Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Greyfield Capital was a defunct Canadian company. Two "con-men" found a signature stamp belonging to the company's former president, and used it as an officially-sanctioned "seal" to appoint themselves corporate officers, issue millions of unregistered shares in their names. The men then took the unregistered, issued shares to create a penny stock "pump-and-dump" scheme. Regulators began looking for those who had helped facilitate the sale of Greyfield's unregistered shares. Regulators were led to petitioners ACAP and Gary Hume. ACAP was a penny stock brokerage firm in Salt Lake City, and Gary Hume was its head trader and compliance manager. Petitioners did not dispute their liability stemming from the Greyfield scheme, rather, they disputed the sanctions they received. FINRA decided to fine ACAP $100,000 and Mr. Hume $25,000, and to suspend Hume from the securities industry for six months. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reviewed and sustained these sanctions. ACAP and Hume then petitioned the Tenth Circuit to appeal the SEC's decision. After review, the Tenth Circuit could not "see how [it] might overturn the agency's decision." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the SEC's decision. View "ACAP Financial v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on an environmental challenge to a federal agency's decision to grant inspection services for the slaughter and processing of horses and other equines at three slaughterhouses. The district court affirmed the agency's grants of inspection. Plaintiffs, various organizations and individuals opposed to horse slaughter, appealed. One slaughterhouse subsequently withdrew its application for inspection; a second slaughterhouse surrendered its grant of equine inspection in order to obtain a grant of inspection for cattle slaughter, and the third slaughterhouse failed to successfully challenge a state permitting decision to allow only non-equine slaughter at the facility. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit found that the then-current congressional appropriations act prohibited funding for equine slaughter inspections. The Tenth Circuit therefore dismissed this appeal and vacated the district court's decision for mootness. View "Front Range Equine v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

In 2012, authorities discovered 4800 child-pornography videos and images in defendant Jesse Evans' possession, 100 of which depicted his own minor daughters and his minor niece. Evans was charged with five counts of production, distribution, and possession of child pornography. He eventually entered a guilty plea to an added sixth count of production of child pornography. Over Evans's objection, the district court applied section 4B1.5(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which provided for a five-point sentence enhancement if "the defendant's instant offense of conviction is a covered sex crime . . . and the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct." The district court specifically found that Evans had produced child-pornography videos on November 5, 2011, and November 25, 2011, thus satisfying the "pattern of conduct" element of 4B1.5(b). The resultant Guidelines sentencing range was 360 months. The district court granted Evans's motion for a downward variance, and sentenced him to 252 months in prison. On appeal of the sentence, Evans argued that 4B1.5(b) did not apply to him because the "pattern of activity" requirement was not met. He also argued that the district court erred in applying 4B1.5(b) because the government did not request it, and he claimed the enhancement should not have been applied "in the interest of fairness." Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC operated a Hampton Inn hotel in Siloam Springs, Arkansas. It purchased a general liability insurance policy from Century Surety Company covering the Hampton Inn for the period of November 13, 2012, through November 13, 2013. Siloam Springs purchased the Commercial Lines Policy through Century Surety's agent, RCI Insurance Group of Claremore, Oklahoma. On January 21, 2013, several guests at the Hampton Inn suffered bodily injury due to a sudden, accidental leak of carbon monoxide from the heating element of an indoor swimming pool. Siloam Springs sought coverage under the Commercial Lines Policy. Century Surety denied coverage, relying on an exclusion set out in the Commercial Lines Policy. That provision (the "Indoor Air Exclusion") excluded from coverage "[b]odily injury' . . . arising out of, caused by, or alleging to be contributed to in any way by any toxic, hazardous, noxious, irritating, pathogenic or allergen qualities or characteristics of indoor air regardless of cause." After Century Surety removed the case to federal court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In its motion, Century Surety asserted that because the insurance contract was to be performed in Arkansas, Oklahoma choice-of-law rules made Arkansas law applicable. It further argued that the Indoor Air Exclusion unambiguously excluded coverage for the carbon-monoxide based injuries to the guests at the Hampton Inn. For its part, Siloam Springs "decline[d] to contest" Century Surety's assertion that Arkansas law applied because, it asserted, "Arkansas law does not differ from Oklahoma law in any way material to [the] coverage dispute." As to the merits, Siloam Springs asserted the Indoor Air Exclusion was ambiguous and, as such, had to be construed in favor of coverage. Without definitively resolving whether Oklahoma or Arkansas law applied, but relying on precedent from Arkansas, the district court granted summary judgment to Century Surety. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review called for the Court to determine the citizenship, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, of a limited liability company ("LLC"). Because the materials before the Court did not demonstrate that complete diversity of citizenship existed at the time of the filing of the complaint, the matter was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Siloam Springs Hotel v. Century Surety Co." on Justia Law

