Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jay Black pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country. The sex act was consensual; at the time of the act, Black was 18 and the victim was 14; and a comparison of Black’s and the victim’s birthdays demonstrated Black was 55 months older than the victim. At sentencing, Black claimed he was not required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) because his conduct fell within the terms of section 16911(5)(C). Using what he asserted was the colloquial or ordinary understanding of age, Black argued the age difference between him and the victim must be figured by subtracting the integers representing completed years of life, without regard for the number of months or days separating their dates of birth (i.e., subtracting the victim’s 14 years of completed life from his 18 years of completed life resulted, according to Black, in a 4-year age difference, an age difference within the parameters of the exception set out in the statute). The district court rejected Black’s assertion and concluded section 16911(5)(C) required a comparison of the birth dates of the offender and victim to determine the relevant age difference. Black appealed. Joining the only other circuit to consider this question, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded “not more than 4 years older than the victim” meant no more than 1461 days or 48 months separate the birthdays of the sex offender and the victim, and affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Black" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Public Service Company of Colorado entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local #111, a union that represented some of the Company’s employees. About two years later, the Company unilaterally modified its retired workers’ healthcare benefits by increasing their copayment obligations for prescription drugs. The Union claimed that the Company had violated the collective-bargaining agreement by doing so and demanded arbitration. The Company refused to arbitrate, and the Union sued and asked the district court to stay the case and compel arbitration. When the district court denied that motion, the Union filed an interlocutory appeal. The issues this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review were: (1) whether the Tenth Circuit ha jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) whether the district court should have sent the case to arbitration. The Court concluded that appellate jurisdiction existed under the Federal Arbitration Act, and that the district court properly denied compelling arbitration because the collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision was not susceptible to an interpretation that covers disputes over retired workers’ healthcare benefits. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "IBEW Local #111 v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

Two companies, Derma Pen, LLC and 4EverYoung, entered a sales distribution agreement. Under the agreement, Derma Pen, LLC obtained the exclusive right to use the DermaPen trademark in the United States. 4EverYoung had a contractual right of first refusal, allowing purchase of Derma Pen, LLC’s U.S. trademark rights upon termination of the distribution agreement. Derma Pen, LLC terminated the agreement, and 4EverYoung wanted to exercise its contractual right of first refusal. The parties reached an impasse, and 4EverYoung started using the DermaPen trademark in the United States. Derma Pen, LLC sued and requested a preliminary injunction to prevent 4EverYoung’s use of the trademark. The district court declined the request, concluding that 4EverYoung was likely to prevail. This appeal to the Tenth Circuit followed, presenting the question: whether Derma Pen, LLC was likely to prevail on its claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition by proving a protectable interest in the trademark. The Court concluded Derma Pen, LLC was likely to prevail by satisfying this element. The district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Derma Pen v. 4EverYoung Limited" on Justia Law

The issue at the heart of this appeal to the Tenth Circuit centered on indemnity stemming from a promise by Martin K. Eby Construction Company’s predecessor to build a water pipeline. Eby engaged another company (the predecessor to Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC), promising to indemnify claims resulting from Eby’s work. While building the water pipeline, Eby accidentally hit a methanol pipeline, causing a leak. At the time, no one knew about the leak. It was discovered over two decades later, and the owner of the methanol pipeline had to pay for the cleanup. The owner of the methanol pipeline sued to recover the expenses from Kellogg and Eby. Kellogg and Eby prevailed, but Kellogg incurred over $2 million in attorneys’ fees and costs. Kellogg invoked Eby’s indemnity promise, suing Eby and its liability insurer, Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. The district court granted summary judgment to Eby and Travelers, leading Kellogg to appeal. To resolve the Kellogg-Eby portion of the appeal, the Tenth Circuit focused on the enforceability of Eby’s promise of indemnity: the promise was broad enough to cover the pipeline owner’s claims against Kellogg for its inaction after Eby caused the leak, but the indemnity clause was not conspicuous; thus, it was unenforceable. The Kellogg-Travelers appeal turned on Kellogg’s argument that Travelers’ insurance policy covered liabilities assumed by its insured (Eby). The Tenth Circuit concluded that because the indemnity clause was unenforceable, it is as if Eby never agreed to assume Kellogg’s liabilities. In the absence of Eby’s assumption of Kellogg’s liabilities, Travelers did not insure Kellogg. Accordingly, Kellogg was not entitled to indemnity from Eby or insurance coverage from Travelers, and Eby and Travelers were entitled to summary judgment. View "Martin K. Eby Construction v. OneBeacon Insurance" on Justia Law

