Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The State of Oklahoma filed suit against defendants, officials of the Kialegee Tribal Town claiming that they, along with a federally-chartered corporation related to the tribe and a related Oklahoma limited liability company, were attempting to construct and ultimately operate a class III gaming facility on non-Indian lands in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, in violation of both IGRA and a state-tribal gaming compact. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but the district court denied the motion. The district court subsequently granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the State that prohibited defendants from constructing or operating the gaming facility on the property at issue. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded the State failed to state a valid claim for relief. View "Oklahoma v. Hobia" on Justia Law

Arizona Secretary of State Ken Bennett and Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach sought, on behalf of their states, that the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) add language requiring documentary proof of citizenship to each state’s instructions on the federal voter registration form. The EAC concluded that the additional language was unnecessary and denied their requests. After Kobach and Bennett filed suit challenging the EAC’s decision, the district court concluded that the agency had a nondiscretionary duty to grant their requests. The EAC appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court’s erred in its conclusion: the decision was "plainly" in conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in "Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. (ITCA)," (133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013)). "This is one of those instances in which the dissent clearly tells us what the law is not. It is not as if the proposition had not occurred to the majority of the Court. Applying traditional APA review standards, our thorough reading of the record establishes that Kobach and Bennett have failed to advance proof that registration fraud in the use of the Federal Form prevented Arizona and Kansas from enforcing their voter qualifications." View "Kobach v. United States Election Assistance Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Joseph Farmer challenged his conviction for being a felon found in unlawful possession of a firearm. On direct appeal to the Tenth Circuit, he argued that the district court erred in admitting at trial evidence that Tulsa police had previously found Farmer unlawfully possessing another firearm in 2010. Farmer maintained the district court should have suppressed evidence of his 2010 firearm possession, offered under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), because Tulsa police obtained that evidence during an unlawful search. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that any error in admitting this 404(b) evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the Court rejected Farmer’s challenges to the prosecutor’s closing argument and his claim of cumulative error. As such, the Court affirmed Farmer's conviction. View "United States v. Farmer" on Justia Law

In 2008, Wells Fargo extended a $14 million line of credit to Gorsuch, Ltd., a ski equipment, apparel, and home furnishing company. In 2009, when Gorsuch's winter sales were lower than expected, Wells Fargo suspended the line of credit. Gorsuch, Ltd. and several Gorsuch Entities (Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C.; Gorsuch, Limited at Aspen; Gorsuch, Limited at Keystone Mountain; and Gorsuch Cooper, LLC) sued Wells Fargo for damages. The Gorsuch Entities argued they were intended third-party beneficiaries of the Credit Agreement and were not subject to a clause precluding third-party beneficiaries from bringing suit. The district court disagreed and dismissed them from the litigation. After Gorsuch, Ltd. and Wells Fargo proceeded to arbitration, Gorsuch Cooper and Gorsuch, Limited at Aspen sought to amend the complaint to add additional tort claims. The district court denied the motion, finding: (1) Gorsuch Cooper and Aspen were no longer parties; and (2) they had not shown good cause to amend after the deadline established in the scheduling order. On appeal, the Gorsuch Entities challenged the order dismissing them from the case. Gorsuch Cooper and Aspen appeal the denial of their motion to amend the complaint. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Gorsuch, LTD. v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

Defendant John Ervin Titley pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a controlled substance. The sentencing court based Titley's 15-year Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) sentence on his previous three state felony convictions. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on an equal protection challenge to the provision in the ACCA that defined a “serious drug offense” to include a state crime for “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute, a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” Titley conceded his conviction for armed robbery in Missouri qualified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. Although his convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in Arkansas and unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in Oklahoma otherwise qualified for the ACCA enhancement, he argued these crimes should not count because they would not be “serious drug offense[s]” had he committed them in 19 other states or the District of Columbia. Disagreeing with defendant's contention, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "United States v. Titley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellees John Niemi, Robert Naegele, III, and Jesper Parnevik claimed that defendants-appellants Erwin Lasshofer and three companies affiliated with him, along with other co-conspirators, perpetrated a fraudulent financing scheme that caused the collapse of Plaintiffs’ large-scale real estate development project in Breckenridge, Colorado. The district court rejected Defendants’ challenges to standing, jurisdiction, and venue, and entered a default judgment of approximately $185 million in favor of Plaintiffs. Upon review of that judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court with two exceptions: (1) the Court reversed as to personal jurisdiction over Innovatis Immobilien GmbH; and (2) vacation of the district court's contempt order. View "Niemi v. Lasshofer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant, Security Service Federal Credit Union (“SSFCU”), appealed a district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants- Appellees, including First American Mortgage Funding, LLC (“FAM”) and First American Mortgage, Inc.; and Stewart Title of California, Inc., Orange Coast Title Company of Southern California, and Lawyers Title Company (together, the “Closing Agents”). In August 2003, SSFCU’s predecessor in interest, New Horizons Community Credit Union, entered into a Funding Service Agreement with FAM, under which FAM originated 26 loans to individual borrowers for the purchase and construction of residential properties in Colorado and California. The Closing Agents performed closing procedures. SSFCU maintained that the FAM Defendants and Closing Agents, through a variety of acts and omissions, wrongfully induced New Horizons to fund these loans to straw borrowers. SSFCU further contended that the loan transactions were a vehicle to misappropriate some $14 million in loan proceeds. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether SSFCU had the right to pursue those claims pursuant to a 2007 Purchase and Assumption Agreement (“PAA”) between SSFCU and the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”), as the liquidating agent for New Horizons. Both the NCUA and SSFCU argued that under the terms of the PAA, the NCUA transferred the “right, title and interest” in the loans and various other assets to SSFCU, including the claims at issue. As the parties to the agreement, the NCUA and SSFCU both understood that a transfer of “the right, title and interest” in the loans was intended to transfer any and all claims relating to those loans. On the other hand, the PAA also provided that “except as otherwise specifically provided” the NCUA retained the “the sole right to pursue claims . . . and to recover any and all losses incurred by the Liquidating Credit Union prior to liquidation.” According to the Defendants, absent a valid assignment from the NCUA, SSFCU could not sue on the claims contained in its Fourth Amended Complaint. The district court agreed with the Defendants. According to the district court, the NCUA retained all claims associated with New Horizons’ losses, it could rely upon the cooperation of SSFCU in pursuing those claims, and, therefore, SSFCU was not a proper party to pursue those claims. The district court did not address an affidavit from the NCUA (through its agent) that cast considerable doubt on its interpretation. The district court held that SSFCU was not a proper plaintiff to assert the claims set forth in its Fourth Amended Complaint and dismissed those claims with prejudice. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the Defendants were neither parties to (or in privity with any party to) nor third-party beneficiaries of the PAA. "The PAA reflects no intent to benefit the Defendants, let alone allow them to enforce it. Essentially, the Defendants are seeking to enforce a right they contend the NCUA has—an exclusive right to the claims asserted by SSFCU3—which is contrary to the doctrine of prudential standing." View "Security Services v. First American Mortgage" on Justia Law

