Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, Jonathan Kearn, was initially indicted on three child pornography offenses involving his own children. He faced up to 30 years’ imprisonment for these charges. However, the government offered a plea agreement for a 10-year sentence if Kearn pled guilty to one of the counts. Following a six-minute conversation with his trial counsel about the plea agreement, Kearn decided to reject the offer and proceed to trial. He was then convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 24 years in prison. After exhausting his appeals, Kearn filed a pro se motion arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the plea-bargaining phase.The district court granted Kearn's motion, finding that his trial counsel provided deficient advice about the proposed plea deal, and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, Kearn would have pleaded guilty. The court ordered the government to reoffer the plea. It then accepted Kearn’s guilty plea, vacated the prior judgment, and resentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Kearn's trial counsel's brief discussion with him was inadequate to explain the complexities of the plea and that counsel had given Kearn inaccurate and misleading information. The court also found that given the substantial difference in sentencing exposure—20 years—and the evidence suggesting Kearn was amenable to pleading guilty if he had been adequately advised, the district court reasonably found that Kearn would have accepted a properly presented plea deal and avoided trial. View "United States v. Kearn" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was considering an appeal by Elite IT Partners Inc. and its officer, James Michael Martinos, against a decision by the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had previously sued the defendants and alleged a fraudulent scheme to sell unnecessary services. The parties had settled the suit with a stipulated judgment providing equitable monetary relief under § 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and waiving future challenges. However, a year after the entry of the stipulated judgment, the Supreme Court held in AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC that § 13(b) does not allow equitable monetary relief. The defendants then requested vacatur of the stipulated judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which the district court denied.Two main issues were considered by the Court of Appeals: whether the defendants' agreement to waive their right to challenge or contest the stipulated judgment prohibited them from arguing that the judgment was invalid, and whether the change in case law could be used as a basis for vacating the judgment. The court held that the defendants had indeed waived their rights to challenge the stipulated judgment and that the change in case law could not be used as a basis for vacating the judgment as it was unrelated to the facts of their case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to vacate the stipulated judgment. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Elite IT Partners" on Justia Law

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In this appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, John Miguel Swan, appealed the district court’s denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The case originated from a grand jury indictment of Swan for being a felon in possession of ammunition. Swan initially plead guilty, but five months later, the district court allowed Swan's plea counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel. Swan later wrote a pro se letter to the district court asserting his factual innocence and indicating that his plea counsel had compelled him to plead guilty. This appeal focuses on the claim that plea counsel materially misrepresented the nature of Swan's right to a jury trial, which, Swan argued, rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.The court found that Swan’s plea counsel informed him that all minorities would be removed from his jury and his case would be tried before exclusively white jurors. This was seen as a material misrepresentation about Swan’s right to an impartial jury selected through racially nondiscriminatory means. The court determined that under these circumstances, Swan’s plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the district court abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case back to the district court to allow Swan to withdraw his guilty plea for further proceedings. View "United States v. Swan" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether a police officer violated the Fourth Amendment by prolonging a traffic stop to determine whether the driver of a rental vehicle was authorized to drive it. The driver, Jerry Dawson, was pulled over for speeding, and during the stop, the officer discovered marijuana and two pounds of methamphetamine in the vehicle. Dawson argued that the officer had no reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity and therefore had no authority to detain him beyond the time necessary to issue the speeding ticket.The court held that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment because checking a rental agreement is an ordinary inquiry incident to a traffic stop. The court found that this inquiry is part of an officer's mission during a traffic stop and does not constitute an "unrelated investigation." Therefore, the officer was justified in continuing to detain Dawson to determine whether he was authorized to drive the rental car.Dawson also appealed his 70-month imprisonment sentence, arguing that the district court erred in concluding it could not adjust his sentence to account for his pretrial time served for a relevant offense. The court dismissed Dawson's appeal of his sentence, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a discretionary refusal to depart from the sentencing guidelines. View "United States v. Dawson" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute between Harvest Group, LLC ("Harvest") and Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc. and Musket Corp. (collectively, "Love’s") over a breach-of-contract claim. Harvest, a company that assists businesses in acquiring economic development incentives, entered into a contract with Love’s to help secure incentives for a renewable diesel facility. In return, Harvest would receive a fee of 10% of the value of any incentives it helped Love's secure.A property tax assessment for the project, which significantly reduced the estimated tax burden, was at the center of the dispute. Harvest claimed that this assessment qualified as an incentive under their agreement, and thus they were entitled to a fee. Love’s, however, argued that the assessment was not an incentive as defined by their contract and that it was not the product of Harvest’s efforts, but simply the result of the assessor’s application of Nebraska tax law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment to Love’s on the issue of whether the assessment was an incentive/benefit under the Agreement and whether the assessment was the product of Harvest’s efforts. There were genuine disputes of material fact about these issues, meaning they must be decided at trial, not on summary judgment. The court also reversed the lower court on the issues of Harvest’s entitlement to interest and whether Harvest was the prevailing party. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "Harvest Group v. Love's Travel Stops & Country Stores" on Justia Law

