Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In September 2009, Plaintiff Bridget Dalpiaz was terminated from her position as the benefits administrator for Carbon County, Utah. She sued, raising several claims against the county and various county officials, including one claim of "Violation of the [Family and Medical Leave Act] – Interference with FMLA Rights" against the county. The district court granted summary judgment to all Defendants on all claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged only the denial of her FMLA claim against Carbon County. Based on all of the evidence in the record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the evidence, even taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, was sufficient to meet the county’s burden of establishing that Plaintiff would have been dismissed regardless of her request for FMLA leave. Plaintiff’s interference claim therefore failed as a matter of law. View "Dalpiaz v. Carbon County, Utah, et al" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated a final Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) to reduce regional haze by regulating emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter (PM) at the five units of the Four Corners Power Plant on the Navajo Reservation. WildEarth Guardians filed a petition under 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) for review of the FIP. It argued that promulgation of the FIP did not comply with the Endangered Species Act (ESA) because the EPA failed to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service about the effect of the FIP even though the EPA had discretion to act to protect endangered fish near the Plant from mercury and selenium emissions. WildEarth argued that the EPA had four grounds for the exercise of discretion that could have benefitted the fish. But the principal ground was mooted by the closure of three units of the Plant, and two other grounds were not raised in WildEarth’s opening brief. "As for the fourth alleged ground, it could not create a duty to consult under the ESA because it would have required the EPA to exceed the clearly delineated boundaries of the FIP." The Tenth Circuit denied the petition. View "WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

Camille Lente appealed a sentence of 192 months' imprisonment, which was well above her advisory Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months, for three counts of involuntary manslaughter and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The district court relied on several specific factual circumstances in calculating its sentence, including Lente's excessive recklessness, her underrepresented criminal history, and her postconviction conduct. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court thoroughly considered the relevant sentencing factors and adequately explained the basis of its decision to vary substantially upward, and that the sentence imposed was reasonable. View "United States v. Lente" on Justia Law

This appeal was brought by the Court Clerk for Tulsa County, Oklahoma, asking the Tenth Circuit to overturn a decision by the district court declaring unenforceable the Oklahoma state constitutional prohibition on issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The issues presented to the Tenth Circuit in this appeal were: (1) whether plaintiffs could attack state constitutional provisions without simultaneously attacking state statutes to the same effect; and (2) whether the Court Clerk was a proper defendant as to the non-recognition portion of the Oklahoma constitutional prohibition. The Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing to directly attack the constitutionality under the United States Constitution of Oklahoma's same-sex marriage ban even though their claim did not reach Oklahoma's statutory prohibitions on such marriages. Under Oklahoma law, a constitutional amendment "takes the place of all the former laws existing upon the subject with which it deals." Because the statutory prohibitions were subsumed in the challenged constitutional provision, an injunction against the latter's enforcement will redress the claimed injury. An earlier appeal of this same case involving the standing inquiry led to a decision by a panel of the Tenth Circuit that dismissed proceedings brought against the Governor and Attorney General of Oklahoma. That panel ruled that "recognition of marriages is within the administration of the judiciary." ("Bishop I"). The Tenth Circuit concluded that the law of the case doctrine applied to Bishop I, but that the doctrine was overcome by new evidence demonstrating that the Tulsa County Court Clerk could not redress the non-recognition injury, thereby depriving Gay Phillips and Susan Barton of standing to sue. The Court affirmed the district court's ruling. View "Bishop, et al v. Smith, et al" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant Tony Washington was convicted on two drug charges: (1) conspiracy to distribute crack and marijuana; and (2) conspiracy to maintain a residence for the purpose of distributing those same drugs. As part of determining Washington's advisory sentencing range under the 2008 version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court calculated Washington's base offense level. On direct appeal, Washington contended the district court attributed too large a quantity of crack to him, "challeng[ing]" two components of the district court's calculations: (1) the conversion of $2600 into 85.05 grams of cocaine base; and (2) the estimation he and his coconspirators purchased 680.4 grams of cocaine base with their pooled money. The Tenth Circuit specifically declined to resolve Washington's challenge to the conversion of $2600, noting: "Washington . . . recognizes that only the challenge to the 680.4 grams can lower the drug quantity below 500 grams and thereby reduce his base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(4). We therefore confine our analysis to the 680.4 grams." The Court then denied Washington's appeal, concluding the quantity of 680.4 grams was supported by sufficient evidence. In August 2011, Washington filed a pro se motion for sentence reduction pursuant to section 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 750 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Instead of challenging the correctness of his base offense level, he made the legally erroneous argument that Amendment 750 allowed the district court to reconsider its previous decision to give him a sentence above the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. The district court denied his motion, concluding that because Amendment 750 did not reduce Washington's offense level, and it was without power to alter his sentence. In May 2013, Washington, acting through appointed counsel, filed another 3582 motion. Although he styled his pleading as a "Motion for Sentence Reduction Under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)," he did not assert the district court had the power to modify his sentence. The district court denied Washington's motion. Washington then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, asking the Court to take up and decide the issue it declined to resolve on direct appeal. The government argued the Tenth Circuit lacked statutory jurisdiction because Washington's appeal did not fit within the four categories of allowed sentencing appeals under 18 U.S.C. 3742(a). The question presented to the Court on appeal was thus a narrow legal question: Could Washington use the sentence-modification procedure set out in 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) to have the court decide an issue left unresolved on direct appeal? "The Supreme Court's decision in Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010), coupled with the policy statements accompanying U.S.S.G. 1B1.10, compel[ed] a negative answer." View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Juan Morales was found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to eighty-six months' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He also argued his Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated when he was placed in handcuffs and transported through the public area of the courthouse in view of the venire. Upon review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed. View "United States v. Morales" on Justia Law

