Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1989, FBI agents raided the nuclear weapons production facility known as Rocky Flats, first operated by Dow Chemical Company, then Rockwell International Corporation. The agents discovered that plant workers had been mishandling radioactive waste for years. The waste found its way into the nearby soil and groundwater.The plant's neighbors followed the government's criminal action with a civil suit, citing the federal Price-Anderson Act and state nuisance law as grounds for relief. A jury found for plaintiffs, and the district court approved roughly $177 million in compensatory damages and $200 million in punitive damages, as well as $549 million in prejudgment interest. Defendants appealed, arguing that the district court had failed to instruct the jury properly about the terms of the Price-Anderson Act. Dow and Rockwell made a "curious tactical decision," arguing that the district court's jury instructions about what constituted a nuclear incident were too permissive. The Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court's jury instructions about what did and did not qualify as a nuclear incident were too permissive. On this basis, it vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of the Act's correct construction. Plaintiffs appealed, renouncing the benefits the Act provided to both parties. Plaintiffs accepted the premise that they could not prove a nuclear incident as the term was interpreted by the Tenth Circuit. Instead, plaintiffs relied on their state law tort claim. Defendants countered with the argument that the Act precluded plaintiffs' state law claim. Furthermore, defendants argued that the Tenth Circuit's mandate in the first appeal of this case barred plaintiffs from relief on their state law nuisance verdict. The district court ruled in favor of defendants, and again this case came before the Tenth Circuit on appeal. "In two separate appeals spanning many years the defendants have identified no lawful impediment to the entry of a state law nuisance judgment on the existing verdict. They have shown no preemption by federal law, no error in the state law nuisance instructions, no mandate language specifically precluding this course. No other error of any kind is even now alleged." The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cook v. Rockwell International" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were five women who were formerly incarcerated at the Hillside Community Corrections Center in Oklahoma City. They filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against multiple defendants, alleging they were sexually abused and harassed in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs’ complaint named fifteen defendants, including Defendant-Appellant Charlotte Day and Defendant-Appellant Mary Pavliska, both of whom were guards at Hillside during the relevant period. Plaintiffs alleged Day and Pavliska were aware of the abuse and did nothing to prevent it. The claims against several defendants were dismissed without prejudice. The remaining defendants (except the alleged perpetrator Anthony Bobelu) moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to all movants except Day and Pavliska. The district ruled a jury could conclude from the evidence presented that Day and Pavliska were deliberately indifferent to a known substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiffs. In an interlocutory appeal, Day and Pavliska argued to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that the district court erred by ruling they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Day’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Pavliska. View "Castillo v. Day" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, defendant-appellant Kansas Department of Labor (KDOL) argued the district court should have dismissed plaintiff-appellee Kathleen Arbogast's suit because: (1) KDOL lacks the capacity to sue and to be sued under Kansas law; and (2) even if KDOL was a proper defendant, it was immune from suit by operation of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Arbogast was employed in the Workers Compensation Division of KDOL. She suffered from asthma and, in April 2008, complained that perfumes and other strong fragrances in the workplace were impairing her ability to work. In September 2010, Arbogast was moved to a workspace in the basement of her office building in an attempt to alleviate the problem. But Arbogast continued to suffer asthma attacks when coworkers wearing fragrances would come speak with her, prompting Arbogast to make additional complaints to her supervisor. In 2011, Karin Brownlee, then-Secretary of Labor, terminated Arbogast's employment at KDOL. The Tenth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider KDOL's capacity argument, but the Court exercised jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and affirmed the district court's determination that KDOL was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Arbogast's claims. View "Arbogast v. Kansas Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Nearly forty years ago the Ute Tribe filed a lawsuit alleging that Utah and several local governments were unlawfully trying to displace tribal authority on tribal lands. After a decade of proceedings at the district court and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc. In the decision that followed, "Ute III," the court ruled for the Tribe and rejected Utah's claim that congressional action had diminished three constituent parts of Ute tribal lands (the Uncompahgre Reservation, the Uintah Valley Reservation, and certain national forest areas. When the Supreme Court denied certiorari, that "should have been the end of the matter." State officials chose "to disregard the binding effect of the Tenth Circuit decision in order to attempt to relitigate the boundary dispute in a friendlier forum" by continuing to prosecute tribal members in state court for conduct within the boundaries recognized by Ute III. Utah argued to the Utah Supreme Court that Ute III did not diminish tribal territory did diminish at least a part of the Uintah Valley Reservation. The Court agreed, as did the U.S. Supreme Court (despite having denied certiorari to "Ute III"). The issue of what to do with the mandate of "Ute III" remained: keeping it in place could leave the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hagen to control only cases arising from Utah state courts and not federal district courts. In "Ute V," the Tenth Circuit elected to recall and modify Ute III's mandate. On appeal, Utah sought to diminish parts of the national forest and Uncompahgre lands. "Ute V" rejected this request. The Tribe filed suit in federal court, seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the State and its counties from pursuing criminal prosecutions of Indians in state court for offenses arising in areas declared by Ute III and V to be Indian country, and prohibiting the State and its subdivisions from otherwise relitigating matters settled by those decisions. Before the Tenth Circuit in this matter were three interlocutory (but immediately appealable) collateral orders this latest litigation has spawned: (1) the Tribe's request for a preliminary injunction; (2) the Tribe's claim of immunity from the counterclaims; and (3) Uintah County's claim of immunity from the Tribe's suit. In all three decisions the district court denied the requested relief. But the Tenth Circuit found Tribe's arguments on all three points as "well taken." The district court should have issued a preliminary injunction; the Tribe was shielded by sovereign immunity; and Uintah County was not. View "Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah" on Justia Law

