Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In February 2011, the United States indicted defendant and his co-defendant Mark Akins on eighty offenses stemming from an allegedly fraudulent investment scheme. Defendant pled guilty to two of the charged offenses and the district court sentenced him at the bottom of the advisory guideline range, to forty-one months in prison. Three weeks after sentencing, defendant met with prosecutors, provided information about his and his co-defendant Akins’s role in the charged fraud, and offered to testify against Akins. At the conclusion of that meeting, an assistant United States attorney (“AUSA”) told defendant and his attorney that the AUSA “would recommend a reduction of defendant's sentence in light of the interview and his cooperation.” Akins later pled guilty to two of the charged offenses and the district court sentenced him to twenty-seven months in prison. Akins’s guilty plea and sentencing occurred within one year of defendant's sentencing. Twice during this one-year period, defendant and his attorney asked the Government to file a Rule 35(b) motion to reduce defendant's sentence. But because the Government thought it still might need defendant's testimony during Akins’s restitution hearing, the Government delayed filing the Rule 35(b) motion. As it turned out, the Government did not need defendant's testimony during the restitution hearing. After that hearing, more than one year after defendant's sentencing, defendant and his attorney again asked the Government to file a Rule 35(b). The Government did so more than fifteen months after sentencing. Because the Government had waited more than one year to file the Rule 35(b) motion, however, the district court’s jurisdiction to consider that motion was limited. The Government, therefore, filed the motion under Rule 35(b)(2)(B), which permitted the district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if he provided the Government with information within one year of his sentencing, but the information “did not become useful to the government until more than one year after sentencing.” The district court, however, concluded it did not have jurisdiction to consider that motion because the Government acknowledged that the information Baker provided was useful both before and after the one-year mark. Defendant appealed that decision. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

In an effort to comply with the Clean Air Act, three states (New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming), one city (Albuquerque), and one county (Bernalillo County) adopted a regional cap-and-trade program regulating sulfur-dioxide emissions over the Colorado Plateau. New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, the City of Albuquerque, and Bernalillo County persuaded the EPA that the trading program would yield better results than the EPA's own compliance standards (referred to as "BART"). Five environmental groups filed petitions for review, arguing that the EPA should not have approved the trading program. Concluding that the EPA's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petitions for review. View "WildEarth Guardians v. EPA" on Justia Law

In May 2012, election officials in six Colorado counties had the theoretical ability to learn how individuals voted because the ballots were traceable. Citizen Center, a Colorado non-profit organization, sued the Secretary of State and the clerks for five of the six counties, contending that the use of traceable ballots violated members' federal constitutional rights involving: (1) voting, (2) free speech and association, (3) substantive due process, (4) equal protection, and (5) procedural due process. In addition, Citizen Center sued five of the clerks for violation of the Colorado Constitution. All defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing, and the clerks included an alternative argument for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed the complaint on standing grounds without reaching the merits of the clerks' argument under Rule 12(b)(6). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded: (1) the claims were partially moot because the Secretary of State adopted new regulations banning some of the challenged practices; (2) Citizen Center had standing on the "live" parts of the claims involving denial of equal protection and procedural due process, but its alleged injury in fact was too speculative for standing on the right-to-vote, free-speech-and-association and substantive-due-process claims; and (3) the first amended complaint failed to state a valid claim against the clerks for denial of equal protection or procedural due process. These conclusions resulted in a termination of all claims except the federal claims against the Secretary of State for denial of equal protection and procedural due process. View "Citizen Center v. Gessler" on Justia Law

Lynn Becker contracted with the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (Tribe) to provide services related to the Tribe's development of its energy and mineral resources. Following a dispute concerning Becker's compensation under the contract, Becker brought breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and accounting claims against the Tribe in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. All of Becker's claims were state law claims. Nevertheless, Becker's complaint asserted that the district court had federal question jurisdiction because the case raised substantial issues of federal law. Becker appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Corrine Kovnat was injured while horseback riding in Yellowstone National Park. Kovnat filed a diversity action alleging negligence, as well as negligent training and supervision, on the part of defendant Xanterra Parks & Resorts (Xanterra), the provider of the horseback riding services. Approximately fifteen minutes into the ride, Kovnat looked down at her saddle and "the thing in the middle, the horn, . . . started to move." Kovnat "yelled out to the wrangler," but the saddle rolled "all the way over" to the left and ended up underneath the horse. Kovnat struck her back on the ground. An emergency medical assistance team employed by the National Park Service was summoned, initiated care, and placed Kovnat on a backboard. Kovnat was then carried to an awaiting ambulance and transported to a hospital in Montana, where she was diagnosed with a fracture to her L1, L2, and L3 transverse process. The district court, in granting Xanterra's motion for summary judgment, concluded that "[t]he inherent risk issue/question, in the light most favorable to [plaintiff], is whether a saddle slipping out of position because of uneven stirrups and/or an improperly secured cinch are inherent risks of horseback riding." Kovnat argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that both of these were inherent risks of horseback riding. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Xanterra with respect to the issue of the loose cinch, but that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding the uneven stirrups. The evidence indicated that, during the course of the trail ride, Kovnat and her saddle rotated to the left side of her horse, the direction of the longer stirrup. Viewing the evidence in the district court record in the light most favorable to Kovnat, the Tenth Circuit concluded a jury could have reasonably drawn two alternate inferences from it. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kovnat v. Xanterra Parks and Resorts" on Justia Law

