Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was apprehended after driving a vehicle containing nearly 50 pounds of methamphetamine and was convicted of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. In seeking a reduced sentence, he argued that he played only a minor role as a courier in the drug operation, submitting a proffer that identified three other individuals allegedly involved in the scheme. The district court considered the sentencing guidelines, which allow for a downward adjustment if the defendant is a minor participant, but declined to apply the adjustment, finding insufficient evidence to support the claim.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma reviewed the case. The defendant objected to the presentence report’s recommendation against the minor-role adjustment, but did not specifically object to the district court’s explanation for denying the adjustment at sentencing. The district court imposed a sentence of 235 months, at the bottom of the applicable guideline range, without the downward adjustment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court plainly erred in denying the minor-role adjustment and whether the sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Applying the plain-error standard, the appellate court held that the district court did not err in its explanation or in its consideration of the defendant’s proffer, and that any ambiguity in the district court’s statements should be interpreted in a legally correct manner. The court further held that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable, as it fell within the guideline range and the district court was not required to explicitly address every statutory factor. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Naranjo-Aguilar" on Justia Law

Two related Wyoming companies, one owning the surface estate and the other owning the mineral estate in an adjacent tract, sought to drill a horizontal well. The plan involved drilling from the surface owner’s land, traversing through federally owned subsurface minerals, and ending in the mineral owner’s adjacent tract. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the federal minerals, informed the companies that they needed to obtain a permit to drill through the federal mineral estate, as the process would involve removing a small amount of federal minerals. The companies disagreed, arguing that BLM lacked authority to require a permit for a well that would not produce from the federal minerals, and filed suit seeking a declaration of their right to drill without BLM’s consent.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming ruled in favor of BLM, holding that Congress had retained sufficient regulatory authority over the mineral estate and had delegated that authority to BLM under the Mineral Leasing Act. The court concluded that BLM could require a permit for the proposed traversing well and that the companies qualified as “operators” under BLM regulations, thus subject to the permit requirement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The Tenth Circuit determined that the dispute was fundamentally about property rights—specifically, whether the surface owner had the right to drill through the federal mineral estate without BLM’s consent. The court held that such disputes must be brought under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), which is the exclusive means for challenging the United States’ title or property interests in real property. Because the companies brought their claim under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act instead of the QTA, the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "True Oil v. BLM" on Justia Law

A nonprofit advocacy organization challenged an amendment to New Mexico’s Campaign Reporting Act (CRA), which requires certain political committees to disclose the names and addresses of donors who contribute above specified thresholds when the committee makes independent expenditures on advertisements referring to candidates or ballot questions shortly before an election. The organization argued that these disclosure requirements burdened its First Amendment rights and would chill potential donors from contributing, citing concerns about possible harassment or retaliation.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted summary judgment to the Secretary of State, finding that the disclosure requirements were substantially related and narrowly tailored to the state’s interest in informing the public about the sources of funding for large, election-related advertisements. The district court concluded that advertisements covered by the law—those referring to candidates or ballot questions and disseminated shortly before elections—were made for a political purpose, and that the law’s temporal, monetary, and geographic limitations, as well as an opt-out provision for donors, ensured the requirements were not overly broad.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment decision de novo. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the challenged disclosure provision withstands exacting scrutiny. The court determined that the law is substantially related to the important governmental interest of transparency in election-related advocacy and is narrowly tailored through its thresholds and opt-out mechanism. The court also found that the evidence presented by the organization did not establish a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals sufficient to invalidate the law on its face. The judgment for the Secretary of State was affirmed. View "Rio Grande Foundation v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Lawrence Rudolph was convicted for the fatal shooting of his wife, Bianca Rudolph, during a 2016 hunting trip in Zambia. The couple, married for nearly thirty-five years, had substantial marital assets and maintained significant life insurance policies. Their marriage was troubled by infidelity, including Mr. Rudolph’s long-term affair with Lori Milliron, a partner at his dental practice. After Bianca’s death, which Mr. Rudolph claimed was accidental, he collected nearly $4.8 million in life insurance proceeds and purchased several high-value assets. Less than two weeks after returning to the United States, he arranged for Ms. Milliron to join him in Arizona, and they began living together.The Federal Bureau of Investigation in Denver initiated an investigation in 2019, reviewing the Zambian authorities’ findings and conducting its own forensic analysis. In December 2021, Mr. Rudolph was arrested in Denver after being deported from Mexico, and indicted by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on charges of foreign murder and mail fraud. He moved to dismiss for improper venue and to sever his trial from Ms. Milliron’s, arguing that the government engaged in forum shopping and that a joint trial would prejudice his defense. The district court denied both motions, admitted certain statements by Bianca under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, and ordered forfeiture of assets purchased with the insurance proceeds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that venue in Colorado was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, as Mr. Rudolph was both “arrested” and “first brought” to the district in connection with the charges. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying severance, admitting Bianca’s statements under Rule 804(b)(6), or ordering forfeiture of the assets, including interest and appreciation. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and forfeiture order. View "United States v. Rudolph" on Justia Law

