Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In February 2021, police officers found Justin Stepp, a convicted felon, with a gunshot wound in a car driven by his girlfriend, along with a firearm in the car’s console and ammunition under the passenger seat. A subsequent search of Stepp’s home uncovered more ammunition. Stepp was charged and convicted by a jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he constructively possessed the firearm or ammunition, and that the court erred by including his 2002 conviction in its calculation of his base offense level. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed Stepp’s conviction and sentence. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Stepp had constructive possession of the ammunition found in his home. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding Stepp’s 2002 conviction fell within the applicable fifteen-year lookback period for calculating his base offense level. View "United States v. Stepp" on Justia Law

Barbara Lindsay, the former Director of Workforce Development and Career Services at Emily Griffith Technical College (EGTC), sued Denver Public Schools (DPS) and Stephanie Donner, EGTC's Executive Director, for retaliation. Lindsay claimed that her termination was motivated by her opposition to racist comments made during the hiring process for the Executive Director position and her assistance to a candidate in filing employment discrimination charges. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of DPS and Donner. Lindsay appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evidence to prove a causal relationship between Lindsay's protected activity (opposition to racist comments and assistance in filing discrimination charges) and her termination. The Court determined that there was no evidence that those who decided to terminate Lindsay's employment were aware of her protected activity. The court further noted that Lindsay failed to show that anyone at DPS knew that she had assisted in bringing discrimination charges before she was fired. Therefore, Lindsay's claim that she was terminated in retaliation for protected activities could not be substantiated. View "Lindsay v. Denver Public Schools" on Justia Law

In this case, Pamela Kathryn Conley appealed her sentence for bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. She argued that the district court incorrectly calculated her loss amount for the bank fraud offense, and that the court erred in accepting her guilty plea for aggravated identity theft.Conley had applied for loans at seven financial institutions using false employment and salary information, and in some cases, she forged the signatures of financial institution employees to create false lien releases for vehicles she used as collateral. She pled guilty to 24 counts of bank fraud and 4 counts of aggravated identity theft.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the district court had erred in calculating the loss amount for the bank fraud offense. The court vacated Conley's sentence for bank fraud and remanded for resentencing on those counts. The court determined that the district court had relied on disputed facts in the presentence report to calculate Conley's U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range for bank fraud, which was procedurally unreasonable.However, the court affirmed Conley's convictions for aggravated identity theft. Conley had argued that the court erred in accepting her guilty plea for this offense in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Dubin v. United States. But the appeals court found that any potential error in accepting the guilty plea was not plain or obvious under current, well-settled law. View "United States v. Conley" on Justia Law

In a case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Bruce McWhorter, a mechanic, had his certification revoked by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) after it was discovered that he had not replaced certain components of an aircraft's engine despite claiming to have performed a major overhaul. McWhorter appealed the decision to an administrative law judge who affirmed the FAA's decision. McWhorter then sought to appeal this decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), but failed to serve the FAA with his notice of appeal in a timely manner. The NTSB dismissed McWhorter's appeal on these grounds. McWhorter subsequently petitioned for a review of the NTSB’s dismissal, but did so 111 days after the NTSB issued its final order, exceeding the 60-day limit prescribed by law.The court clarified that the 60-day limit for seeking appellate review stipulated in 49 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather a claim-processing rule. This means that a petitioner’s failure to comply with this time limit does not affect the court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal. However, the court found that McWhorter had not established reasonable grounds for the delay in filing his petition for review, as required by the same statute for petitions filed after the 60-day limit. The court determined that the primary blame for the delay was on McWhorter, not on any confusion created by the FAA or the NTSB. Therefore, the court denied McWhorter's petition as untimely. View "McWhorter v. FAA" on Justia Law

