Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Citizens for Constitutional Integrity and Southwest Advocates, Inc. appealed the denial of their motion for temporary relief by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The Department of the Interior’s Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (the Office) granted a coal-mining permit for an expansion of the King II Mine (the Mine) in the Dunn Ranch Area of La Plata County, Colorado. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin mining under the expansion and ultimately vacate the permit. They alleged the Office conducted flawed assessments of the probable hydrologic impacts of the expansion, contrary to the requirements of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (the SMCRA or the Act). As authority for their motion, they invoked the Act’s citizen-suit provision, or alternatively, the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded Plaintiffs were not entitled to temporary relief because their claims under the SMCRA and the APA were not likely to succeed on the merits. View "Citizens for Constitutional Integrity, et al. v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Zechariah Freeman was convicted by jury of one count of sexual abuse. Appealing, Freeman argued: (1) the evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction; (2) the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the offense; and (3) the district court erred by denying his request to use his peremptory challenges allotted by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b)(2) to strike prospective alternate jurors. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-landowners alleged Anadarko Petroleum Corporation's intracompany practice of leasing its mineral interests to its affiliated operating company, including its 30% royalty rate, had the intent and effect of reducing the value of Plaintiffs’ mineral interests. Plaintiffs claimed Anadarko thereby maintained and furthered its dominant position in the market for leasing oil and gas mineral interests in violation of the Sherman Act § 2 and Wyoming antitrust laws. Plaintiffs sought treble damages and attorneys’ fees under § 4 of the Clayton Act. The federal district court certified a class action, for liability purposes only, comprised of “[a]ll persons . . . having ownership of Class Minerals during the Class Period.” Anadarko appealed the district court’s class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court applied the correct legal standard in deciding whether the class satisfied the requirements of Rule 23, and it did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s class certification. View "Black, et al. v. Occidental Petroleum, et al." on Justia Law

In March 2020, The Vail Corporation and Vail Resorts, Inc. (collectively, “Vail”) closed its ski resorts and did not reopen them until the start of the 2020–2021 ski season. Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Passholders”) were a group of skiers and snowboarders who purchased season passes from Vail to access its resorts during the 2019–2020 ski season. Passholders, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals, brought contractual, quasi-contractual, and state consumer protection law claims based on Vail’s decision to close due to the COVID-19 pandemic without issuing refunds to Passholders. The district court granted Vail’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all of Passholders’ claims for failure to state a claim. Passholders appealed, arguing the district court erred in its interpretation of their contracts with Vail. Although it did not agree with the district court’s interpretation of “2019–2020 ski season,” the Tenth Circuit concurred with the ultimate conclusion that Passholders failed to state a contractual claim. Passholders sought only one form of relief in their complaint, but they purchased passes under the condition that the passes were not eligible for refunds of any kind. Recognizing that Passholders might amend their breach of contract and breach of warranty claims to seek other forms of relief, the Tenth Circuit vacated the dismissal of these two claims with prejudice and remanded for the district court to modify its judgment to a dismissal without prejudice. As with Passholders’ breach of contract and breach of warranty claims, the Court concluded the district court correctly dismissed Passholders’ consumer protection claims. Recognizing Passholders could refile these claims to seek an alternative remedy, the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Passholders’ state consumer protection law claims with prejudice so the district court could modify its dismissal of these six claims to be without prejudice. View "McAuliffe, et al. v. Vail Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant M Welles and Associates, Inc. (“Welles”) appealed a district court's decision concluding that Defendant-Appellee Edwell, Inc. was not liable for trademark infringement, thereby granting granted final judgment for Edwell. "The marks at issue are undoubtedly similar:" Welles used the mark "EDWEL," whereas Edwell uses the mark "EDWELL." Similarity notwithstanding, the magistrate judge found that consumers were unlikely to be confused by the marks because Edwell never intended to copy Welles’s mark, the parties operated in different markets, consumers were likely to exercise a high degree of care in selecting the parties’ services, and there was almost no evidence of actual confusion. On appeal, Welles argued the magistrate judge applied an erroneous legal standard in analyzing likelihood of confusion, urged the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to adopt a presumption of confusion for cases like this one, and contended that the magistrate judge clearly erred in finding no likelihood of confusion. The Tenth Circuit rejected each of Welles’s arguments and affirmed final judgment for Edwell. View "M Welles & Associates v. Edwell" on Justia Law

