Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants-Appellants Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., and Chesapeake Investments appealed a district court judgment awarding Plaintiff-Appellee BP America Production Company $22,265,302 plus interest, and a district court order compelling Chesapeake to pay $1,403,669.38 in attorneys' fees and disbursements. BP cross-appealed the district court order confirming an arbitration award. This dispute arose out of a purchase and sale agreement ("PSA") entered into by Chesapeake as seller and BP as purchaser of oil and gas properties for $1.75 billion. The PSA contained three arbitration provisions. After closing, the parties agreed on title defects. Less the aggregate threshold, the parties agreed BP was owed $81,234,556. At the same time, disputed title defects and benefits were submitted to title arbitration. BP sought approximately $46 million for disputed title defects, and Chesapeake sought approximately $22 million for disputed title benefits and "credits." While the title arbitration was pending, BP submitted a proposed final accounting statement reflecting the agreed title defects of approximately $80 million. Chesapeake responded with an exception report changing the $80 million to $58 million. When BP asked why, Chesapeake responded that it had applied a $22 million offset based on its pending claims in the title arbitration; Chesapeake did not dispute the $80 million in agreed title defects, but temporarily withheld the $22 million because it might recover that amount in title arbitration. Though the accounting arbitration ended, the title arbitration continued. The arbitration panel issued an award finding $11,526,434 in title defects (favoring BP), and $3,727,031 in title benefits (favoring Chesapeake). The arbitration panel noted that it made no determination of whether these amounts exceeded the aggregate threshold, or whether its ruling would actually cause any money to exchange hands. If the parties could not agree on the effect of the panel's ruling on the ultimate purchase price adjustment, they could submit their positions on that issue to further arbitration. Shortly thereafter, BP requested payment from Chesapeake. Because a $3 million in title benefits awarded to Chesapeake did not exceed the aggregate threshold, Chesapeake received no price adjustment to offset the $22 million it previously withheld. The parties filed competing motions to confirm in the district court. The court ultimately entered judgment in favor of BP for $22,265,302 plus interest. Chesapeake appealed that judgment. The district court later granted in part BP's motion for attorneys' fees and costs and awarded $1,403,669.38 against Chesapeake for fees and disbursements. Chesapeake appealed that judgment too. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit affirmed both awards in Chesapeake's direct appeals and dismissed BP's cross-appeal. View "BP America Production Company v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

In 1996, Marcus Lewis pleaded guilty to statutory rape in Missouri and was sentenced to five years of probation. As a convicted sex offender, Lewis was required by federal law to register his status in his state of residence under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA - and its statutory predecessors). Lewis last registered in Kansas in May 2011, and he did not voluntarily register in any other state since that time. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether a convicted sex offender who violated SORNA when he (1) abandoned his residence in one state; (2) moved from that state to another; and (3) knowingly failed to update his sex offender registration, could be prosecuted in the state from which he departed. The Tenth Circuit concluded that under the relevant statutory provisions and case law, a sex offender may be prosecuted in either the departure district where the offense began or in other districts where the offender was required to update his registration. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

