Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several Utah residents and same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses in Utah and were denied. They filed suit against the Governor, the Attorney General of Utah and the Clerk of Sale Lake County, all in their official capacities, challenging provisions of Utah law relating to same-sex marriage. Utah Code 30-1-2(5) included among the marriages that were "prohibited and declared void," those "between persons of the same sex." The Legislature referred a proposed constitutional amendment, known as Amendment 3, to Utah's voters (Amendment 3 passed with approximately 66% of the vote and became section 29 of Article I of the Utah Constitution). Plaintiffs alleged that Amendment 3 violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them of the fundamental liberty to marry the person of their choosing and to have such a marriage recognized. They also claimed that Amendment 3 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs raised their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking both a declaratory judgment that Amendment 3 was unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that "[a]ll citizens, regardless of their sexual identity, have a fundamental right to liberty, and this right protects an individual's ability to marry and the intimate choices a person makes about marriage and family." Furthermore, the court held that Amendment 3 denied plaintiffs equal protection because it classified based on sex and sexual orientation without a rational basis. It declared Amendment 3 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined enforcement of the challenged provisions. The Governor and Attorney General filed a timely notice of appeal and moved to stay the district court's decision. Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a stay. The Supreme Court, however, granted a stay of the district court's injunction pending final disposition of the appeal by the Tenth Circuit. Having heard and carefully considered the argument of the litigants, the Tenth Circuit concluded that, consistent with the United States Constitution, the State of Utah may not deny a citizen benefit of the laws based solely on the sex of the person the citizen chooses to marry. View "Kitchen, et al v. Herbert, et al" on Justia Law

The issues on appeal to the Tenth Circuit in this case stem from pollution at a four-square-mile area in Denver where Debtor-ASARCO, Union Pacific Railroad Company, and Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Company., Inc. all operated facilities. All companies allegedly contributed to the release of hazardous substances at the site. The Environmental Protection Agency brought a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) action against debtor-ASARCO which was pending when the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The EPA filed proofs of claim in the bankruptcy case seeking recovery of ASARCO's portion of the cleaning expenses. ASARCO moved to settle the claims to resolve its CERCLA liabilities. ASARCO sought contribution from Union Pacific and Pepsi. The district court ruled: (1) that ASARCO's direct contribution claim was time-barred under CERCLA section 113 (42 U.S.C. ß 9613); (2) that post-bankruptcy ASARCO was not a subrogee of pre-bankruptcy ASARCO; (3) and that ASARCO could not bring a subrogation claim. ASARCO appealed all three of these rulings. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.View "Asarco LLC v. Union Pacific, et al" on Justia Law

A Utah state trooper stopped Sherida Felders for speeding while on a trip from California to Colorado. Based on her answers to a few questions, Trooper Brian Bairett asked to search Felders’s car for drugs. After Felders refused, Bairett called for assistance from K-9 Unit officer Jeff Malcom to conduct a dog sniff. The ensuing two-hour search yielded no drugs. Felders and her passengers filed suit against Bairett and Malcom under 28 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, among other claims, that both Bairett and Malcom unlawfully searched Felders’s car in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Malcom moved for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim based on qualified immunity. The district court denied Malcom’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found as a matter of law that Malcom could not establish probable cause to search the car prior to conducting the dog sniff and that material facts were in dispute regarding (1) whether Malcom’s canine alerted prior to jumping into the vehicle; and (2) whether Malcom facilitated the dog's entry into the vehicle prior to establishing probable cause. Malcom filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. He argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment because he had probable cause to search the car prior to conducting the dog sniff and, alternatively, that the law did not clearly establish that his actions during the sniff violated the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Malcom did not have probable cause to search the vehicle prior to conducting the sniff. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Malcom's motion for summary judgment. View "Felders, et al v. Malcom, et al" on Justia Law

MMS Construction & Paving, L.L.C. entered into a subcontract with Head, Inc. to pave asphalt runway shoulders at Altus Air Force Base in Oklahoma. The project was delayed and MMS, expressing concern that Head had not been making agreed payments, quit the job. MMS also complained that completing the job would be more expensive than it originally believed because certain requirements were being imposed that Head said would be waived. After MMS quit, Head finished the job, relying on other subcontractors. MMS sued Head on state-law claims of breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, quantum meruit, and misrepresentation, and brought a claim under the federal Miller Act on Head’s surety bond for the project. Head filed a counterclaim, alleging that MMS breached the contract. After a jury trial, MMS was awarded damages and attorney fees. Head filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, both of which the district court denied. Head appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to show that Head breached the contract; (2) if there was a breach, it was not material; (3) an Oklahoma statute limited MMS’s breach-of-contract damages to the amount unpaid plus interest; (4) the evidence was not sufficient to establish MMS’s alleged lost-profits damages for breach of contract; (5) MMS did not present sufficient evidence to prove misrepresentation or any damages from misrepresentation, MMS waived the misrepresentation claim, and the award of misrepresentation damages duplicated the award of damages for breach of contract; and (6) MMS was not entitled to attorney fees from Head because the Miller Act does not allow recovery of those fees. Upon careful consideration of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit reversed damages award based on the misrepresentation claim because the jury’s award was not supported by any evidence at trial. On all other issues, the Court affirmed. View "MMS Construction & Paving v. Head, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

