Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Joyce Rock was terminated from her position as principal of a school in the Central Consolidated School District (the District) after she spoke at a public meeting in opposition to a proposal by the District’s administration to close her school. Rock brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against defendants the District’s Board of Education and Superintendent Don Levinski, alleging that they violated the First Amendment by retaliating against her for her speech. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that they did not violate Rock’s First Amendment rights and that Levinksi was entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that Rock’s interest in publicly expressing her policy views did not overcome Defendants’ concern that those holding high-ranking policy positions speak publicly with a single voice on policy matters. View "Rock v. Levinski" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kizzy Kalu recruited foreign nationals to come to the United States for specialized nursing employment, required them to work as non-specialized laborers in nursing homes, retained a portion of their wages for personal profit, and threatened them with deportation and financial ruin if they did not comply with his demands. He misrepresented the terms of their employment to the government to obtain visas and bring the foreign nationals into the country. The government charged defendant in a 95-count superseding indictment. After a trial, a jury found defendant guilty of 89 of the counts alleged, including: (1) mail fraud; (2) encouraging and inducing an alien; (3) visa fraud; (4) forced labor; (5) trafficking in forced labor; and (6) money laundering. The district court sentenced defendant to 130 months of imprisonment on some counts and 120 months on others, with the sentences running concurrently. The court also ordered forfeiture in the amount of $475,592.94 and awarded $3,790,338.55 in restitution. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendant argued the district court erroneously instructed the jury on various offenses and sought reversal of his convictions. He also argued the district court abused its discretion in calculating restitution. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Kalu" on Justia Law

Michael and Rebecca Gordon filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. In their petition, they sought to treat $2,051 in a savings account as an exempt asset under the Colorado exemption for “[p]roperty . . . held in or payable from any pension or retirement plan or deferred compensation plan.” The Trustee objected on the ground that the exemption did not apply to funds once paid out from a retirement plan. The bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee’s objection and denied the Gordons’ motion for reconsideration. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado affirmed, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit also affirmed. View "In re: Gordon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tab Bonidy lived in a rural area near Avon, Colorado. He was granted a concealed carry permit under Colorado law and regularly carried a handgun for self-defense. Avon’s post office did not deliver mail to residents’ homes; instead, it provided mailboxes in the post office building, and residents had to travel there to collect their mail. The post office lobby, where residents’ mailboxes are located, is open to the public at all times. The post office did not regularly employ security officers. Bonidy sued the United States Postal Service (USPS) challenging 39 C.F.R. section 232.1(l) (“the regulation”), which prohibited the storage and carriage of firearms on USPS property. Bonidy claims the regulation is unconstitutional as applied to him because it violated his Second Amendment right to (1) bring his gun into the USPS building in Avon; and (2) to store the gun in the post office parking lot while he picked up his mail. The district court ruled, on cross-motions for summary judgment, that the regulation was constitutional insofar as it prohibited guns in the building, but unconstitutional insofar as it prohibited guns in the parking lot. Both sides appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the regulation was constitutional as to all USPS property at issue in this case, including the parking lot, because the Second Amendment right to bear arms has not been extended to “government buildings.” Alternatively, even if the Court concluded that the parking lot did not qualify as a “government building,” the Court stated it would uphold this regulation as constitutional as applied to the parking lot under independent intermediate scrutiny. View "Bonidy v. United States Postal Svc." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Gary Sparks was convicted of witness tampering and sentenced to thirty-six months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Sparks’ conviction arose out of a statement he made to his thirteen-year-old granddaughter, “H.L.,” in advance of her expected testimony in a criminal proceeding against her mother, Sparks’ daughter, Stacy Ashley. Ashley faced charges for, inter alia, distribution of a substance containing oxymorphone, with death resulting. Investigators met with H.L., who told them that she had witnessed Ashley trading pills with the deceased individual the night before he overdosed and died. After discussing H.L.’s likely testimony with Ashley on two occasions, Sparks took H.L. to visit Ashley in jail roughly three weeks before the expected trial date. After the visit, Sparks took H.L. to dinner. H.L. confided in Sparks that she had spoken with an investigator. According to H.L., Sparks told her “you should only lie about the important stuff.” On appeal, Sparks argued that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the jury was not properly instructed on a possible affirmative defense. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Sparks" on Justia Law