Intervenor-Appellant, the Committee to Elect Pete Dinelli Mayor appealed a district court's ruling that a provision of the Albuquerque City Charter limiting campaign contributions was unconstitutional. The original defendants chose not to appeal. The Committee, an intervenor whose interests were aligned with the original defendants, filed a notice of appeal. Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee, Giant Cab Company moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the Committee lacked standing because it did not have a direct stake in the outcome of the appeal. The Committee argued it had the right to enforce the limitation on campaign contributions, giving it a personal stake in the outcome. The Tenth Circuit, after review, concluded that the citizen-complaint provision of the Albuquerque Election Code did not give the Committee a personal stake in the litigation. Accordingly, the Court granted Giant Cab's motion and dismissed the appeal. View "Greenbaum v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on a dispute over insurance coverage following a private airplane crash. Garmin International, Inc., purchased an insurance policy from Appellees (the insurance companies). In 2008, while the insurance policy was in effect, Appellant Henry Bartle, an individual who had some dealings with Garmin, crashed while piloting his malfunctioning personal aircraft, injuring himself and his passengers. Bartle sought coverage under Garmin’s insurance policy for indemnification from claims brought against Bartle by his injured passengers. Appellees, the insurers, brought suit federal district court seeking a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act that Bartle did not qualify as an "Insured" under Garmin’s policy. Bartle submitted evidence to the district court to demonstrate he was indeed an "Insured," but the district court refused to consider much of the evidence because the evidence failed to conform to district court rules regarding proper citation. Without considering this evidence, the district court granted summary judgment to the insurers, finding that Bartle was not an "Insured" under the policy. Bartle appealed both the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurers and its refusal to consider the excluded evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[t]he district court concluded, and Mr. Bartle acknowledged, that the exhibits submitted could not be feasibly used by the district court without great difficulty. The district court cannot be expected to review evidence, evaluate arguments, or arrive at reasoned conclusions without usable citations. In this case the merits cannot be separated from the process, and ultimately Mr. Bartle bore the responsibility to present evidence that would allow a rational trier of fact to find in his favor." View "Certain Underwriters v. Bartle" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the developer of a master-planned subdivision (master developer) was liable under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act when a different developer sells units in a condominium project in the subdivision without providing a property report or making a statement of record available, as required by 15 U.S.C. 1703(a)(1)(A)-(B). RP Steamboat Springs, LLC was formed for the purpose of developing a mixed-housing, master-planned subdivision in Steamboat Springs, Colorado, called Wildhorse Meadows. RP entered into an agreement with the City of Steamboat Springs to develop Wildhorse Meadows. As master developer and initial owner of the Trailhead parcel, RP engaged in a variety of marketing activities through its listing agent, S&P Properties, for the development as a whole and for Trailhead Lodge specifically. A group of investors formed Trailhead Lodge at Wildhorse Meadows, LLC for the purpose of developing the Trailhead Lodge condominiums. Trailhead LLC hired Resort Ventures as its management company and S&P Properties as its listing and marketing agent. S&P Properties and Trailhead LLC's unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a separate project agreement for the Trailhead Lodge. RP entered into a project agreement with S&P Properties concerning Trailhead Lodge and then assigned all of its rights, title, and interest in the Trailhead Project Agreement to Trailhead LLC. RP transferred the Trailhead parcel to Trailhead LLC by special warranty deed. Two days before Trailhead LLC officially obtained ownership of the Trailhead parcel, several Buyers entered into (substantially identical) preconstruction purchase and sale agreements with Trailhead LLC. RP was not a signatory