The case concerns a fatal car accident that occurred in February 2017 on a state highway within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation in Oklahoma. Lloyd Ray Hatley, while driving slightly above the speed limit, glanced at a vehicle parked on the shoulder. When he looked back, he saw another car, driven by Gay Ott and carrying Mary Nappa, had swerved into his lane and was braking. Hatley was unable to stop in time and collided with the car, resulting in Nappa’s death. Emergency responders extricated the passengers, but Nappa was pronounced dead at the scene. Hatley was not injured. Data from the vehicles indicated the Pontiac attempted an illegal left turn and Hatley was accelerating before braking sharply to avoid the collision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted Hatley on four counts related to the accident, including involuntary manslaughter in Indian country. The government sought to prove Hatley’s Indian status—an essential element for federal jurisdiction—using a tribal verification letter and testimony from Derrick Vann, a Cherokee Nation records custodian. Hatley objected to the admissibility of this evidence, arguing lack of foundation and hearsay. The district court admitted the evidence, and the jury convicted Hatley of involuntary manslaughter under Count 4, acquitting him on other counts. Hatley was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the government was required to prove Hatley’s Indian status at the time of the offense. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the tribal verification letter and Vann’s testimony, as neither was properly authenticated nor admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because no other competent evidence established Hatley’s Indian status at the relevant time, the error was not harmless. The Tenth Circuit reversed Hatley’s conviction and remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and conduct further proceedings. View "United States v. Hatley" on Justia Law

Two former Army members, Aaron Wilson and Sean Dillon, were convicted by court-martial for sex crimes committed during their active-duty service. Both had been medically retired from the Army due to disabilities—Wilson in 2012 and Dillon in 2015. After their retirements, each was charged and convicted by court-martial for offenses that occurred while they were on active duty. Both challenged the court-martial’s jurisdiction, arguing that as medically retired servicemembers, they were no longer part of the “land and naval Forces” under the Constitution and thus could not be subjected to military jurisdiction.Wilson and Dillon appealed their convictions through the military justice system. The United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both convictions, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces denied discretionary review. After exhausting military appeals, both petitioners filed for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, arguing that the statutory grant of military jurisdiction over medically retired personnel exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority. The district court denied both petitions, holding that military retirees maintain a formal relationship with the armed forces and remain subject to recall, distinguishing them from separated servicemembers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of habeas relief de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that medically retired servicemembers retain military status because they hold rank, receive pay, may wear the uniform, and are subject to recall. Therefore, they are part of the “land and naval Forces” under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution. The court concluded that Congress’s statutory grant of court-martial jurisdiction over such retirees is constitutional and affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Wilson v. Curtis" on Justia Law