Colorado Golf Club Holding Company LLC (CGC Holding), Harlem Algonquin LLC and James Medick proposed certification of a class action suit. They alleged a group of lenders conspired to create a fraudulent scheme to obtain non-refundable up-front fees in return for loan commitments , and misrepresented their ability and their objective to make good on the promises to meet certain financing obligations as part of a scheme to entice borrowers to pay the up-front fees. The class intended to offer generalized proof that the lenders concealed the financial history of Sandy Hutchens, the principal defendant, and his use of pseudonyms, to preserve the superficial integrity of the operation. The borrowers argued that had they known about this pretense, no putative class member would have taken part in the financial transactions that caused each to lose its up-front fees, amounting to millions of dollars of cumulative losses. The ultimate issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the class could pursue claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In opposing the claims, the lenders argued that each class member would have to demonstrate that it relied on the lenders’ misrepresentations or omissions to satisfy RICO’s causation element, making a single trial unwieldy and unworkable. The Tenth Circuit held that the lenders were wrong in this respect: RICO class-action plaintiffs are not entitled to an evidentiary presumption of a factual element of a claim. The Court agreed with the district court that a class could be certified in this context. Plaintiffs' theory sufficiently allayed any concerns about Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate over those idiosyncratic to individual class members. The Tenth Circuit affirmed certification of the class, but reversed the district court with regard to certification decision as to the lenders’ law firm and lawyers, Broad and Cassel, Ronald Gache and Carl Romano. Because several claims were not properly before the Court in this interlocutory appeal, the Court declined to address: (1) whether plaintiffs’ claims constituted an impermissible extraterritorial application of RICO; (2) whether the plaintiffs could prove proximate cause; or (3) whether the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over certain defendants. View "CGC Holding v. Gache" on Justia Law

The district judge noted that defendant-appellant Elder Sabillon-Umana was a "bit player" in a larger drug operation. In that light, the sentencing judge stated that he thought a guidelines base offense level of 32 sounded right and he asked the probation officer to offer some justification for that number. The officer told the court that finding Sabillon-Umana responsible for 1.5 kilograms of cocaine and 1.5 kilograms of heroin sold by the larger conspiracy would yield the court’s desired base offense level. By the hearing’s end, the district court adopted those findings as its own and imposed a sentence based on them. The district court is supposed to start with the facts, then consult empirics about similarly situated defendants and the expertise of the Sentencing Commission, and only then make an individualized judgment about the case at hand informed by that information. The district court in this case failed to follow that order, and this, the Tenth Circuit concluded, was error. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Sabillon-Umana" on Justia Law

Tarran Brinson was charged with various offenses involving trafficking in child prostitution. At trial, the prosecutor presented expert testimony on the operation of child prostitution rings, testimony by three men who had sex with a prostitute, and evidence consisting of electronic messages. Brinson was convicted and he appealed, raising six issues pertaining to: (1) the qualification of the prosecution's expert witness; (2) the admission into evidence Facebook posts and certain text messages; (3) the admission of certain statements of an unidentified declarant; (4) the admission of a "testimonial document" without allowing cross-examination of the person creating the document; (5) the admission of certain evidence incident to Brinson's arrest; and (6) the overall sufficiency of the other evidence presented against him. Finding no reversible error in any of the trial court's decisions with regard to these issues, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Brinson's conviction. View "United States v. Brinson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Julius Darius Jones was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of the 1999 murder of Paul Howell, as well as conspiracy to commit a felony (robbery of a vehicle with firearms) and possession of a firearm after conviction of a felony. In accordance with the jury’s recommendation, Jones was sentenced to death for the murder conviction, 25 years’ imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction, and 15 years’ imprisonment for the possession of a firearm conviction. The two terms of imprisonment were ordered to be served consecutively. After exhausting his state court remedies, Jones sought federal habeas relief by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied that petition and also denied Jones a certificate of appealability (COA). Jones appealed, and the Tenth Circuit granted him a COA as to a single claim: whether Jones’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek evidence corroborating a confession purportedly made by Jones’s coconspirator. After review, the Court rejected that claim and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Jones v. Trammell" on Justia Law

Westar Energy was an electric company based in Topeka, Kansas that owned several sources of electricity, including the Jeffrey Energy Center (JEC). The JEC was a coal-fired power plant composed of three units: Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 3. In 2005, Westar began a project to upgrade the JEC’s existing flue gas desulfurization (FGD) system. Wahlcometroflex Inc. (Wahlco) was a Delaware corporation that designed and manufactured a number of products including FGD dampers. On December 22, 2006, Westar and Wahlco entered into a contract under which Wahlco agreed to manufacture and deliver dampers to Westar for Units 1, 2, and 3. This case involved a dispute over the meaning and application of a liquidated damages in that contract provision under Kansas law. The district court held that Westar did not need to establish that Wahlco's late delivery of the equipment actually delayed Westar’s production schedule in order to recover contractual liquidated damages. Finding no error in that judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Wahlcometroflex v. Westar Energy" on Justia Law

In April of 2008, Kane County Utah brought an action under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a, to quiet title to five roads or road segments. It later amended its complaint to cover a total of fifteen roads or road segments. The QTA contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for the settlement of property claims against the United States. This case centered on a dispute between Kane County (joined by the State of Utah as intervenors) and the United States over the existence and breadth of the County’s rights-of-way on federally owned land in Southern Utah. In 2013, the district court issued two final orders giving rise to the issues presented to the Tenth Circuit on appeal. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in allowing for unspecified improvements in setting the widths of the rights-of-way on Skutumpah, Swallow Park and North Swag roads. The case was remanded on the question of the scope of the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way on these roads. The County did not explain how it arrived at “disputed title” to Sand Dunes, Hancock or the Cave Lakes roads; the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court and find it had no jurisdiction over the QTA claims to Sand Dunes and Hancock roads and reversed its decision with respect to those roads. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kane County, Utah v. United States" on Justia Law