The Pueblo of Jemez brought suit against the United States under the federal common law and the Quiet Title Act (QTA), seeking to quiet its allegedly unextinguished and continuing aboriginal title to the lands of what was known as Valles Caldera National Preserve. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of law and dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). It reasoned that sovereign immunity barred the action based on its conclusion that the Jemez Pueblo’s title claim against the United States accrued in 1860 when the United States granted the lands in question to the heirs of Luis Maria Cabeza de Baca (the Baca heirs). The claim thus fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA), which waived sovereign immunity and provided a cause of action to all Indian claims against the government that accrued before 1946 so long as they were filed within a five year statute of limitations period. Because the claim was not so filed, it became barred by sovereign immunity. The Pueblo appealed, arguing that its aboriginal title was not extinguished by the 1860 grant to the Baca heirs and that its claim for interference with its Indian title did not accrue until 2000, after the United States acquired an interest in the Valles Caldera and began interfering with the Jemez Pueblo’s access to the land. Upon careful consideration of the arguments made on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings: "This appeal is not about whether the Jemez Pueblo holds aboriginal title. On remand, the Jemez Pueblo will have to prove that it had, and still has, aboriginal title to the land at issue in the case. This appeal concerns whether the 1860 Baca grant extinguished the Jemez Pueblo’s alleged aboriginal title to the lands which are the subject of this action. We hold it did not and the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, the 1860 Baca grant itself provided a pre-1946 claim against the United States the Jemez Pueblo could have brought under the ICCA." View "Pueblo of Jemez v. United States" on Justia Law

Cox Enterprises was the defendant in a class-action antitrust suit. Shortly before trial was set to begin, Cox moved to arbitration. Cox' request came after considerable discovery, potentially dispositive motions, and a petition to the Tenth Circuit. The district court determined that Cox’s assertion of its right to arbitrate was "overly late" and inconsistent with its conduct in litigating the case, and thus held that Cox had waived its right to compel arbitration. After applying the six factors outlined by the Tenth Circuit in "Peterson v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.," (849 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1988)) for determining whether a party has waived its right to compel arbitration, the Court concluded that Cox did waive its right to compel arbitration. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "In re: Cox Enterprises" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Jeffrey Williams filed a motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea to various drug and firearm charges based on newly discovered evidence. Specifically, defendant submitted affidavits in support of his claim that his guilty plea was involuntarily entered because the law enforcement officers investigating his case planted evidence, gave false testimony, and used threats and intimidation to suborn perjury from other witnesses. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court vacated defendant's convictions, concluding that the officers had perpetrated a fraud on the court and that vacating defendant's convictions was necessary to correct the fraud and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The government appealed, arguing the district court lacked jurisdiction over defendant's motion due to his failure to first obtain certification from the Tenth Circuit, as required by 28 U.S.C. 2255, permitting him to file a second or successive petition for habeas corpus relief. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) limited the courts' power to correct fraud on the court and to prevent a miscarriage of justice when the court vacates a conviction in response to a second or successive habeas petition. "Although a district court may invoke these powers sua sponte, the district court here acted on Mr. Williams's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which is a second or successive petition." The Court therefore reversed the district court's order vacating defendant's conviction for lack of jurisdiction. But the Tenth Circuit exercised its discretion to treat defendant's appellate brief as a request to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h), and granted that request in part. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant supplied "significant" amounts of power cocaine to Virok Webb and his associates, who ran a drug distribution ring out of Junction City, Kansas. The Government charged Dewberry and several other codefendants with conspiracy to distribute 280 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of crack cocaine (Count 1) and conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of powder cocaine (Count 2). Only Dewberry went to trial; the other codefendants entered into plea agreements. A jury found Dewberry guilty on both charges. The jury also returned special verdicts pertaining to the amount of drugs and finding he conspired to distribute 280 grams or more of crack and 5 kilograms or more of powder. The district court sentenced. Dewberry to the mandatory minimum of 20 years in prison on Count 1 and 168 months on Count 2. It determined both sentences would run concurrently. On appeal, Dewberry challenged: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence for the two conspiracy convictions; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence for the jury's finding that he was accountable for 280 grams or more of crack; (3) the district court's imposition of a 168-month prison term on Count 2; and (4) the district court's denial of his initial pretrial motion to sever. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Dewberry" on Justia Law

Defendants Michael Jacoby, Derek Zar, and Susanne Zar appealed convictions and sentences arising from their participation in a mortgage fraud scheme. From 2005 to 2006, real estate agent Michael Jacoby devised and executed a mortgage fraud scheme involving the purchase of 18 residential properties in Colorado. Jacoby recruited willing sellers to sell homes at inflated prices, willing buyers to purchase the homes by obtaining mortgage loans based on falsified loan applications, and willing investors to supply short-term loans to cover the buyers' down payments. Jacoby acted as realtor for each transaction, while Derek Zar and his mother, Susanne Zar, were buyers. Derek Zar purchased seven of the properties with fraudulent loan applications and participated in the sales of four other properties either by arranging for the sale of or selling three properties to Susanne Zar and one to another buyer. Susanne Zar purchased six of the properties with fraudulent loan applications and participated in the sales of four other properties by preparing false documents to support Derek Zar's purchases. For some transactions, Jacoby arranged for sellers to "donate" part of the sales proceeds to grant programs without disclosing to lenders that the "donation" would be funneled back to buyers to repay short-term loans from investors covering the buyers' down payments. In other transactions, Jacoby arranged for back-to-back sales involving the same property. The government tried the defendants together, but each defendant separately appealed and filed separate briefs. Finding no reversible trial or sentencing errors as to any defendant, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Zar (Derek)" on Justia Law