Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Susan Bennett appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, defendant-appellee Windstream Communications, Inc. Windstream acquired the company that had employed Bennett for twelve years, Paetec Communications, Inc. At the time of the acquisition, Bennett was a Fiber Optic Tech III, responsible for locating fiber optic cable, repairing, splicing, and testing it, and performing routine weekly and monthly maintenance at various sites. After the acquisition, Bennett’s pay and benefits remained the same. A few months after Windstream assumed Paetec’s operations, Todd Moore became Bennett’s supervisor. Moore instituted a policy requiring all technicians, including Bennett, to check in to an assigned manned office each morning at 8 a.m. unless they had tasks to perform at other worksites. Bennett was assigned to check in at the Tulsa office, which was the closest manned office to her home in Gore, Oklahoma. Given the distance between Gore and Tulsa, Bennett was required to commute a total of almost four hours each day. A Human Resources specialist, testified that the check-in policy, though not written, was standard Windstream practice. Bennett understood that she was required to report to the Tulsa office each morning at 8 a.m., yet she often arrived at the Tulsa office more than two hours late. On a number of occasions, she did not report to the Tulsa office at all or left several hours early to drive home, rather than working until 5 p.m. as required. Bennett was disciplined for her tardiness and absences. Concurrently with the discipline, Bennett complained of chest pains and made a workers' compensation claim for "work related stress." Bennett failed to return to work following her medical leave, and she was "separated" from the company. Bennett brought several claims alleging gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), violation of the Oklahoma Antidiscrimination Act (OADA), and constructive discharge in violation of Oklahoma public policy and federal law. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Bennett v. Windstream Communications" on Justia Law

Andalex Resources, Inc. petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of the Mine Safety and Health Administration's (MSHA) decision to revoke previously granted modifications to the application of certain mine safety regulations. In 2008, Andalex ceased mining and sealed two of its mines, the Pinnacle and Aberdeen mines. Although it sealed the mines, Andalex left some infrastructure in place, presumably so it could one day reopen the mines. Andalex complied with one of MSHA's regulations requiring the operator to submit updated maps with notations that it had sealed all openings to the underground mines. After Andalex sealed the two mines, MSHA issued a proposed decision revoking the six modifications it had previously granted to Andalex. When Andalex sealed the two mines, MSHA declared the Pinnacle Mine "[non-producing]" and the Aberdeen Mine "[a]bandoned." MSHA considered Andalex's sealing of the two mines a change of circumstances, allowing revocation under 30 C.F.R. 44.52(c). Andalex disagreed, sought a hearing with an ALJ, and moved for a summary decision, arguing that revocation was improper under section 44.52(c) because MSHA had not demonstrated a change of circumstances or shown that any of the findings MSHA had made in granting the modifications were now invalid. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error in the agency's decision and affirmed. View "Andalex Resources, Inc. v. MSHA" on Justia Law

Oklahoma tried petitioner-appellant Keynon Owens twice for the first degree felony murder of Javier Carranza during a botched robbery of Javier and his cousin, Jesus Carranza. The first trial resulted in a guilty verdict on felony murder, but an acquittal on the predicate charge of the armed robbery of Javier. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) reversed the murder conviction and remanded for retrial on the ground that error committed by the trial court resulted in a substantial possibility of prejudice - that Owens may have been convicted based on his involvement in the robbery as a whole rather than the predicate felony charged in the information. Owens was convicted again after a second trial. On his second appeal to the OCCA, Owens unsuccessfully argued that his retrial was in violation of Double Jeopardy Clause. He contended the jury's acquittal on the predicate robbery felony (of Javier) at his first trial should have barred the State from retrying him for felony murder under constitutional principles of collateral estoppel. Owens next sought habeas relief in federal district court. Deferring to the OCCA's interpretation of federal law, the district court held the denial of Owens's collateral estoppel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Tenth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability (COA) to decide whether Owens's retrial for felony murder violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. In the Tenth Circuit's view, Owens did not meet his burden of "show[ing] that the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." The Court therefore affirmed the denial of the petition and dismissed this appeal. View "Owens v. Trammell" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Elizabeth Kupfer and her husband jointly filed federal income taxes for 2004-2006, but failed to report over $790,000 in gross income. The government charged defendant with three counts of tax evasion, one for each tax year. She admitted that she had failed to report a substantial amount of gross income, but denied that her under-reporting was willful. A jury disagreed and found defendant guilty on each of the three counts. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury; (2) the trial court erred in denying her request for a mistrial after she alleged a juror commented on other charges against defendant during jury deliberations; and (3) the trial court erred in calculating defendant's sentence. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the trial court did miscalculate defendant's sentence. The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "United States v. Kupfer" on Justia Law

