Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-appellants represent a class of retirees formerly employed by Sprint-Nextel Corporation, Embarq Corporation (or a predecessor and/or subsidiary company of either Embarq or Sprint). Plaintiffs sued after Defendants altered or eliminated health and life insurance benefits for retirees. Plaintiffs asserted Defendants: (1) violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their contractual obligation to provide vested health and life insurance benefits; (2) breached their fiduciary duty by, inter alia, misrepresenting the terms of multiple welfare benefit plans; and (3) violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and applicable state laws by reducing or eliminating the same benefits. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claims, the ADEA claims, the state-law age discrimination claims, and some of the contractual vesting claims. The district court granted Defendants’ motions in part and Plaintiffs obtained a Rule 54(b) certification. The Tenth Circuit concluded Defendants did not contractually agree to provide Plaintiffs with lifetime health or life insurance benefits and thus affirmed in part the grant of summary judgment as to the contractual vesting claims. To the extent the district court granted summary judgment against class members whose contractual vesting claims arise, in whole or in part, from summary plan descriptions (other than those identified in Defendants’ motion), the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment against those class members. The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) and reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining breach of fiduciary duty claims to the extent those claims were premised on a fraud theory. Finally, because Defendants’ decision to reduce or terminate the group life insurance benefit was based on a reasonable factor other than age, their actions did not violate the ADEA, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on those claims. View "Fulghum v. Embarq Corporation" on Justia Law

It was undetermined when petitioner Carlos Jovany Medina-Rosales entered the United States, but he received an adjusted status as a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in late 2001. In 2013, while residing in Oklahoma, he was convicted of grand larceny in Oklahoma state court. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began removal proceedings. The Notice to Appear ordered him to appear before an Immigration Judge (IJ) in Dallas, Texas, even though the issuing officer was in Tulsa, Oklahoma. About two months later Medina-Rosales was issued a Notice of Hearing stating that a master hearing would be held before an IJ in Tulsa. The Dallas-based IJ held video conference hearings with Medina-Rosales and his counsel, who were in Tulsa. The IJ issued an oral decision, ordering Medina-Rosales’ removal and pretermitting and denying his applications for waiver of inadmissibility and adjustment of status. The IJ rejected his argument that Fifth Circuit law applied, deciding, instead, that Tenth Circuit law applied because the case arose in Tulsa, even though the IJ was located in Dallas and proceedings were conducted by video conference. Next, the IJ determined that Medina-Rosales was ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility, and, by extension, adjustment of status, because he had been convicted of the aggravated felony of grand larceny after acquiring LPR status. The BIA dismissed Medina-Rosales’ appeal, and he appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Based on the clear and unambiguous language of 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), the Tenth Circuit concluded that Medina-Rosales was eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for review and remanded this case back to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for further proceedings. View "Medina-Rosales v. Holder" on Justia Law

Professional golfing legend Jack Nicklas' participation in a developer's plan to build a luxurious golf course and housing plan allegedly led plaintiffs-appellants Jeffrey and Judee Donner to invest $1.5 million in the development. "Plans went awry:" the developer's parent company went bankrupt, and the project was never built. The Donners settled with the developer's parent company in its bankruptcy proceedings, then sued Jack Nicklaus and Jack Nicklaus Golf Club, LLC for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The district court dismissed the action, holding in the alternative: (1) the complaint failed to state a valid claim for relief; and (2) defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the Donners elected their remedies by entering into a settlement agreement with other parties. After review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court with respect to two issues: (1) the dismissal of the claim involving intentional misrepresentation of Mr. Nicklaus's membership status; and (2) the award of summary judgment to Mr. Nicklaus and Nicklaus Golf, finding the settlement agreement did not include defendants, and the Donners neither affirmed nor repudiated a contract. The case was affirmed in all other respects, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Donner v. Nicklaus" on Justia Law