Andrew Scott, a professional process server and licensed private investigator in Colorado, was hired to serve a subpoena on State Trooper Charles Hiller. The service attempt became contentious, leading Hiller to file complaints against Scott with both the Colorado Office of Private Investigator Licensure and the Process Servers Association of Colorado. Hiller alleged that Scott endangered his safety by including personal information in an affidavit of service, potentially violating Colorado Revised Statute § 18-9-313(2.7), which prohibits publishing law enforcement officers’ personal information online if it poses an imminent and serious threat. The Office of Private Investigator Licensure dismissed its complaint, but the Association expelled Scott, citing a violation of the statute. Scott subsequently created a website, copscore.org, intending to publish information about police misconduct, but refrained from posting content due to fear of prosecution under the statute.Scott filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the local District Attorney, seeking a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing Scott’s complaint on the grounds that he lacked standing for a pre-enforcement challenge. The court found Scott had not demonstrated an injury in fact, reasoning that his conduct was not “arguably proscribed” by the statute, especially since Scott stated in his summary judgment briefing that he did not know of any imminent and serious threat to Hiller’s safety from the intended publication.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Scott had standing to pursue a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge because his intended conduct was at least arguably prohibited by the statute, and the credible threat of prosecution chilled his speech. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "Scott v. Allen" on Justia Law

The defendant, a young man with a history of firearm-related offenses, was previously adjudicated delinquent for shooting at a person, making him a “Category I restricted person” under Utah law and barring him from possessing firearms. Despite this, he was found in possession of a handgun in April 2022 and was charged with a felony for possessing a dangerous weapon as a restricted person. On the day of his arraignment for that charge, he purchased another firearm. Later, in October 2022, he was found with this new firearm after allegedly firing it at a group of people.Following the October incident, a federal grand jury indicted him for illegal receipt of a firearm by a person under indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(n) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as interpreted by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The United States District Court for the District of Utah denied his motion, finding that while the Second Amendment presumptively protected his conduct, § 922(n) was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court cited historical laws disarming dangerous groups and surety laws as analogues. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal, and was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(n) de novo. The court held that § 922(n) is facially constitutional, finding it “relevantly similar” to founding-era practices of pretrial detention and bail, which imposed comparable, temporary restrictions on the right to bear arms for those accused of serious crimes. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and upheld the conviction. View "United States v. Ogilvie" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a minor in Indian Country. The minor was his half-sister, and the sexual relationship began when he was 23 and she was 14, continuing for approximately eight years. After the relationship ended, the defendant was charged and convicted under federal law. At sentencing, the district court determined an adjusted base offense level of 20, which would have resulted in a guideline range of 33 to 41 months. However, the court varied upward, using a guideline range corresponding to a higher offense level, and imposed a 96-month prison sentence. The court also imposed a five-year term of supervised release, including a prohibition on viewing adult pornography.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma imposed the sentence and the supervised release conditions. The defendant appealed, arguing that the 96-month sentence was substantively unreasonable and that the prohibition on adult pornography was not adequately explained and infringed on his constitutional rights. He contended that the district court gave too much weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense, did not sufficiently consider a psychosexual evaluation indicating a low risk of reoffending, and failed to address the risk of unwarranted sentencing disparities. He also challenged the pornography restriction as lacking a compelling justification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held that the 96-month sentence was substantively reasonable given the length and harm of the abuse, and that the district court did not err in weighing the statutory factors. Regarding the pornography restriction, the Tenth Circuit found no plain error because the record supported a basis for the condition, given the defendant’s history and admissions. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Doty" on Justia Law

Kyle Messerli died from acute intoxication after repeatedly inhaling Difluoroethane gas contained in computer duster cans, a practice known as “huffing.” He became addicted to the substance, using multiple cans daily, and ultimately overdosed. His father, Robbin Messerli, acting individually and as representative of Kyle’s estate, sued several manufacturers and distributors of the computer duster products. The lawsuit alleged that the companies knew their products were being abused but failed to take adequate steps to reduce harm, including ineffective warnings and product design changes.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas reviewed the case. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Kansas law bars tort recovery when the plaintiff’s injuries result from their own illegal acts. The district court agreed, finding that the illegality defense—where a plaintiff’s illegal conduct proximately causes their injury—remains valid under Kansas law and was not abrogated by the state’s adoption of comparative fault principles. The court dismissed Messerli’s claims and denied his subsequent motion to certify the question to the Kansas Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the illegality defense applies to products liability actions under Kansas law. The court held that the defense is still available, as neither the Kansas Legislature nor the Kansas Supreme Court has abrogated it. The court further determined that Kansas’s comparative fault regime does not implicitly eliminate the illegality defense, which is grounded in public policy against allowing recovery for injuries caused by one’s own illegal acts. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Messerli’s claims. View "Messerli v. AW Distributing" on Justia Law