While executing a search warrant at defendant-appellant Omero Cordova’s home, law enforcement found marijuana, firearms, and drug paraphernalia. Cordova admitted those items belonged to him. Cordova sought to suppress the evidence against him when he was subsequently charged with various drug related offenses. Although the district court agreed the affidavit failed to provide probable cause, it denied Cordova’s motion to suppress under the good faith exception to the warrant requirement. The court also rejected Cordova’s separate motion to suppress his statements, concluding his confession was voluntary. A jury subsequently convicted Cordova of all six charges against him. Cordova appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress the evidence and his statements. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding the affidavit contained so few facts implicating either Cordova or his current home that a reasonable officer could not have relied on the warrant in good faith. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Cordova" on Justia Law

Luis Carlos Castro-Gomez appealed a district court’s finding that his prior Illinois conviction for attempted murder was a crime of violence triggering a 16-level enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”). The district court overruled Castro-Gomez’s objection, finding that Illinois’ definition of murder corresponded with the uniform generic definition of the offense, triggering the enhancement. Castro-Gomez was sentenced to 35 months in prison. Castro-Gomez’s sole argument on appeal was that Illinois’ definition of murder required only the intent to do great bodily harm, while the generic definition of murder required more. Read together, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-4(a) (West 2015) and 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2015) made intent to kill (which encompasses killing an individual with merely intent to do great bodily harm) an element of Illinois’ definition of attempted murder. This tandem reading cured the only overbreadth of which Castro-Gomez complained. The Tenth Circuit rejected this challenge and affirmed his sentence. View "United States v. Castro-Gomez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Yang You Lee was a native and citizen of Thailand. He became a permanent resident of the United States in 1987 when he was five years old. In 2014, an immigration judge (IJ) sitting in Dallas found him removable for committing a crime of violence (a misdemeanor domestic assault) and denied his application for cancellation of removal. In the Board of Immigration Appeal's order dismissing Lee's appeal, the BIA noted Oklahoma City next to Lee's file number, apparently indicating Lee's final hearing was located there. Lee filed his petition for review in the Fifth Circuit, which transferred the petition to the Tenth Circuit sua sponte and without explanation. The Tenth Circuit concluded after review that venue was proper with the Fifth Circuit, and transferred this case back to that court for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Joan McInerney filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Dennis King, a part-time officer with the Colorado School of Mines Police Department, and Deputy Sheriff Brian McLaughlin, alleging that their warrantless entry into her home violated the Fourth Amendment. McInerney appealed the district court’s grant of Officer King’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. In July 2009, King was assigned to investigate a complaint that McInerney had gotten into a physical altercation on the School of Mines campus. King did not knock on the door or announce his presence, and he did not attempt to contact McInerney by phone. As he stated in an affidavit, the condition of McInerney’s home "caused me concern, including over officer safety." He contacted the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office once he determined this situation no longer involved delivery of a summons. Deputy McLaughlin arrived on the scene, and the two officers went to the front porch and knocked and announced their presence several times. McInerney later testified that she was sound asleep in her bedroom with a noisy air conditioner three feet from the head of her bed, and that her car was parked out front. McLaughlin radioed his dispatcher to say he was entering the home to perform a welfare check. Both officers entered with their guns drawn. The day after the incident, McInerney told an internal affairs investigator that she was furious, felt "totally violated" after the incident. McInerney's suit alleged her rights had been violated when the officers entered her residence without a warrant, without her consent, and without any "legally recognizable exigent circumstances" justifying their warrantless entry. In dismissing McInerney's claims, the court ruled that King was not personally responsible for McLaughlin’s warrantless entry into the home because he had no authority to direct McLaughlin’s actions. The court concluded that it was objectively reasonable for King to enter the house behind McLaughlin to provide backup for the deputy’s safety. The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, finding that King had fair notice that his conduct in entering McInerney’s house without a warrant was unlawful. "[B]ased on the existing case law at the time of Officer King’s warrantless entry – both those cases finding exigent circumstances and those holding such circumstances were not present – it was clearly established that the circumstances he confronted did not constitute exigent circumstances. [. . .] it was clearly established that officers may not create exigent circumstances to justify their actions. Thus, the district court erred in granting Officer King summary judgment based on qualified immunity." View "McInerney v. King" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Clinton Eldridge appealed the denial of his habeas petition. He pled guilty to various violent felonies and was incarcerated at a federal prison. On appeal, he argued that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) incorrectly computed his sentence by not crediting all of his time served from his original sentencing hearing through his resentencing, a period of nearly nine years. He also argued that the district court failed to address his arguments concerning credit for time he served from his arrest to his original sentencing (235 days) and for time he served after his parole (for an earlier crime) was revoked (61 days). Because Eldridge was convicted and sentenced in the District of Columbia Superior Court, a court of general jurisdiction separate from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Tenth Circuit concluded it was not obvious whether petitioner was a federal or state prisoner. Under 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1), if Eldridge was a state prisoner, he had to obtain a Certificate of Appealability (COA) before he could appeal. If he was a federal prisoner, he did not need a COA to appeal a final judgment in a section 2241 case. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Eldridge was a state prisoner for purposes of section 2253(c)(1) and that he had to obtain a COA to proceed on appeal. The Court further concluded that Eldridge did not meet the necessary showing to obtain a COA. Accordingly, the Court denied a COA and dismissed this appeal. View "Eldridge v. Berkebile" on Justia Law