Lisa Knitter worked as a "handyman" for Lewis General Contracting, Inc. (LGC) from March to October 2010. During this time, LGC's sole client was Picerne Military Housing, LLC (Picerne), now known as Corvias Military Living, LLC. Knitter performed handyman services exclusively on Picerne properties. She sued Picerne under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging: (1) she was paid lower wages than her male counterparts; (2) Picerne effectively fired her in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment and wage discrimination; and (3) after she was fired, Picerne denied her application for vendor status in retaliation for her prior complaints of discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to Picerne, dismissing Knitter's Title VII action because Picerne was not her employer. The district court also dismissed her claim for retaliatory denial of vendor status because Knitter did not apply for employment with Picerne when she applied to be a vendor. Knitter appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error, however, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Knitter v. Picerne Military Housing" on Justia Law

As a result of an investigation into purported clinical weight-loss studies from 2006-2008, defendant Edward Mulikin was indicted by a grand jury sitting in the District of Colorado in November 2011. The indictment consisted of nineteen counts of mail fraud. Defendant was arrested in January 2012; in August 2012, a superseding indictment was filed asserting the same nineteen counts of mail fraud. The superseding indictment alleged that Defendant's purported weight-loss studies were part of an "advance fee scheme" in which Defendant made false representations to induce participants to submit deposits which he had no intention of refunding. Defendant's residence was searched pursuant to a warrant. Law enforcement seized two hard drives, a computer, two binders, and two folders during the search. Prior to trial, Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized at his residence. After a trial, the jury convicted defendant to seventeen of the nineteen counts of mail fraud. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized at his home, challenging whether the warrant established probable cause that the items seized would have been located at the residence. Defendant also argued the affidavit failed to establish a nexus between the criminal acts and the residence to be searched. Furthermore, defendant argued the list of items to be seized in the search warrant was impermissibly broad. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that even if evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was admitted in error, that admission was harmless and did not warrant reversal of defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Mullikin" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Shaw was convicted of robbing a bank and two credit unions, attempting to commit a second robbery at one of the credit unions, and committing four related firearms offenses. He was acquitted on a charge of robbing a second bank. On appeal he argued: (1) the jury could not be impartial because it learned of an improper gesture he made to a member of the jury panel during jury selection; (2) the district court erred in admitting a confession of a codefendant who had been convicted at an earlier trial; (3) the court also erred in admitting evidence of an uncharged bank robbery; and (4) the court at sentencing, rather than the jury, found that he had been previously convicted of a firearms offense. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

David Richison began a payroll processing company in the 1990s in Oklahoma with his niece and nephew, Shannon and Chad Richison. The company was called "Ernest Group, Inc." and did business under the name "Paycom Payroll." David wrote two software programs for use at the company. The first program, ("BOSS") was assigned to Ernest Group in 1999. The second was called "Independence." David left Ernest Group and moved to Maryland where he formed his own payroll company, "Period Financial Corporation." David wrote a third program, "Indy," based in part on Independence. In 2009, Ernest Group filed a copyright infringement suit against David and Period, alleging that Indy infringed on Ernest Group's copyright in BOSS. Shortly after filing its complaint, Ernest Group registered a copyright in Independence, calling it a work-for-hire. By 2011, David had written a fourth program, "Cromwell," which would become a new basis for Ernest Group's lawsuit. The parties ultimately settled and agreed to the entry of a consent decree. All of Ernest Group's claims were released, except a claim for injunctive relief based on infringement. All rights to Independence were assigned to Ernest Group, and the parties agreed that a special master be assigned to determine whether Cromwell infringed on BOSS or Independence. The parties could not agree, however, which version of Cromwell should have been the subject of the special master's analysis. The special master ultimately found copyright infringement occurred, and the district court adopted the special master's report. David and his company appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the special master did not document his application of each step of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, and that "[h]is report reads consonantly with the misconception that an infringement analysis begins and ends with 'copying in fact.'" The Court therefore vacated the district court's order adopting the report and remanded with instructions for the district court to request a more thorough report with which to analyze Ernest Group's infringement claim.View "Paycom Payroll, et al v. Richison, et al" on Justia Law