This antitrust class action stemmed from an allegation that Dow Chemical Company conspired with its competitors to fix prices for polyurethane chemical products. Over Dow’s objection, the district court certified a plaintiff class including all industrial purchasers of polyurethane products during the alleged conspiracy period. The action went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict against Dow. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, denying Dow’s motions for decertification of the class and judgment as a matter of law. Dow raised four issues on appeal, all of which the Tenth Circuit rejected. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "In re: Urethane AntiTrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Mr. and Mrs. Melot owed millions of dollars in federal taxes. Billy Melot was serving time in federal prison for tax crimes. The debt led the United States to foreclose on the Melots’ real properties, and the Melots tried to stop the foreclosure. Sanctions were imposed because of the methods used by the Melots in relation to their attempts to stop the foreclosure: the district court regarded them as fraudulent. The disagreement began when the district court reduced the tax assessments to judgments and ordered the sale of the Melots’ real properties. That order prompted a motion to intervene by Steven Byers, who filed documents asserting liens on the property. The documents were mailed from the city where the Melots’ properties were located (Hobbs, New Mexico). The government suspected fraud and collaboration with the Melots, pointing out to the court that: (1) Byers lived in prison; (2) he could not own any liens because he was destitute; (3) the Melots never disclosed any liens; (4) Mrs. Melot had signed Byers’ name on the lien and motion to intervene; and (5) the New Mexico address listed for Byers was actually the home of Mrs. Melot’s friends. At the hearing on the motion to intervene, Byers moved to withdraw his motion for lack of proof. The court denied the motion to withdraw, and the government presented evidence tending to show that the Melots and Byers created a scheme to derail the foreclosure. Mrs. Melot refused to answer questions, invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The magistrate judge certified criminal contempt by the Melots. More than a year later, the district court issued its order addressing the contempt certification with sanctions including removal of Mrs. Melots from the property, reimbursing the government's costs for the hearing, striking of the Melots' pending motions, and filing restrictions. The Melots argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the district court violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by imposing sanctions without notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Tenth Circuit agreed, reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Melot (Katherine), et al" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Trent appeals his conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He raises five issues, on of which raised a question of whether the Tenth Circuit could apply what is called the “modified categorical approach” to determine whether his prior felony is a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). On the ACCA issue the Tenth Circuit held that the general Oklahoma conspiracy statute was divisible and therefore subject to the modified categorical approach, and that Defendant’s prior violation of that statute was a serious drug offense because the object of the conspiracy was manufacturing methamphetamine. View "United States v. Trent" on Justia Law

Using peer-to-peer file-sharing software, Defendant-Appellant Jory Nance downloaded child pornography on his laptop computer from sometime in 2009 through April 2012. He also used this software to share child pornography with others, including an Edmond, Oklahoma detective who was able to download eight files containing child pornography from Nance during March and April 2012. This resulted in the United States charging Nance with eight counts of transporting child pornography. A jury convicted Nance of multiple counts of transporting child pornography and receiving or attempting to receive child pornography. He challenged those convictions, contending: (1) the district court erred in admitting evidence of his uncharged bad acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2); and (2) there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that he attempted to receive child pornography. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Nance" on Justia Law

In 2006, United States Postal Inspectors learned Crosby Powell had deposited checks stolen from the United States mail into his accounts at TCF Bank, UMB Bank, and Wells Fargo. An investigation revealed Powell had altered payee information or forged endorsements on some of the stolen checks. The United States obtained a superseding indictment charging Powell with eleven counts of uttering or possessing forged checks, and seventeen counts of possessing stolen mail. At trial, the government sought to prove the forged checks were “of an organization” by presenting evidence that each bank into which the forged checks were deposited was a federally insured bank operating in interstate commerce. The jury convicted Powell on the first eleven counts set out in the indictment. In his appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Powell raised three challenges to his convictions, all of which were raised for the first time on appeal, all of which were raised on the same premise: at no point during his possession or utterance of the forged checks were the checks "of" the banks into which they were deposited. The Tenth Circuit agreed that the forged checks were not "of" the depository banks. Because Powell did not raise his arguments before the district court, however, he was not entitled to relief unless he could "successfully run the gauntlet created by our rigorous plain-error standard of review." The Court found that Powell could not satisfy this burden as to all counts of conviction. Accordingly, the Court: (1) affirmed Powell’s convictions as to Counts 10, 13, and 20; and (2) remanded the case to the district court so it could vacate the remaining convictions and take any other necessary actions. View "United States v. Powell" on Justia Law

Gustave Brune repeatedly failed to update his sex offender status as required by Kansas and federal law. When arrested for these failures, the arresting agents found images of child pornography on Brune’s computer. He was eventually indicted in federal court for failure to update the sex offender registry and possession of child pornography, and convicted on both charges. Brune argued on appeal: (1) that a subsection of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was unconstitutional; and (2) the statute that criminalizes possessing, or accessing with the intent to view, materials containing images of child pornography was unconstitutionally overbroad because it proscribed significant amounts of speech and conduct protected by the First Amendment. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny Brune's motions to dismiss his indictment. View "United States v. Brune" on Justia Law