In 2019, the United States Forest Service (“FS”) issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) authorizing livestock grazing for 10 years on land in the Upper Green River Area Rangeland (“UGRA”) in Wyoming. Two sets of petitioners-appellants, the Center for Biological Diversity and Sierra Club (collectively, “CBD”) and Western Watersheds Project, Alliance for Wile Rockies and Yellowstone to Unitas Connection (collectively “WWP”) challenged the UGRA Project under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), and the Administrative Procedures Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: (1) the Fish and Wildlife Service’s failures in the Biological Opinion to consider certain impacts the UGRA would have on female grizzly bears was arbitrary and capricious, but that the Opinion’s reliance on certain conservation measures was not; and (2) the Forest Service’s reliance on the Fish and Wildlife Service’s Biological Opinion was arbitrary and capricious. As to WWP’s NFMA claims, the Court determined the ROD’s failure to consider the adequacy of forage and cover for migratory birds in the Project area was arbitrary and capricious. The Court remanded without vacated to the agencies to address deficiencies identified. View "Western Watersheds Project, et al. v. Haaland, et al." on Justia Law

After the government charged defendant-appellant Apache Young with one count of violating the felon-in-possession statute, he moved to suppress the firearms seized from his truck during an encounter with law enforcement. Young argued: (1) officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him; and (2) even if he was justifiably detained, the scope of his detention was not reasonably related to the justification for the initial encounter. The district court rejected both arguments. Young preserved the issue in a conditional plea agreement and made the same arguments he did at the district court to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jimmy Lee Brooks was convicted by jury of unlawful possession of ammunition and witness tampering. The ammunition charge stemmed from an incident in which Brooks shot a firearm at a car his then-girlfriend was riding in, striking her in the buttocks. Over Brooks’ objection, the sentencing court concluded he committed attempted second-degree murder and applied a cross-reference to the attempted murder guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1. The district court was also required to calculate the guidelines under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 and, in doing so, applied a heightened base offense level on the assumption that Oklahoma aggravated assault and battery was a crime of violence. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Brooks renewed his challenge to the attempted murder cross-reference, arguing that the district court was required to find he acted with specific intent to kill but instead found he acted with malice aforethought. To this, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the attempted murder cross-reference was appropriate only when the defendant intended to kill and that the court’s finding on malice aforethought was insufficient to support the cross-reference. Brooks also argued the district court plainly erred because, under United States v. Winrow, 49 F.4th 1372 (10th Cir. 2022), Oklahoma aggravated assault and battery was not a crime of violence. The government conceded, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that Oklahoma aggravated assault and battery was not a crime of violence. But because Brooks’ argument that his substantial rights were impacted by this error was speculative, the Tenth Circuit left the issue open for the district court to consider on remand. Accordingly, Brooks’ sentence was vacated and his case remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Agnes Mukantagara, and her son, Plaintiff Ebenezer Shyaka, challenged an unfavorable United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) decision on refugee status. Meanwhile, the government began separate removal proceedings. Plaintiffs filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah seeking judicial review of the termination of their refugee status. Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the agency action was not final and because of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In the district court’s view, the regulation implementing the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provision allowing for the termination of refugee status, 8 C.F.R § 207.9, constitutes a triggering event that “arises from” an action taken to remove an alien. The district court said Plaintiffs’ claims fell within the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) because they challenged the decision “to seek removal.” The district court dismissed the action, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction. But the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the district court read the statute too expansively. “Congress did not intend the zipper clause 'to cut off claims that have a tangential relationship with pending removal proceedings.' ... the regulation strips USCIS’s discretion whether it should take action to remove an alien under the circumstances.” USCIS’s decision “is not a decision to ‘commence proceedings,’ much less to ‘adjudicate’ a case or ‘execute’ a removal order.” View "Mukantagara, et al. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Audubon of Kansas (Audubon) was frustrated with federal bureaucracy: the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) knew for decades that junior water-rights-holders were impairing its senior water right in Quivira Wildlife Refuge (the Refuge), threatening the endangered species there. Despite years of study and negotiation between the Service, state agencies, and Kansas water districts, the Refuge water right remained impaired. Audubon filed this lawsuit seeking to force the Service to protect the Refuge water right. But in 2023, the Service did act by requesting full administration of the Refuge water right, which was a remedy Audubon sought for its failure-to-act claim. For its claims of unlawful agency action, Audubon also sought to set aside an agreement between the Service and a water district. The Tenth Circuit determined all material terms of this agreement expired. The Service argued Audubon’s claims were moot; Audubon countered that its claims weren't moot or that a mootness exception should apply. To this, the Tenth Circuit concluded Audubon’s claim of unlawful agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) was moot, and that claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. As for Audubon’s claim of agency inaction under § 706(1), the Court found the mootness exception of “capable of repetition but evading review” applied, but the Court lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. View "Audubon of Kansas v. United States Department of Interior, et al." on Justia Law