Defendant Wesley Bear pled guilty to one count of failing to register or update a registration as a sex offender. At sentencing, the district court imposed certain special sex offender conditions of supervised release in addition to its standard conditions of supervised release. Bear objected to the conditions restricting his contact with children and requiring him to submit to sex offender mental health assessment and treatment. The district court overruled his objections, and Bear appealed, arguing: (1) it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to impose sex offender conditions where his conviction of the prior sex offense occurred twelve years before this conviction; (2) the conditions involved a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing; and (3) the special conditions were not consistent with pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded this case for further proceedings. The Court held Bear’s prior sex offense was reasonably related to the imposition of the special sex offender conditions and survive his 3583(d)(1) challenge. The assessment and treatment condition also survived Bear’s 3583(d)(1) challenge. The Court vacated the conditions limiting Bear’s ability to be at his children’s residence and his ability to be alone with his children without supervision, finding the district court record did not provide compelling evidence that could support the restrictions on Bear's contact with his own children. View "United States v. Bear" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari in this post-conviction relief (PCR) action to review the Court of Appeals' decision, which remanded for a determination of the lawfulness of Antonio Bordeaux's sentence. Bordeaux's plea agreement was capped at a sentence of twenty-five years. He pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery and two counts of burglary. He was sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment on the armed robbery charges, and to twenty-five years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of twenty years with three years' probation on the burglary counts. Bordeaux's plea proceeding was conducted simultaneously with that of a co-defendant, Wesley Washington. Washington had been indicted on two counts of first degree burglary, but pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree burglary. The transcript reflected that the plea colloquy with the trial judge alternated between Bordeaux and Washington. During Bordeaux's plea colloquy, he acknowledged on at least seven occasions that he was pleading guilty to two counts of first degree burglary. At sentencing, Bordeaux was again reminded, and acknowledged, that he was being sentenced pursuant to his plea negotiations for two counts of first degree burglary, each of which carried a minimum fifteen-year sentence, and a maximum of life imprisonment. The State argued the Court of Appeals erred because the unambiguous plea colloquy and imposition of sentence control over the ambiguous written sentence. To this point, the Supreme Court agreed: it was clear Bordeaux pleaded guilty to first degree burglary, was sentenced within the legal limits for that crime, and in consonance with his negotiated plea agreement. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "United States v. Margheim" on Justia Law

Former mayoral appointee, Wayne McDonald, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Colorado state law after he was terminated from his position with the City of Denver based on a complaint by Officer Leslie Wise that he had sexually harassed her. He sued the Mayor of Denver, the Mayor’s press secretary, and the City and County of Denver for due process violations, breach of contract, and unlawful disclosure of confidential information under the Colorado Open Records Act. He sued Wise for defamation. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. McDonald was an at-will employee serving at the pleasure of the Mayor and had no property interest in his continued employment, thus, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections were not therefore implicated when he was terminated, and the district court was correct in dismissing this claim. The district court concluded that McDonald failed to plead facts sufficient to satisfy "Workman’s" falsity prong: "[e]ven if the Mayor only stated that Mr. McDonald was fired because of allegations of serious misconduct, his termination of Mr. McDonald due to the allegations gives the false impression that Mr. McDonald did in fact commit serious misconduct. Mr. McDonald has been unable to find employment because of the media reports of his misconduct. Given that the statements here were made publically, Mr. McDonald has sufficiently pled a deprivation of his liberty interest." The Court found that that the unemployment compensation hearing McDonald received was not an adequate substitute for the process the City owed him: McDonald was able to explain himself at the unemployment compensation hearing, that fact alone did not establish it was a name-clearing hearing. McDonald pled sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that he was deprived of a liberty interest in his good name and reputation without due process when the City made public the fact that he was terminated for serious misconduct. Thus, the Mayor was not entitled to qualified immunity. The City is therefore liable if the Mayor deprived McDonald of his liberty interest without due process. There was a reasonable inference from Wise’s behavior following the alleged sexual harassment that she did not believe McDonald had sexually harassed her. An inference and alleged awareness of falsity, coupled with the fact that Wise made the statement to their employer, were sufficient to provide a reasonable inference that Wise acted with reckless disregard of the consequences of her conduct. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred when it held that Wise was immune from liability at this early stage of the proceedings and that McDonald failed to state a viable claim for defamation. The Court reversed the district court’s order dismissing the case against Wise and remanded for further proceedings. View "McDonald v. Wise" on Justia Law