurisdictional element of RICO required showing only a minimal effect on interstate commerce; (4) VICAR was unconstitutionally applied because their violent crimes did not affect interstate commerce; and (5) the court erroneously admitted testimonial hearsay under the guise of a gang expert’s opinion, in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: (1) the government did not violate Brady because the undisclosed evidence was not material; (2) the government did not violate Napue; (3) the challenge to the interstate-commerce jury instruction on the RICO charge failed because it was based on a false premise that there was no evidence that the RICO enterprise engaged in economic activity; (4) the challenge to the VICAR convictions failed because it was based on the same false premise; and (5) testimonial hearsay was erroneously admitted but harmless because it was cumulative of other testimony. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Attorney John Cogswell appealed the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction. Acting on behalf of Predator International, Inc., Cogswell filed a lawsuit in April 2009 against Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc. and Industrias El Gamo, S.A. (collectively, Gamo). The original complaint alleged patent infringement and other claims. When it appeared that Lee Phillips, a co-inventor of the patent at issue, was asserting that he still owned half the patent, Cogswell moved to dismiss the infringement claim, explaining that Predator would litigate ownership in state court with the expectation of reviving the patent-infringement claim once it had established its ownership. The state litigation expanded after Gamo purchased Phillips’s interest in the patent. Cogswell then moved in federal court to supplement Predator’s complaint with a challenge to Gamo’s claimed interest in the patent and moved to amend the complaint by reviving the patent-infringement claim. The district court denied the motion. Eventually the district court imposed a Rule 11 sanction on Cogswell for filing the motion to supplement and amend Predator’s complaint, justifying the sanction on grounds that he was forum shopping on the claims he wished to add, his motion came too long after he had learned of Gamo’s purchase of Phillips’s interest in the patent, and nothing had changed to justify his reinstating the patent-infringement claim. The Tenth Circuit reversed: the motion to supplement and amend was not unwarranted under existing law. View "Predator International v. Gamo Outdoor" on Justia Law

The appeals before the Tenth Circuit in this opinion concerned the regulations (as a part of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA")) that required group health plans to cover contraceptive services for women as a form of preventive care ("Mandate"). In response to religious concerns, the Departments implementing the ACA (Health and Human Services ("HHS"), Labor, and Treasury) adopted a regulation that exempted religious employers (churches and their integrated auxiliaries) from covering contraceptives. When religious non-profit organizations complained about their omission from this exemption, the Departments adopted a regulation that allowed them to opt out of providing, paying for, or facilitating contraceptive coverage. Under this regulation, a religious non-profit organization could opt out by delivering a form to their group health plan’s health insurance issuer or third-party administrator or by sending a notification to HHS. The Plaintiffs in the cases here were religious non-profit organizations. They argued that complying with the Mandate or the accommodation scheme imposed a substantial burden on their religious exercise. The Plaintiffs argued the Mandate and the accommodation scheme violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the Religion and Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. While Tenth Circuit recognized the sincerity of Plaintiffs’ beliefs and arguments, it concluded the accommodation scheme relieved Plaintiffs of their obligations under the Mandate and did not substantially burden their religious exercise under RFRA or infringe upon their First Amendment rights. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, (6 F.Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Colo. 2013)), and reversed the district courts’ grants of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in "Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius," (No. CIV-13-1015-F, 2013 WL 6804265 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2013)), and "Reaching Souls International, Inc. v. Burwell," (No. CIV-13-1092-D, 2013 WL 6804259 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2013)). View "Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case alleged their former bankruptcy trustee breached professional duties due them because of conflicting obligations the trustee owed the bankruptcy estate. Plaintiffs sought recovery under state law. However, plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against the trustee alleging diversity jurisdiction and the right to have the case resolved in an Article III court. The trustee maintained the case should have been heard in an Article I bankruptcy court because the alleged-breached professional duties arose from the bankruptcy proceedings. The district court concluded the case should have been heard in the Article I court, and certified its decision for immediate appeal. The Tenth Circuit concluded that an Article III court had jurisdiction, and reversed the district court's order. View "Loveridge v. Hall" on Justia Law

Colorado law required electricity generators to ensure that 20% of the electricity they sell to Colorado consumers comes from renewable sources. Colorado's scheme may require Coloradans to pay more for electricity, but voters overwhelmingly approved the ballot initiative proposing the renewable energy mandate. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether "Colorado's renewable energy mandate survive an encounter with the most dormant doctrine in dormant commerce clause jurisprudence." The Energy and Environment Legal Institute (EELI) argued that Colorado consumers receive their electricity from an interconnected grid serving eleven states and portions of Canada and Mexico. Because electricity could go anywhere on the grid and come from anywhere on the grid, and because Colorado was a net importer of electricity, Colorado's renewable energy mandate effectively meant some out-of-state coal producers, like an EELI member, would lose business with out-of-state utilities who fed their power onto the grid. And this harm to out-of-state coal producers, EELI argued, amounted to a violation of one of the three branches of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Therefore, EELI sought to have the mandate declared unconstitutional. In the end, the district court disagreed with EELI's assessment and after review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed too, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "Energy & Environment Legal v. Epel" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ryan Ridens received a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum sentence enhancement established by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) for certain felons with three or more prior convictions for “violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s].” He claimed the district court erred in imposing the enhancement because: (1) a burglary conviction used to trigger the sentence should not have counted as a “violent felony” because there was insufficient proof that it was a qualifying burglary within the meaning of the ACCA; and (2) triggering the mandatory minimum with the judicially found fact of his three prior qualifying convictions violated the Sixth Amendment. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed his sentence. View "United States v. Ridens" on Justia Law