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In this case, the petitioner, Samuel Drinkert, appealed the denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. Drinkert contested his convictions for violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which he received via a court martial. He argued that the military courts improperly admitted prior consistent statements made by one of his alleged sexual-assault victims. These convictions arose from two separate incidents involving two victims - his brother's ex-girlfriend and a co-worker.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court focused on whether the military courts had given fair consideration to each of Drinkert's claims. The Court held that Drinkert had not shown that the military courts had failed to apply the proper legal standards or that they had failed to give adequate consideration to the issues involved. The Court determined that Drinkert's claims were thoroughly briefed and addressed by the military courts, therefore satisfying the requirement of 'full and fair consideration'. The Court also found that any error asserted by Drinkert was not of substantial constitutional dimension, the issue was not one of pure law, and no military considerations warranted a different treatment of the constitutional claims. Thus, the Court concluded that Drinkert was not entitled to habeas review in civil courts. View "Drinkert v. Payne" on Justia Law

Posted in: Military Law
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In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, private citizens and a non-profit organization sued High Mountain Mining Company for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act. The plaintiffs claimed that High Mountain Mining, which operates a gold mine in Colorado, allowed pollutants from its settling ponds to seep into the groundwater, which then migrated into a nearby river. Under the Clean Water Act, a permit is required for any discharge of pollutants from a point source into navigable waters. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the settling ponds were a point source and that the operation of these ponds constituted an unpermitted discharge of pollutants into navigable waters, thus violating the Clean Water Act. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court made a legal error by not adequately considering all the relevant factors to determine whether the connection between the point source and the navigable water was the functional equivalent of a direct discharge. Given the potentially broad implications of the Clean Water Act for mines throughout the Western United States, the appellate court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Stone v. High Mountain Mining Company" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant Christopher Guinn appealed his convictions for aggravated sexual abuse and assault, arguing that the district court improperly admitted evidence of his prior nonsexual abuse under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 413. He also contested his 240-month sentence, arguing that the district court miscalculated his criminal-history category, which led to the wrong advisory Guidelines range.The court affirmed Guinn's convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court found that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Guinn’s previous sexual assaults against his former girlfriends under Rule 413. However, the court agreed with Guinn that his sentences for two prior convictions should have been counted as a single sentence because they were not separated by an intervening arrest. This error led to an incorrect calculation of Guinn's criminal-history category, which in turn affected his sentencing range. The court remanded the case for resentencing under the correct criminal-history category. View "United States v. Guinn" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In February 2021, police officers found Justin Stepp, a convicted felon, with a gunshot wound in a car driven by his girlfriend, along with a firearm in the car’s console and ammunition under the passenger seat. A subsequent search of Stepp’s home uncovered more ammunition. Stepp was charged and convicted by a jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he constructively possessed the firearm or ammunition, and that the court erred by including his 2002 conviction in its calculation of his base offense level. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed Stepp’s conviction and sentence. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Stepp had constructive possession of the ammunition found in his home. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding Stepp’s 2002 conviction fell within the applicable fifteen-year lookback period for calculating his base offense level. View "United States v. Stepp" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Barbara Lindsay, the former Director of Workforce Development and Career Services at Emily Griffith Technical College (EGTC), sued Denver Public Schools (DPS) and Stephanie Donner, EGTC's Executive Director, for retaliation. Lindsay claimed that her termination was motivated by her opposition to racist comments made during the hiring process for the Executive Director position and her assistance to a candidate in filing employment discrimination charges. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of DPS and Donner. Lindsay appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evidence to prove a causal relationship between Lindsay's protected activity (opposition to racist comments and assistance in filing discrimination charges) and her termination. The Court determined that there was no evidence that those who decided to terminate Lindsay's employment were aware of her protected activity. The court further noted that Lindsay failed to show that anyone at DPS knew that she had assisted in bringing discrimination charges before she was fired. Therefore, Lindsay's claim that she was terminated in retaliation for protected activities could not be substantiated. View "Lindsay v. Denver Public Schools" on Justia Law