In this case, Domingo Martinez Jr. was convicted of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenged the admission of a narcotics detective’s testimony about Santa Muerte shrines, claiming the testimony violated his First Amendment rights. He also objected to the district court’s instruction to the jury to disregard a robocall inadvertently played during the trial, rather than declaring a mistrial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court found no error in the admission of the detective's testimony relating to Santa Muerte, noting it was based solely on the detective's law enforcement experience, not personal self-study. Moreover, the testimony was relevant to the issue raised by Mr. Martinez's entrapment defense, whether he was predisposed to drug trafficking. The court also found no error in the district court's treatment of the robocall interruption. The district court had instructed the jury to disregard the interruption twice and recessed the trial briefly to ensure it would not happen again. The court of appeals found no indication that the jury had time to process the robocall or that it affected the outcome of the trial. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that impounding a vehicle from a private property without a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale violates the Fourth Amendment. The defendant, Isaac Ramos, was arrested after an altercation at a convenience store. His truck was impounded from the store's parking lot, and a subsequent inventory search revealed a machine gun and ammunition. Ramos was charged with unlawful possession of a machine gun and being a felon illegally in possession of ammunition. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the impoundment of his truck violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied his motion, and he appealed.The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding that the impoundment was not supported by a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale. The court considered five factors: whether the vehicle was on public or private property; if on private property, whether the property owner had been consulted; whether an alternative to impoundment existed; whether the vehicle was implicated in a crime; and whether the vehicle’s owner and/or driver had consented to the impoundment. The court found that all of these factors weighed against the reasonableness of the impoundment, and thus, it violated the Fourth Amendment. The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to grant Ramos’s suppression motion and conduct any further necessary proceedings. View "United States v. Ramos" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided in favor of a debtor, Chuza Oil Company, and its related parties, who were alleged to have made fraudulent transfers during bankruptcy proceedings. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that the transfers were not fraudulent, rejecting the trustee's argument that the transfers depleted the bankruptcy estate by replacing subordinated debt with unsubordinated debt. The court held that Chuza Oil Company did not have an interest in the transferred funds as they were earmarked for a specific creditor and were not part of the bankruptcy estate. The court further held that the earmarked funds did not diminish the estate, finding that the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the estate was not diminished by the combination of payments into and out of Chuza Oil Company was not clearly erroneous. The court also found that the statutory exceptions to the trustee's preferential transfer and constructive fraudulent transfer claims were satisfied, as Chuza Oil Company received much more in loans from the defendants than it paid to the specific creditor. View "Montoya v. Goldstein" on Justia Law

In the case involving BP America Production Company and Debra Anne Haaland, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling upholding the agency order requiring BP to pay nearly $700,000 in correctly assessed royalty underpayments. BP argued that the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act shielded it from these payments. However, the court rejected BP's interpretation of the Act. The court found that BP's obligation was a single monetary obligation of $905,348.24, not each of the 443 constituent royalty obligations. Therefore, BP did not meet the statutory condition of less than $10,000 for relief from liability for payments. The court also rejected BP's argument that the Secretary's "deemed" final decision lacked a reasoned basis and thus violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The court found that the Secretary's deemed final decision adopted the ONRR Director's decision on the issues raised. View "BP America Production Company v. Davis, et al." on Justia Law

In a case involving the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan participant, Ian C., sought coverage for his son, A.C., to receive treatment at Catalyst Residential Treatment for mental health and substance abuse issues. UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company (United), the claims fiduciary for the plan, initially covered the treatment but subsequently denied coverage. Ian C. appealed this denial internally, a process in which United upheld its original decision. Ian C. then took his case to federal district court, alleging that United's denial violated his right to a "full and fair review" of his claim under ERISA. The district court ruled in favor of United.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the court held that United's denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious, violating ERISA regulations guaranteeing a "full and fair review" of claims. In particular, the court found that United had failed to consider A.C.'s substance abuse as an independent ground for coverage in their decision to deny benefits, in violation of their fiduciary duties under ERISA. The court therefore reversed the district court's decision. View "C., et al. v. United Healthcare Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff, Robert Hampton, sued his former employer, the Utah Department of Corrections (UDC), alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act. Hampton, who was born without the second and fifth digits on both hands, claimed that UDC refused to accommodate his disability, treated him disparately based on that disability, and retaliated against him for requesting accommodation.Hampton, who had previously worked as a corrections officer in Arizona, was hired by UDC in 2016. He was required to qualify on UDC-approved firearms, including a Glock 17 handgun. Hampton requested an accommodation to use a different handgun, a Springfield 1911, due to difficulties he encountered in handling the Glock due to his disability. This request was denied, and Hampton was later terminated from his position.The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Hampton's failure-to-accommodate claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that Hampton’s request for a different handgun could be considered a reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, and that the district court erred in determining that using a Glock handgun was an essential function of Hampton’s job based solely on the UDC’s firearms policy.However, the court affirmed the district court’s grants of summary judgment on Hampton’s claims of disparate treatment and retaliation. It found that Hampton had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his disability was a determining factor in his termination or that his reassignment to a different position constituted an adverse employment action. View "Hampton v. Utah Department of Corrections" on Justia Law