Paul Levy filed suit, alleging that he was constructively discharged from the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) in retaliation for advocating for better accommodation for a disabled co-worker. He filed retaliation claims against SRS under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to SRS on both claims, concluding that SRS was entitled to sovereign immunity on Levy's ADA claim and that Levy's Rehabilitation Act claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Levy appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Levy v. Kansas Dept of SRS" on Justia Law

Appellants William Karl Jenkins and M. Earlene Jenkins (collectively, Mr. Jenkins) appealed an order of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) that affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of their claim for the payment of certain secured promissory notes. Alternate Fuels, Inc. (AFI) was a Kansas corporation that formerly engaged in surface coal mining operations. On December 9, 1992, AFI filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the District of Kansas. AFI briefly continued its coal mining operations under the terms of a confirmed plan of reorganization. At that time, John Warmack acquired 100% of the stock of AFI and assumed control. Mr. Warmack then formed Cimarron Energy Co., LLC to handle the mining operations for which AFI still held permits. Mr. Warmack owned 99% of Cimarron. Twenty-four certificates of deposit, valued at approximately $1.4 million, were pledged to secure multiple reclamation bonds. Then, Cimarron recommenced mining operations. AFI’s equipment was released to AFI’s secured creditors, who ultimately foreclosed and sold the equipment back to Cimarron. Mr. Jenkins entered into an agreement to purchase Mr. Warmack’s interest in AFI. Mr. Jenkins did not intend to resume mining operations or otherwise operate AFI. Instead, Mr. Jenkins believed that, through his political connections, he could fulfill AFI’s remaining reclamation obligations and obtain the proceeds of the release of the 24 certificates of deposit and the sale of Cimarron’s mining equipment. Mr. Jenkins testified that he knew AFI had no prospect of repaying two promissory noted from its own funds; his only prospects for future payment were the certificates of deposit. The bankruptcy court found that Mr. Jenkins’ claims were not allowed claims because the transfers alleged to be consideration for the notes should have been recharacterized as equity contributions. In the alternative, the court found that Mr. Jenkins failed to sustain his burden of proof as to the validity and amount of his claim, or that Mr. Jenkins putatively secured claim should have been subordinated to the status of an unsecured claim. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that Mr. Jenkins' transfers did not meet the criteria for either recharacterization or equitable subordination, and he satisfied his burden of proof as to the validity and amount of his claim. View "Redmond v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2012, a federal grand jury indicted defendant-appellant Timothy Vanderwerff for three child-pornography-related offenses. He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the district court erred in rejecting his initial (first) plea agreement with the government because it contained an appellate waiver. The government agreed with defendant, as did appointed amicus counsel, and all parties urged reversal and remand for resentencing. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit also agreed that such relief is appropriate. Specifically, the Court concluded that the district court’s rejection of Vanderwerff’s plea agreement was premised on legally erroneous and irrelevant considerations; consequently, its action constituted an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Vanderwerff" on Justia Law

