Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the United States Department of Labor (DOL) and Ascent Construction, Inc., its CEO Bradley Knowlton, and the Ascent Construction, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan (the Plan). The DOL investigated Ascent and Knowlton for potential breaches of their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The DOL found that Knowlton had deposited over $311,000 of the Plan’s cash into Ascent’s checking accounts and used it to pay Ascent’s business expenses. The DOL also discovered that a former Ascent employee had requested a distribution from his retirement account but never received it, even though the Plan’s custodian had issued a distribution check at Knowlton’s request.The DOL filed a lawsuit alleging that Knowlton and Ascent had violated ERISA’s fiduciary-duty standard and prohibited-transaction rules. The DOL sought a preliminary injunction to remove Knowlton and Ascent as Plan fiduciaries and appoint an independent fiduciary to prevent further ERISA violations and dissipation of the Plan’s assets. The district court granted the DOL’s motion, and the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal.While the appeal was pending, the case proceeded in the lower court. The DOL filed an amended complaint and discovery commenced. The district court later entered a default judgment against the defendants due to their willful failure to engage in the litigation process and comply with the court’s orders. The court also issued a permanent injunction that superseded the preliminary injunction, permanently barring Knowlton and Ascent from serving as trustee and administrator of the Plan.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed the defendants' appeal as moot. The court reasoned that the preliminary injunction dissolved automatically with the entry of the final judgment, regardless of whether the final judgment was issued on the merits or by way of default judgment. The court concluded that granting the defendants’ requested relief—vacatur of the preliminary injunction—would have no “effect in the real world.” View "Su v. Ascent Construction" on Justia Law

This case arose from a raid by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at Abel Ramirez-Peñaloza’s family home in Heber City, Utah. After Mr. Ramirez-Peñaloza was indicted for unlawful entry into the U.S., ICE officials attempted to arrest him at his home. During two searches of his home, officials detained and questioned his family members. The plaintiffs, some of Mr. Ramirez-Peñaloza’s family members who were detained during the searches, filed claims against the U.S. and the agents alleging Fourth Amendment and state law violations.The district court dismissed most of the plaintiffs’ claims, but allowed three claims to go to trial, where a jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers on the excessive use of force and false arrest claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the dismissed claims were barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) judgment bar, which precludes suits against federal employees after the entry of final judgment on a claim against the U.S. for an analogous cause of action. Since the district court entered final judgment in favor of the U.S. on the plaintiffs’ analogous FTCA claims, the claims against the individual defendants were barred. View "Ramirez v. Reddish" on Justia Law

The defendant, Darnell Tyree-Peppers, was on supervised release after pleading guilty to stealing a firearm from a federally licensed dealer. During his supervised release, his probation officer filed a petition to modify the conditions of his supervision due to alleged violations. Later, the probation officer filed a petition for his arrest and revocation of supervision based on three alleged violations of his supervision conditions. The district court issued the requested warrant. The probation officer later submitted an amended petition alleging that Tyree-Peppers had been arrested by state police officers on charges of first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, potentially violating the condition that he not commit another federal, state, or local crime.The district court for the District of Kansas did not conduct the hearing on the petition until after the expiration of Tyree-Peppers' supervised release term. The court granted the petition in part and ordered an additional one year of supervised release. Tyree-Peppers challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release, arguing that the delay in the revocation proceedings was not “reasonably necessary for the adjudication,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed with Tyree-Peppers. The court found that the delay was attributable to an ongoing state prosecution of Tyree-Peppers on the very serious charge of first-degree murder. The outcome of that proceeding was directly related to the question of whether Tyree-Peppers violated the condition of his supervised release forbidding him from committing a state crime. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Tyree-Peppers" on Justia Law

The case involves three transgender individuals, Rowan Fowler, Allister Hall, and Carter Ray, who sued the Governor of Oklahoma, the Commissioner of Health for the Oklahoma State Department of Health, and the State Registrar of Vital Records. The plaintiffs challenged an executive order issued by the Governor that directed the Oklahoma State Department of Health to stop amending sex designations on birth certificates. The plaintiffs, who had obtained court orders directing that their sex designations on official documents be amended, had their applications for amended birth certificates denied by the Department of Health, citing the Governor's executive order.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging that the policy violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the equal protection claim, but affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim. The court found that the policy of denying sex-designation amendments on birth certificates was not rationally related to any legitimate state interest and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to allege that their involuntary disclosures of their transgender status amounted to state action. View "Fowler v. Stitt" on Justia Law