David Hawkins filed claims against his former employer, Schwan's Home Service, Inc. ("SHS"), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Oklahoma law. Hawkins has described his chief responsibilities as "ordering products to be delivered by [SHS's] delivery drivers, scheduling, and loading trucks with products." According to a Mr. Hillaker, who supervised truck operations as part of his leadership duties, fleet management often included driving company trucks to service appointments or otherwise "[s]huttling trucks to salespeople" to ensure product delivery. Hillaker's observation that the facility-supervisor position involved driving was bolstered by the "Qualifications" section of SHS's facility-supervisor job description, which indicates that an "excellent driving record" was required. The job description further specified that "meet[ing] the Federal Department of Transportation eligibility requirements, including appropriate driver's license and corresponding medical certification," was a "condition of employment for this position" Hawkins suffered from several health conditions that came to a head in 2010: he was "in and out of the hospital . . . with heart problems and fainting spells and very high blood pressure." Hawkins experienced a minor stroke in June of 2010, but he resumed working soon afterward. On June 14, 2010, Hawkins emailed a human-resources manager that Hillaker wanted him "to drive trucks back and [forth] to" Enid and Woodward. Hawkins explained that these requests had taken place in May and June of 2010 just as his health issues were escalating, and that Hillaker was "telling everyone in Enid" that Hawkins was "a liability." He further suggested Hillaker had begun asking him to drive the trucks to Enid and Woodward in order to "force[ ] [him] to quit." Another co-worker offered similar testimony, maintaining that Hillaker expressed that Hillaker was "very upset about [Hawkins] being in the hospital . . . [and] wanted him gone." On June 21, 2010, Hawkins failed a routine DOT medical evaluation. The next day, SHS gave Hawkins a letter notifying him that he had been placed on a 30 day company requested unpaid leave, and that he had thirty days to obtain certification or "to find a non-DOT position." Hawkins testified that he perused job listings on SHS's public website. However, he "did not apply for any jobs." On June 23, 2010, Hawkins signed a termination form. Despite the language on the form indicating that his resignation was voluntary, Hawkins wrote on the form that the reason for his action was: "Force[d] to quit for medical reason." Before his separation from SHS, Mr. Hawkins began the process of seeking Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits from the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). The SSA denied Hawkins's claim after reconsideration. An administrative law judge determined at a 2011 hearing that Hawkins was not disabled. Hawkins filed his ADA and Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act ("OADA") claims. The district court ruled in SHS's favor on May 28, 2013, and Hawkins appealed. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's "principled analysis" of the district court record, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of SHS. View "Hawkins v. Schwan's Home Service" on Justia Law

Defendant Joshua Ferdman and three co-conspirators concocted a scheme to fraudulently obtain cellular phones from Sprint stores in three states and resell them. Defendant obtained account information for a number of Spring corporate customers. With this information, defendant went to retain stores, purchased the phones, charging the price of the phones to the corporate accounts. Some of the phone were sold to one of his co-conspirators for resale online. Defendant ultimately pled guilty on conspiracy charges, for which he was sentenced to fifteen months in prison. As part of his sentence, the court ordered Defendant to pay Sprint $48,715.59 in restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). The court calculated this amount based on what Sprint referred to as the “retail unsubsidized price” of 86 cell phones Defendant fraudulently procured, plus Sprint’s shipping and investigative costs. Defendant appealed the district court’s restitution order, arguing the Government’s proof of loss was insufficient to support the award. Finding that the district court erred in its application of the MVRA in calculating defendant's restitution amount, the Tenth Circuit vacated the order of restitution for lack of an adequate evidentiary basis, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ferdman" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Michael Dunn was convicted of possessing child pornography, receiving child pornography and distribution of child pornography. Defendant received a 144-month sentence for these convictions, followed by a 25-year term of supervised release. The district court imposed certain special conditions of the release (including restrictions on defendant's ability to access computers and the internet), and ordered payment of restitution. Defendant raised several arguments on appeal: (1) the court erred in instructing the jury, relieving the government of its burden to prove he "distributed" pornography; (2) his convictions for receipt and possession were multiplicitous and violated Double Jeopardy; (3) the special conditions of his supervised release limiting his access to computers and the Internet were not supported by necessary findings of fact; and (4) the district court applied an incorrect legal standard with regard to restitution (affecting the total amount owed). After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the special conditions imposed on release were not supported by necessary findings of fact. The Court also agreed that an incorrect legal standard was used in calculating restitution. On those grounds the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings; the Court affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "United States v. Dunn" on Justia Law