to the Contracts, but it was mentioned as the master developer. Buyers each paid a deposit toward the purchase of their respective Trailhead Lodge units. At the time Trailhead LLC entered into the Contracts with Buyers, no one had filed a statement of record with the Department of Housing and Urban Development for Trailhead Lodge, nor were Buyers provided a property report, as required by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. As a result of this failure, Buyers had the right to rescind the Contracts within two years after signing, which they did. The now-insolvent Trailhead LLC did not return the deposits Buyers paid under the Contracts. Buyers filed this action Trailhead LLC, RP, and S&P Properties. Among other claims, Buyers alleged Trailhead LLC, RP, and S&P Properties all qualified as developers under the Land Sales Act and that they violated the Land Sales Act by failing to file a statement of record and failing to provide a property report when Buyers purchased the condominium units. The district court subsequently granted Buyers' motion for summary judgment against Trailhead LLC on the Land Sales Act claims. Buyers later settled all claims against S&P Properties, and S&P Properties was dismissed from the case. Buyers and RP agreed to submit those Land Sales Act claims to the district court on written briefs, supporting affidavits, and stipulated facts. In its ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court ruled that RP was not liable under the relevant provisions of the Land Sales Act. Buyers timely appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded that because the master developer in this case, RP Steamboat Springs, LLC (RP), neither directly nor indirectly sold the condominium units at issue, it was not liable under the Land Sales Act. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of RP. View "Dalzell v. Trailhead Lodge at Wildhorse" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellee Manuel Olmos (a citizen of Mexico) was convicted in state court on charges involving identity theft, providing false information to a pawnbroker, and forgery of a government document. Olmos received probation, but was taken into federal custody six days later on the ground that his conviction triggered mandatory detention. Olmos sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to a bond hearing, where he could seek release while his removal hearing was pending. The district court agreed and granted a writ of habeas corpus, holding that he was entitled to a bond hearing. At the eventual bond hearing, Olmos was released on a $12,000 bond. The government argued on appeal that the Attorney General had a statutory duty to detain Olmos (without a bond hearing) notwithstanding his six-day gap in custody. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the government and reversed based on: (1) deference to the way the Board of Immigration Appeals has interpreted section 1226(c); and (2) the continued duty to impose mandatory detention even if the Attorney General had waited too long to take custody of Olmos. View "Olmos v. Holder" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Maurice Edwards of a single count of Possession of Controlled Substances with Intent to Distribute. On appeal, he argued: (1) the admission of an anonymous 911 call that mentioned him by name violated the Confrontation Clause; (2) the trial evidence and jury instructions that allowed him to be convicted as a principal constructively amended his indictment; and (3) the jury instruction on aiding and abetting omitted an essential element. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

After a jury convicted defendant-appellant Jesus Figueroa-Labrada of conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, the district court attributed to Figueroa 746.19 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine (the total amount of methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy) and sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment. On direct appeal, a panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed his sentence and remanded for resentencing based on the district court's failure to make particularized findings to support attributing the total quantity to Figueroa. In doing so, the panel noted that it was "reasonably probable" that only 56.7 grams of the methamphetamine mixture could be attributed to Figueroa based on his participation in the conspiracy. Figueroa appealed he district court's denial of his request for a reduced sentence under the "safety-valve" provision of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). The district court held section 3553(f) did not apply because Figueroa failed to make the disclosures necessary to support a reduced sentence before his initial sentencing hearing. After review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of section 3553(f), concluding that when a defendant provides information to the government for the first time on remand, but before the resentencing hearing, the plain text of the statute required the district court to consider that information in determining whether the defendant has satisfied 3553(f). Because the district court here failed to do so, its judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the district court to determine Figueroa's eligibility for a safety-valve sentence. View "United States v. Figueroa-Labrada" on Justia Law