In 2012, Cheston Foster was arrested for violating the terms of his supervised release, including traveling to Massachusetts without permission. Following a revocation hearing where Foster admitted the violations enumerated, the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced Foster to time served and 30 months of supervised release. The court imposed a special condition that he reside in a halfway house residential re-entry center. Foster’s attorney sought an alternative arrangement by providing the probation office with the address of Foster’s mother, but the probation officer opposed this suggestion. The district court stated, “[w]hat we will do is we will start with a residential re-entry center, and if through his assigned probation officer there is an alternative that is reasonable, we will go at it that way, but we will start there.” On December 27, 2012, Foster left the residential reentry center without permission and did not return. A few months later, a grand jury issued an indictment charging Foster with a single count of escape from custody. Foster’s attorney moved to dismiss the indictment because the residence requirement “was not part of any detention or a sanction for his supervised release violation,” and therefore Foster was not in custody for purposes of the escape statute. The district court dismissed the indictment after concluding that Foster was not in custody. The government appealed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law

I&W, Inc. owned a mining operation in Carlsbad, New Mexico. Excavation on its property created a cavern, which grew so large it infringed upon the subsurface property of the nearby Circle S Feed Store, LLC. This cavern, in turn, caused subsidence and damages to Circle S’s surface property. A New Mexico state court found I&W negligent and liable for damages its solution mining operations caused to Circle S’s property. I&W sought indemnification for the damages under its commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies, which had been issued by Mid-Continent Casualty Company. Mid-Continent, in turn, sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that it was not required to indemnify I&W for damages awarded in the state court action. The district court granted summary judgment for Mid-Continent, holding that a provision of the policies’ Oil Industries Limitation Endorsement (Oil Endorsement) excluded coverage of the damages awarded in state court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the Oil Endorsement excluded coverage under the excess/umbrella policies issued to I&W, but held the Endorsement did not affect coverage under the primary policies. View "Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Circle S. Feed Store, et al" on Justia Law

Salt Lake County employee Michael Barrett helped a colleague pursue a sexual harassment complaint against her boss. According to Barrett, his superiors began a campaign to have him discharged or demoted. After he was demoted Barrett filed suit alleging that the county violated Title VII by retaliating against him for helping a coworker vindicate her civil rights. The jury found for Barrett. At trial the county argued that it disciplined Barrett because he was a poor worker. But the evidence showed that Barrett's fourteen years working for the county were marked only by promotions and positive reviews until he helped draw attention to his colleague's plight. On appeal, the county asks the Tenth Circuit to reverse the jury's verdict, but finding no error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment. View "Barrett v. Salt Lake County" on Justia Law

Five members of Petitioner Steven Bonney's extended family, four girls and one boy, accused him of sexually assaulting them on various occasions when they were between the ages of six and eight and Petitioner was a teenager. The assaults allegedly occurred around 2000 or 2001. The State of Wyoming charged Petitioner in 2008 with four counts of second degree sexual assault and one count of third degree sexual assault. The issue before the Tenth Circuit, as framed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, was whether the Wyoming state court's denial of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on collateral review of a guilty plea "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established" Supreme Court precedent. The federal district court thought so, but upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed.View "Bonney v. Wilson, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant JetAway Aviation, LLC sued Defendants-Appellees Board of County Commissioners of the County of Montrose, Colorado and the Montrose County Building Authority, and nongovernmental defendants Jet Center Partners, LLC, Black Canyon Jet Center, LLC, Kevin Egan, and James Rumble, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Sherman Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on JetAway’s antitrust claims on multiple bases, including that JetAway did not have antitrust standing to bring its claims. JetAway appealed that decision, and the Governmental Defendants cross-appealed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on state-action immunity grounds. Acting as a quorum, Judges Tymkovich and Holmes joined this opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, specifically, because JetAway failed to establish an antitrust injury and, consequently, lacked antitrust standing to bring this action. However, the judges employed different reasoning in reaching this conclusion. Because the Tenth Circuit fully denied JetAway relief at the threshold on the basis of its failure to establish an antitrust injury, it did not reach the Governmental Defendants' cross-appeal regarding state-action immunity and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. In addition, the Court addressed two pending procedural matters: a motion to seal and a motion to strike. JetAway filed an unopposed motion to seal numerous documents that were under seal in the district court. The Tenth Circuit's clerk's office provisionally granted that request pending the merits panel's final determination. The Court then denied the motion, finding that JetAway did not provide any basis for sealing the documents; instead, it merely stated that the documents were filed under seal. "[A] generalized allusion to confidential information is woefully inadequate to meet JetAway's 'heavy burden.'" View "JetAway v. Board of County Commissioners, et al" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded Appellant Michael Zinna only $8000 in attorney's fees. The case was remanded to the district court to calculate a reasonable fee. In a separate order, the Tenth Circuit ruled Zinna was entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee for the appellate proceedings and remanded the matter to the district court to calculate that fee also. On remand, the district court entered two orders: the first awarded Zinna $16,240 in trial fees and the second awarded him $18,687.50 in appellate fees. Zinna filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the judgment. Upon re-review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Zinna's notice of appeal was timely as to both aspects of the fee award. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court ignored our mandate, thereby abusing its discretion when it calculated attorney's fees for the trial court proceedings. Zinna's arguments relating to the award of appellate fees were waived due to inadequate briefing. The case was remanded one again for further proceedings.View "Zinna v. Congrove" on Justia Law