Pro se plaintiff George Farmer, a resident of Colorado and a licensed attorney, sued defendant Banco Popular under federal and state law to challenge Banco’s demand that he pay off the full amount owed under a $150,000 Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) his deceased father obtained in 2001. In 2012, the parties informed the district court they had reached a settlement: Banco was to pay Farmer $30,000 and forgive some principal, unpaid interest, and attorney’s fees. Farmer would pay $137,380.94 in satisfaction of the HELOC, due later that year. Farmer “began to negotiate a number of the . . . terms of the draft agreement.” Banco “sent Farmer the completed settlement agreement, but Farmer sought changes to the exhibits.” These exhibits included a deed in lieu of foreclosure and a satisfaction of mortgage. After Farmer received the revised exhibits he still would not sign the settlement agreement, but “again sought more changes, including the amount, timing, and structure of the payment.” Banco ultimately filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Notwithstanding his prior representations to the court, Farmer sought to reduce his net payment of $107,380.34 under the terms of the agreement to $100,000, but pay it by October 1 rather than by October 15. The court held another hearing on September 10 at which Farmer again told the court the settlement was fine: “‘[W]e are all in agreement to enforce the settlement,’ and ‘the only thing that remains is the date that my payment is due.’” The parties then agreed that Banco would not pay Farmer $30,000 as previously agreed, but instead, Farmer would pay Banco $107,380.34 by November 15, 2012. “Banco Popular sent Farmer an agreement reflecting the new amount and due date, but instead of signing, Farmer asked for changes and additions. Banco Popular refused most of those changes and asked Farmer to sign the revised agreement, which he never did.” A prior Tenth Circuit decision recited, in detail, Farmer’s ongoing conduct that led the district judge to “warn that he would impose the most severe sanctions and penalties if the parties did not comply with his order” enforcing the settlement. "Now here we are again:" Farmer appealed the district court order imposing fees and costs on him as a punitive sanction. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order, as modified: sanctions imposed on Farmer in the form of fees and costs due and payable to Banco totaled $50,824.53; Farmer was admonished that further prolongation of this appeal absent good cause would result in the Court imposing its own monetary sanctions on him pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38. The Clerk of Court was directed to initiate a formal attorney disciplinary proceeding for the Court to consider further whether additional discipline is appropriate. View "Farmer v. Banco Popular" on Justia Law