Mid-Continent Casualty Company brought a declaratory judgment action to settle an issue with its commercial commercial general liability (CGL) policy issued to Pennant Service Company. In 2001, True Oil Company, an owner and operator of oil and gas wells, entered into a master service contract (MSC) with Pennant for work on a well in Wyoming. The MSC included a provision whereby Pennant agreed to indemnify True Oil resulting from either Pennant or True Oil's negligence. In July 2001, Christopher Van Norman, a Pennant employee, was injured in an accident at True Oil's well. Van Norman sued True Oil in Wyoming state court for negligence. In accordance with the MSC's indemnity provision, counsel for True Oil wrote to Pennant requesting indemnification for its defense costs, attorney fees, and any award that Van Norman might recover against it. Mid-Continent refused to defend or indemnify True Oil based on Wyoming's Anti-Indemnity Statute, which invalidates agreements related to oil or gas wells that "indemnify the indemnitee against loss or liability for damages for . . . bodily injury to persons." In May 2002, True Oil brought a federal action against Mid-Continent for declaratory relief, breach of contract (CGL policy), and other related claims. In February 2005, the district court granted Mid-Continent summary judgment, determining that the MSC's indemnity provision, when invoked with respect to claims of the indemnitee's own negligence was unenforceable as a matter of public policy. The court held that Mid-Continent was not required to defend or indemnify True Oil in the underlying suit as it then existed because "where an indemnification provision in a MSC is void and unenforceable, the insurer never actually assumed any of the indemnitee's liabilities under the policy." The district court granted summary judgment to True Oil, determining Mid-Continent breached its duty to defend and indemnify True Oil. As damages, the court awarded True Oil the amount it paid to settle the underlying suit and the attorney fees and costs incurred in defending itself. Mid-Continent appealed the district court's judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Mid-Continent v. True Oil Company" on Justia Law

The case involves statements made by plaintiff Vehicle Market Research, Inc. (VMR) in a breach of contract case that were allegedly inconsistent with earlier statements by its sole owner, John Tagliapietra. VMR developed and owned certain intellectual property, including a software system to calculate the value of a total loss of an automobile for the purposes of the automobile insurance industry and certain “pre-existing software tools, utilities, concepts, techniques, text, research or development” used in the development of the software. When Mr. Tagliapietra filed for personal bankruptcy, he asserted that his shares in VMR were worth nothing. A few years later, as the bankruptcy was winding down, VMR sued Mitchell International, Inc., a company which held an exclusive license to VMR's technology. That case sought $4.5 million in damages for the alleged misappropriation of that technology. The question this case presented to the Tenth Circuit was whether the statements by VMR and Mr. Tagliapietra in the litigation against Mitchell were so clearly contrary to the statements made by Mr. Tagliapietra in his bankruptcy proceeding that VMR should have been judicially estopped from proceeding with its suit against Mitchell. After review, the Court concluded that neither VMR’s litigation claim for payments nor Mr. Tagliapietra’s deposition testimony in that lawsuit was clearly inconsistent with his valuation of 0.00 for his VMR stock at the time of his bankruptcy petition in 2005, the date when the initial bankruptcy representations were made. "If there were grounds for judicial estoppel, it would have to be based on a duty by Mr. Tagliapietra to amend his bankruptcy pleadings to report a possible increased value for his VMR stock at least as of the time that VMR filed its suit against Mitchell in 2009. However, our precedent is not clear on whether a debtor has a continuing duty to amend his bankruptcy schedules when the estate’s assets change in value. Given our reluctance to invoke judicial estoppel, and keeping in mind that judicial estoppel is an affirmative defense that its proponent must prove, we conclude that in this case Mitchell has not met its burden of showing any clearly inconsistent statements that would warrant that relief." View "Vehicle Market Research v. Mitchell International" on Justia Law