The widow of Sherman Shatwell sued her husband's medical care providers for negligence after a missed diagnosis. Shatwell complained of neck pain, and was sent home with antibiotics. By the time he learned the pain was caused by cancer, it was too late to treat it. Two weeks before trial, some of the medical providers settled out of court. Dr. Kenneth Phillips remained a party to the case. Days before jury selection, Phillips sought permission from the court to amend the pretrial order so he could amend his trial strategy, including adding new jury instructions, exhibits, and witnesses to support his new defense. The district court denied the motion, and the doctor was ultimately found liable for damages totaling over $1 million. On appeal Phillips argued the district court erred by not allowing him to amend the pretrial order. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Monfore v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Erma Aldaba brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action on behalf of her dead son, Johnny Manuel Leija, who died after an altercation with Appellants Officer Brandon Pickens and Deputies James Atnip and Steve Beebe in the Oklahoma hospital where he was being treated for pneumonia. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to all claims except Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force against Appellants; the district court denied Appellants’ request for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity, holding there were numerous fact issues regarding the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct that prevented summary judgment. Appellants filed this interlocutory appeal. After review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff could show a violation of clearly established law sufficient to defeat Appellants’ request for qualified immunity. View "Aldaba v. Marshall County" on Justia Law

This case grew out of Donna Meyers's employment at the Eastern Oklahoma County Technology Center. During her employment, Meyers had a disagreement with a subordinate who taught at the school. When the school superintendent learned of the situation, he instructed Meyers to consult another supervisor before taking any action against the subordinate. Four days later, Meyers violated this instruction by taking away two of the subordinate's classes. The school superintendent viewed this as insubordination and recommended Meyers be fired. Meyers then sued the school and the superintendent, alleging retaliation for engaging in protected speech and deprivation of procedural due process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Meyers appealed. The appeal raised two questions for the Tenth Circuit's review: (1) could a reasonable trier of fact conclude that school administrators retaliated against the plaintiff when she directly disobeyed instructions?; and (2) could a reasonable trier of fact infer denial of due process, in the absence of a liberty or property interest, based on inadmissible hearsay? The Court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find retaliation or denial of due process. As a result, the Court affirmed. View "Meyers v. Eastern OK County Tech Center" on Justia Law

Multiple plaintiffs, including ConAgra Foods, Inc. and Swift-Eckrich, Inc., brought suit in Kansas state court against Americold Logistics, LLC and Americold Realty Trust (the "Americold entities"). The Americold entities removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. As grounds for removal, the Americold entities argued the parties were completely diverse. No party challenged the propriety of removal; the district court did not address the issue. The merits of the suit were submitted to the district court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the Americold entities. ConAgra and Swift-Eckrich then appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the Americold entities to file a supplemental brief addressing whether the citizenship of a trust was determined by exclusive reference to the citizenship of its trustees? According to "Carden v. Arkoma Associates," (494 U.S. 185 (1990)), the answer to this question was "no:" the citizenship of a trust, just like the citizenship of all other artificial entities except corporations, is determined by examining the citizenship "of all the entity's members." That being the case, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit underlying this appeal. The case was remanded back to the district court for vacation of its judgment on the merits and for remand of the matter to state court. View "Conagra Foods v. Americold Logistics" on Justia Law