Defendant Ronald Ullmann pled guilty to making a false statement. The charge arose from sexually explicit written conversations between Ullmann and an undercover FBI agent posing online as a thirteen-year-old minor. Ullmann was sentenced to 60 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The district court imposed twelve conditions of supervised release which restricted Internet use. When Ullmann was released from prison, the special conditions took effect. Shortly thereafter, however, the U.S. Probation Office filed a motion to modify the conditions of his supervised release, claiming technological advances necessitated the modifications. The modifications replaced the twelve conditions restricting Internet use with a single condition. Although the language of the modified condition stated that it authorized “restrictions and/or prohibitions” on the use of the Internet and Internet-capable devices, the Probation Office’s manual acknowledged that “Tenth Circuit case law did not allow for an absolute restriction from computer access, except possibly in the most extreme case. . . . Offenders are permitted to use a computer and access the Internet, with the clear understanding that their computer activities are being monitored.” Ullmann had no objection to continued restrictions and monitoring. Instead, he narrowly objected to the “prohibitions” on his access to the Internet and use of the panoply of devices listed in the proposed single condition. He also objected that some of the devices listed in the modified condition, such as “Internet appliance devices,” were neither intended for nor capable of use for interpersonal communication. At the hearing on the proposed modification, the district court orally clarified that the “restrictions and/or prohibitions” language only restricted (and did not prohibit) use of various Internet-capable devices. Additionally, the court explained that the restrictions covered only certain Internet-capable devices by stating that Ullmann “has not been prohibited from using his computer, cell phone or any other electronic appliance with internet access. Rather, [Ullmann]’s use of these items may be restricted in order to monitor his post-release conduct.” In its subsequent written order, the district court repeated these conclusions verbatim, overruled Ullmann’s objections, and imposed the modified condition. Ullmann appealed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed because the district court's oral pronouncement prior to modification, clarifying that it was restricting, rather than prohibiting, Ullmann’s use of the Internet and Internet-capable devices, saved the otherwise deficient condition. View "United States v. Ullmann" on Justia Law

Defendant Elvin Alisuretove pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud arising out of his role in a scheme that involved “skimming” debit card account information from convenience store gas pumps and then using that account information to make cash withdrawals from automated teller machines (ATMs). Alisuretove was sentenced to 63 months in prison, to be followed by a 36-month term of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay restitution totaling $240,682.27. Alisuretove appealed, arguing that the district court, in determining his total offense level and the length of his sentence, erred in calculating the amount of loss associated with his conduct. Alisuretove also argued that the district court erred in determining the amount of restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded reversed the district court's calculation of restitution owed, but affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Alisuretove" on Justia Law

In 2008, Donald Stewart, driving a semi-tractor trailer, hit the back of a tow truck driven by Melvin Mathis. Mathis sued Stewart and his employer, Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., for negligence in the District of Wyoming. After a bench trial, the district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court determined Stewart was 100 percent at fault for the accident, and entered judgment in favor of Mathis. The damages award, which was significantly less than Mathis sought, was based on findings that his spinal injuries from the accident were only temporary and he did not suffer a mild traumatic brain injury (“MTBI”). Mathis moved for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the judge’s law clerk had an undisclosed conflict of interest. The court denied the motion. On appeal, Mathis challenged: (1) the district court’s factual findings relating to his back and head injuries; (2) whether the court impermissibly allowed a defense expert to testify beyond his qualifications as a biomechanical engineer; and (3) the court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on the alleged law clerk conflict. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking" on Justia Law