Headwaters Resources, Inc. carried commercial liability insurance issued by two insurance companies: Illinois Union Insurance Company and ACE American Insurance Company. Headwaters sought reimbursement for its litigation costs arising from a case brought by landowners in Virginia, alleging that Headwaters had caused personal injury and property damage during the construction of a nearby golf course. The complaint alleged that fly ash used in the construction process caused air and water pollution that devalued their homes and created health risks to the homeowners. The insurance companies told Headwaters that defense costs related to Headwaters’ pollution were outside the scope of the coverage and denied the claim. Headwaters sued, and the district court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies, finding that the pollution exclusions in the insurance policies precluded coverage. Jurisdictions that have addressed the scope of a "total pollution exclusion" were either: (1) courts that applied the pollution exclusions as written because they find them clear and unmistakable; or (2) courts that narrowed the exclusions to "traditional environmental pollution," because they found the terms of the exclusion to be ambiguous due to their broad applicability. The Utah Supreme Court had not yet weighed in on this debate, and the federal district court did not pick a side on its behalf. Instead, the district court found that certain of the at-issue pollution exclusions unambiguously applied to bar coverage and that the remaining pollution exclusions, although possibly ambiguous, still applied because the complaints unquestionably alleged traditional environmental pollution. As a result, the complaints triggered the pollution exclusions in all of the policies, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that each of the pollution exclusions was unambiguous, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Headwaters Resources v. Illinois Union Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Samuel Rodriguez pleaded guilty to the distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine. In determining the sentence, the district court applied an enhancement based on a finding that Rodriguez was a career offender because he had at least two earlier felony convictions for a crime of violence or a controlled substance. One of these convictions involved simple assault under the Texas Penal Code. The parties disagreed on whether the assault conviction involved a "crime of violence." In an earlier appeal, Rodriguez’s attorney argued that the district court should not have considered the Texas conviction a crime of violence. A panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument, affirming the conviction. Rodriguez then sought collateral relief, claiming that his attorney had mishandled the issue both at sentencing and in the direct appeal. The district court recharacterized the request as a motion to vacate the sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and denied relief. Rodriguez asks the Tenth Circuit for a certificate of appealability so that he could appeal the denial of relief . Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Rodriguez was ineligible for a certificate of appealability, and dismissed his appeal. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) grants grazing permits to private individuals who own land adjacent to public lands; adjacent, private lands are called "base properties." Grazing permits limit both the number of animals grazing on a specific allotment of public land and the number of days they are permitted to graze. Appellant Stanley Jones appealed his convictions for one count of unlawful use or occupation of public lands, and two counts of allowing his livestock to graze without authorization on public lands. While Mr. Jones owned cattle in Wyoming, he was not the owner of the base properties adjacent to the two BLM public lands or allotments involved in this suit. Instead, his brother owned the adjacent base properties During the periods at issue, no grazing permit had been issued to Mr. Jones or his brother, nor has Mr. Jones leased his brother's property, as required for obtaining such a permit. After issuing Mr. Jones multiple administrative trespass notices and fines over the years for grazing his cattle on these and other allotments without a permit, the BLM, through the United States Attorney's Office for Wyoming, brought criminal charges against him, including one count of unlawful use or occupation, and for unauthorized grazing. A jury convicted Mr. Jones of all three criminal counts, and thereafter, the district court sentenced him to two years of supervised probation for each count, to be served concurrently, together with a $3,000 fine, contingent on his compliance with certain terms and conditions, and a $75 special assessment. Appearing pro se, Mr. Jones appealed, arguing that "the handling of the district court proceeding caused the jury to come to the wrong conclusion and that the true and honest facts should have been considered." Furthermore, Mr. Jones argued: (1) the district court improperly granted the government's motion in limine and excluded his witness from testifying, thereby depriving him of a fair trial; and (2) the proceedings against him were fundamentally unfair and denied him due process for a multitude of reasons. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

This appeal consolidated two cases about United States Forest Service actions in the Black Hills National Forest (BHNF). Appellants, (collectively, "Biodiversity") were largely non-profit organizations interested in species and habitat protection in the BHNF. Appellees were the Forest Service and several of its officials tasked with managing the BHNF. Intervenors-Appellees were state and county governments and private groups concerned with how management of the BHNF affected nearby private land, state and county citizens, and visitors. Biodiversity sued the Forest Service regarding the BHNF in two separate proceedings: (1) in the United States Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming, Biodiversity claimed the Forest Service had failed to comply with various federal statutes and regulations; and (2) in the United States Federal District Court for the District of Colorado, Biodiversity moved for relief, arguing the Forest Service had violated a settlement agreement. The district courts denied Biodiversity's petition for review and dismissed Biodiversity's motion, respectively. After careful consideration of the district courts' records, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible errors and affirmed the Wyoming and Colorado courts.View "Biodiversity Conservation, et al v. Jiron, et al" on Justia Law

In October 2004, Cellport Systems, Inc. and Peiker Acustic GMBH & Co. KG entered into an agreement concerning Cellport’s technology for the hands-free use of cellphones in cars. In 2009, Cellport filed suit against Peiker, alleging breach of that agreement and sought royalties for seven Peiker products. The district court awarded Cellport royalties on only two of the products, interpreting an acknowledgment in the license agreement as "a rebuttable presumption." Cellport appealed, and Peiker filed a conditional cross-appeal. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court found that section 1.17(i) of the License Agreement created a category of products on which royalties are due regardless of whether any of Cellport’s patents were infringed; Peiker owed Cellport royalties on those products. On remand, the district court was directed to calculate the damages due Cellport for those two products. Because the district court only briefly addressed the relationship between the "BTPSC" and the "'456 Patent" the Tenth Circuit remanded to allow the district court to determine whether additional royalties were owed to Cellport. With respect to Peiker's cross-appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Cellport that the issue was not ready for appellate review and further held that it was not ripe for review by the district court. View "Cellport Systems v. Peiker Acustic" on Justia Law