Anthony Buntyn, an employee of a private company that transported detainees for law enforcement agencies, was charged with willfully violating the detainees' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause due to inhumane conditions of confinement. The conditions developed while Buntyn transported the detainees in a van to various detention facilities. The government alleged that Buntyn had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause through deliberate indifference to intolerable conditions of confinement and that this indifference had resulted in bodily injury to three detainees. The jury found Buntyn guilty of depriving the detainees of humane conditions, acting willfully and with deliberate indifference, and causing bodily injury to one detainee.Buntyn appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for a finding of guilt, that the district court erred in preventing his attorney from using the term malice in closing argument, and that the court coerced the jury to reach a verdict. The Tenth Circuit rejected Buntyn's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings of inhumane conditions, deliberate indifference, and willfulness. The court also found that the district court did not err in prohibiting the use of the term malice in closing argument, and that Buntyn had waived his challenge to the district court's instruction for the jury to continue deliberating. View "United States v. Buntyn" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Breeze Aviation Group, Inc. (Breeze), an airline company, and its dispute with the National Mediation Board (NMB) and the Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA). Breeze challenged the administration of a union-representation election by the NMB, which resulted in the NMB’s certification of ALPA as the representative of pilots employed by Breeze. Breeze argued that the NMB improperly excluded trainee pilots from voting in the union election and improperly refused to extend the cut-off date for voter eligibility to allow more pilot trainees to complete their training and become eligible to vote.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The district court dismissed Breeze's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction to review NMB certification of union representation only where the complaining party shows that the certification decision was a gross violation of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) or that it violated the constitutional rights of an employer, employee, or Union. The district court determined that Breeze’s complaint did not make the required showing.Breeze appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that the NMB had fulfilled its statutory duty to investigate and acted within the broad bounds of its statutory discretion when it designated who could participate in the election, set the rules that governed that election, and held the election itself. The court concluded that Breeze's arguments did not point to any specific requirement in the RLA that the NMB violated, and were more in terms of policy and broad generalities as to what the RLA should provide. View "Breeze Aviation Group v. National Mediation Board" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Gary Avant, was a truck driver for Muskogee County. County officials believed that Avant was complaining to other citizens about the county’s road plan and the assignment of a county worker. Avant was subsequently fired by the county commissioner. Avant sued the commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. However, during the litigation, Avant denied making the statements that led to his firing. The commissioner moved for summary judgment, arguing that the perceived speech hadn’t involved a matter of public concern. The district court denied this part of the motion, and the case was remanded for the district court to develop the record.After remand, the district court again denied summary judgment, leading the commissioner to appeal again. On appeal, the commissioner argued that Avant hadn’t pleaded a claim for perceived speech and that qualified immunity applies given the lack of precedent on how to assess a public concern for perceived speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the adequacy of the pleadings. However, it did have jurisdiction over the commissioner’s argument for reversal based on the absence of a clearly established violation. The court concluded that Avant had not shown that the perceived speech involved a clearly established public concern. Therefore, the commissioner was entitled to qualified immunity, and the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for the district court to grant summary judgment to the commissioner in his personal capacity on the First Amendment claim for retaliation based on perceived speech. View "Avant v. Doke" on Justia Law

The case involves Alonzo Cortez Johnson, a state prisoner who petitioned for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Johnson, a Black man, claimed that his constitutional rights were violated because the state court failed to follow the appropriate procedural steps under Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits racial discrimination in jury selection. Johnson alleged that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory strikes based on race. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the state court had mishandled the Batson procedural framework and remanded the case to the district court to hold a Batson reconstruction hearing, unless doing so would be impossible or unsatisfactory.On remand, the district court granted Johnson conditional habeas relief, deciding that holding a Batson reconstruction hearing would be “both impossible and unsatisfactory.” The court reasoned that it could not sufficiently reconstruct all relevant circumstances to meaningfully apply Batson’s third step, which involves determining whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the strikes were actually a pretext for discrimination.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's decision. The court found that the district court had enough evidence to hold a Batson reconstruction hearing at step two, which involves the prosecution providing a race-neutral reason for the objected-to strike(s). The court concluded that the district court had applied the “impossible or unsatisfactory” standard too harshly and remanded the case back to the district court to hold a Batson reconstruction hearing. View "Johnson v. Rankins" on Justia Law

Steven Robert Venjohn pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court sentenced him to 41 months' imprisonment, considering his prior conviction for Colorado felony menacing as a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2(a)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.). This classification increased his sentencing range. Venjohn appealed, arguing that the district court's ruling improperly inflated his sentencing range.The district court's decision was based on the probation officer's calculation in the presentence investigation report. The officer found that Venjohn's previous conviction for Colorado felony menacing qualified as a § 4B1.2(a) "crime of violence" and increased his base offense level accordingly. The district court agreed with this assessment and sentenced Venjohn to 41 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Taylor, Colorado felony menacing no longer categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found that the district court's characterization of Venjohn's prior conviction as a "crime of violence" and the subsequent enhancement of his sentence was an error. The court concluded that this error was plain under current federal law and Colorado law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Venjohn" on Justia Law

The case involves Scott Johnson, Harlene Hoyt, and Covey Find Kennel, LLC, who challenged the constitutionality of a Kansas statute that allows warrantless inspections of their homestead, where Mr. Johnson operates a business that houses and trains bird dogs. They also claimed that their constitutional right to travel was infringed by a statutory requirement that they make the premises available for inspection within 30 minutes of the arrival of an inspector. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their right-to-travel claim but remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Mr. Johnson’s business is closely regulated and, if so, whether warrantless inspections are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the boarding or training kennel industry was not clearly closely regulated, and the government had not shown that warrantless searches were necessary. The court also held that the regulations did not impose burdens beyond those commonly borne by owners of businesses who travel away from the locations of their businesses, and thus did not violate the plaintiffs' right to travel. View "Johnson v. Smith" on Justia Law