Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A physician employed jointly by a Kansas hospital and its parent health system alleged that he was fired and later reported to the state medical licensing board in retaliation for reporting another doctor’s alleged sexual harassment of nurses. The physician had served in various roles at the hospital, including as Chief Medical Officer, and had made a formal complaint about a colleague’s conduct. After an internal investigation into an unrelated anonymous complaint about the physician’s own conduct, the hospital terminated his employment and subsequently referred several of his cases for outside peer review, which led to reports being filed with the state licensing board.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment to the hospital and health system on the physician’s Title VII retaliation claims, finding that he could not show the reasons for his termination or the reports to the licensing board were pretextual. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims. The physician appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the physician presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the hospital’s internal investigation and subsequent actions were motivated by retaliatory animus, particularly under a “cat’s paw” theory, where biased subordinates influenced the ultimate decisionmakers. The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the stated reasons for termination and reporting were pretextual, including evidence of disparate treatment and an unfair investigation. The Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on both Title VII retaliation claims and remanded for further proceedings. It also directed the district court to reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Byrnes v. St. Catherine Hospital" on Justia Law

In this case, police in Denver were investigating a shooting that occurred early in the morning. They identified a suspect described as a light-skinned Black male with a bald head, thick beard, and muscular build, and circulated a photo of him. Later that day, officers surveilled a vehicle believed to be connected to the suspect. When a group, including a Black male with some similar clothing but not matching the suspect’s physical description, arrived in a different car and then left in a third vehicle, officers decided to stop that vehicle at a gas station. During the stop, officers detained Noah Huerta, a passenger, and conducted a patdown, finding a firearm magazine on him. A subsequent search of the vehicle, after obtaining the driver’s consent, revealed a handgun near Huerta’s seat.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Huerta’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed and dangerous, and also ruled that the firearm would have been inevitably discovered. The court also denied Huerta’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which challenged the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute under recent Supreme Court precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress de novo. The court held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Huerta was armed and dangerous, as the connection between the group and the shooting suspect was tenuous and based on a mere hunch, and the conduct of the vehicle’s occupants was innocuous. The court also found that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply. However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment, as binding circuit precedent foreclosed Huerta’s constitutional challenge. The court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Huerta" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was stopped by police officers in Aurora, Colorado, for speeding. During the stop, the officers observed the defendant make a dramatic movement toward the passenger side of his vehicle, to the extent that he was no longer visible to them. The officers recognized the defendant as a member of a local violent gang and learned from him that he was on parole for robbery. After asking the defendant to exit the vehicle and conducting a pat-down that revealed no weapons, the officers searched the passenger seat area and found a firearm. The defendant was subsequently charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm evidence, which argued that the warrantless vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was armed and dangerous, based on his furtive movement, gang affiliation, and parole status for a violent crime. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress de novo, considering the totality of the circumstances. The court held that the combination of the defendant’s dramatic movement, his recognized gang membership, and his parole for robbery provided reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, justifying the protective vehicle search under the officer safety exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court also rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), finding it foreclosed by circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. McGregor" on Justia Law

In 2009, the defendant and two co-defendants abducted a family at gunpoint, including two young daughters, and robbed them of $30,000. A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado convicted the defendant of four counts of kidnapping, one count of conspiracy to kidnap, and one count of possessing and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The convictions for kidnapping the children were central to the sentencing dispute.Following the initial sentencing, which totaled 600 months, the defendant challenged his convictions and sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit previously remanded the case for resentencing after the government conceded that the firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) should be vacated, in light of Johnson v. United States, which found the residual clause of “violent felony” unconstitutionally vague. On remand, the district court conducted a de novo resentencing. The government argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(2) required mandatory minimum twenty-five-year sentences for each kidnapping conviction involving a child. The district court agreed and imposed concurrent 300-month sentences for each remaining count.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(2). The appellate court held that kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) is not categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), because it can be committed without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Therefore, § 3559(f)(2) did not mandate a twenty-five-year minimum sentence for each conviction. The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing consistent with its decision. View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law

The defendant, an enrolled member of a Native American tribe, was charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse against his minor stepdaughter, D.P., occurring over several years in Indian Country. The alleged abuse began when D.P. was about six years old and continued until she was over twelve, with a brief pause when her mother was more frequently present. D.P. disclosed the abuse following a suicide attempt at age twelve, and her mother and medical professionals testified about her outcry. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on D.P.’s credibility, as there was no physical evidence corroborating her allegations. The defense sought to challenge D.P.’s credibility, highlighting her mental health history, medication use, and possible suggestibility, and attempted to introduce four sexually suggestive, fictionalized YouTube videos created by D.P. at age eleven.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted the government’s motion in limine under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, excluding any mention or introduction of the YouTube videos at trial. The court found the videos constituted evidence of “other sexual behavior” or “sexual predisposition” and did not fall within any of Rule 412’s exceptions. The defense argued the videos were relevant to impeach D.P.’s credibility, not to prove sexual behavior or predisposition, and that exclusion violated the defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and due process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary ruling and constitutional claims. The Tenth Circuit held that Rule 412’s bar applies to evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition, even if the purpose is impeachment, and that no exception for general impeachment exists. The court further held that exclusion of the videos did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights, as the Constitution does not mandate admission of general impeachment evidence absent a showing of bias or motive to lie. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

Several businesses involved in the cultivation, distribution, and sale of hemp products in Wyoming and elsewhere challenged a Wyoming statute, Senate Enrolled Act 24 (SEA 24), which significantly altered the state’s regulation of hemp. SEA 24 narrowed the definition of hemp to exclude synthetic substances and expanded the definition of THC to include both delta-9 and delta-8 THC, requiring that the combined concentration not exceed 0.3%. The law also added both naturally occurring and synthetic delta-8 THC to Wyoming’s Schedule I controlled substances, making it unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess hemp products exceeding the new THC limits or containing synthetic substances, even if such products are legal under federal law.After SEA 24 was enacted, the plaintiffs filed a preenforcement action in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that SEA 24 was preempted by the federal 2018 Farm Bill, violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking, and was void for vagueness. The plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect. The district court denied the motion for preliminary relief and subsequently dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that most defendants were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the remaining claims lacked legal merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked a substantial federal right to support their preemption claim, failed to demonstrate a Dormant Commerce Clause violation, did not establish a regulatory taking of their commercial personal property, and did not show that SEA 24 was unconstitutionally vague. The court also dismissed the appeal of the denial of preliminary relief as moot due to the dismissal of the complaint. View "Green Room v. State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Several healthcare employees in Colorado, including those at the University of Colorado Hospital Authority and South Denver Cardiology Associates, were terminated after refusing to comply with their employers’ COVID-19 vaccination mandates. These mandates, implemented in 2021, required employees to either be vaccinated or obtain a medical or religious exemption. The plaintiffs declined vaccination and did not seek exemptions, resulting in their dismissal.Following their terminations, the plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, asserting nearly identical claims. They alleged violations of statutory, constitutional, and contractual rights, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state-law breach of contract and tort claims, and an implied private right of action under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds such as sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim. The district courts dismissed all claims, finding that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled any viable legal theory. The courts also denied the plaintiffs’ requests to amend their complaints after judgment was entered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissals de novo. The court held that none of the statutes cited by the plaintiffs—including the Emergency Use Authorization statute, the PREP Act, and 10 U.S.C. § 980—unambiguously conferred individual rights enforceable under § 1983. The court also found that the constitutional claims, including those based on due process and equal protection, were not adequately pled and that the breach of contract claim was waived for lack of argument. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ judgments, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted and that the lower courts did not abuse their discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Timken v. South Denver Cardiology Associates" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor to the plaintiffs conveyed land to the United States in a land exchange but retained certain water rights that could only be accessed through the conveyed property, now managed by the U.S. Forest Service. The conveyance documents did not mention these water rights or provide any right of access. Over the years, the plaintiffs and their predecessors sought permits from the Forest Service to access and develop the water rights, but the agency repeatedly expressed concerns about environmental impacts and indicated it had the authority to deny access. In 2010, the Forest Service formally opposed the plaintiffs’ efforts to maintain the water rights in state court, asserting it would not grant the necessary land use authorization.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The court found the QTA claim time-barred by the statute’s twelve-year limitations period, reasoning that the plaintiffs or their predecessors were on notice of the government’s adverse claim well before the suit was filed in 2022. The court also dismissed the DJA claim, holding it was essentially a quiet title claim subject to the same limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the QTA claim was untimely because, by 2006 at the latest, the Forest Service had asserted exclusive control sufficient to put the plaintiffs on notice of its adverse claim, causing the limitations period to expire before the suit was filed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief and that the third, alleging a taking, was not ripe because the plaintiffs had not first sought compensation under the Tucker Act. View "Purgatory Recreation I v. United States" on Justia Law

A former employee of an Oklahoma-based aviation training company alleged that his one-year employment contract was not renewed because he is a disabled veteran and because he complained to human resources about his supervisor’s disparaging comments regarding his disability. The employee, a Marine veteran with a high VA disability rating, worked as a Loadmaster Instructor in Kuwait. During his tenure, he disclosed his disability status for affirmative action purposes and later informed his supervisor and a co-worker when his rating increased. After this disclosure, his supervisor made inappropriate remarks about the disability system and the employee’s status, which led to a complaint and a subsequent reprimand of the supervisor. The employee’s FAA flight certificate expired shortly before his contract ended, and he received a negative performance appraisal from his immediate supervisor. The company’s higher management, who were responsible for contract renewal decisions, cited subpar job performance and the lapse of the flight certificate as reasons for not renewing the contract.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims. The court found that the employee failed to present sufficient evidence that the stated reasons for non-renewal were pretextual under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or that the decision was motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus. The court also held that the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) does not protect against discrimination based solely on disability status, but rather on military service itself.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the employee did not create a triable issue of fact under the “cat’s paw” theory linking a supervisor’s alleged bias to the ultimate decisionmakers. The court also confirmed that USERRA does not extend to claims of discrimination based solely on disability status. View "Sellman v. Aviation Training Consulting" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between two brothers, Matthew and Shane, involving a $445,000 debt that Matthew owed to Shane. After learning that the government intended to recover over $1 million from him due to unrelated criminal charges, Matthew convinced Shane to allow him to create a company in Shane’s name to shield assets. Later, Matthew orchestrated a real estate transaction through this company, Cap Fund 783, LLC, resulting in a $767,000 assignment fee. Matthew attempted to divert these proceeds to himself by lying to the escrow agent and falsifying business records online to make it appear he controlled Cap Fund, thereby concealing the asset from Shane.The United States District Court for the District of Utah presided over Matthew’s trial. A jury convicted him on two counts of wire fraud, based on his phone call to the escrow agent and his online alteration of Cap Fund’s records. The district court also found him guilty, after a bench trial, of criminal contempt and possession of ammunition by a felon. Matthew was sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution. He appealed, arguing that his actions did not deprive Shane or the escrow agent of property, that the district court erred by not admitting a state-court judgment, and that the government failed to prove the interstate element for one wire fraud count.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction for wire fraud related to the phone call, holding that a creditor’s right to collect a debt is a property interest under the wire fraud statute, and that the escrow agent also had a property interest in the funds. The court reversed the conviction on the count involving the online alteration, finding insufficient evidence that the communication crossed state lines. The court affirmed the convictions for criminal contempt and felon-in-possession, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law