Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a matter of first impression, the issue presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether a district court could appropriately dismiss part of an action pursuant to the forum non conveniens doctrine while allowing the other part to proceed before it. Reasoning that the forum non conveniens doctrine was fundamentally concerned with the convenience of the venue the Court concluded the answer to that question was “no:” a district court clearly abuses its discretion when, as here, it elects to dismiss an action as to several defendants under a theory of forum non conveniens while simultaneously allowing the same action to proceed against other defendants. View "DIRTT Environmental Solutions, et al. v. Falkbuilt, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under: 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68; and Oklahoma state law, challenging an allegedly unconstitutional scheme to collect “court debts” from impoverished Oklahoma citizens. The Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SACAC”) named numerous “Defendants,” which fell into three broad categories: (1) individual Oklahoma sheriffs, the Oklahoma Sheriff’s Association (“OSA”), and officials of Tulsa and Rodgers Counties (collectively, “Sheriffs”); (2) state court judges (collectively, “Judges”); and (3) Aberdeen Enterprises, II, Inc. and its principal officers (collectively, “Aberdeen”). Plaintiffs alleged Aberdeen, a debt-collection company, acting in concert with other Defendants, used actual or threatened incarceration to coerce indigent Oklahomans into paying court debts, without any inquiry into ability to pay. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, broadly holding that three independent doctrines prevented Plaintiffs from proceeding on any claim against any Defendant. Plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting that none of the doctrines identified by the district court deprived federal courts of the ability to reach the merits of the claims listed in the complaint. To this, the Tenth Circuit agrees the district court erred in dismissing the SACAC. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Graff, et al. v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Eusebio DeVargas was indicted on two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He moved ti dismiss his indictment, arguing that neither of his two previous felony convictions could have served as predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) because his civil rights were fully restored after he completed the sentences for each of those convictions. DeVargas also moved to suppress evidence that was seized at his residence at the time of his arrest, as well as post-arrest statements that he made to a law enforcement officer. After the district court denied both of his motions, DeVargas pleaded guilty to a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and, under the terms of his plea agreement, reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and his motions to suppress. The Tenth Circuit rejected DeVargas’s arguments and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Devargas" on Justia Law

This appeal grew out of overpayments that lessee, Safeway Stores 46, Inc., made to its lessor, WY Plaza, L.C. The lease allowed Safeway to deduct construction costs from the payments to WY Plaza. But Safeway neglected to make these deductions for twelve years before demanding repayment. WY Plaza rejected the demand based on Safeway’s delay. Safeway responded by paying under protest and suing for restitution and a declaratory judgment. Both parties sought summary judgment. In its own motion, WY Plaza denied the availability of restitution because the parties’ obligations had been set out in a written contract. The district court agreed with WY Plaza. But the court went further, deciding sua sponte that Safeway’s delay prevented recovery under the doctrine of laches. So the court granted summary judgment to WY Plaza and denied Safeway’s motion. The Tenth Circuit disagreed as to both trial court rulings. Despite the lack of any laches argument in its motion, the district court relied on laches to grant summary judgment to WY Plaza on the claim for declaratory relief. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erroneously failed to notify Safeway before granting summary judgment to WY Plaza based on laches. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit found that in granting WY Plaza’s motion for summary judgment, the district court relied on arguments that WY Plaza hadn’t raised. The district court also erroneously granted summary judgment to WY Plaza on the restitution claim: "The unilateral nature of Safeway’s mistake doesn’t prevent restitution." The Tenth Circuit held Safeway was entitled to summary judgment because WY Plaza failed to create a triable fact-issue, and Safeway was entitled to summary judgment on its claims for a declaratory judgment and restitution. View "Safeway Stores v. WY Plaza" on Justia Law

A district court revoked defendant-appellant Donald Booker’s supervised release and sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison. Booker appealed, arguing the district court erroneously based his sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release on retribution. After review, the Tenth Circuit determined district courts could not modify or revoke a term of supervised release based on the need for retribution. Because the district court quoted from a 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factor representing retribution, the district court erred. “But even assuming this error was plain, Mr. Booker has not shown that it affected his substantial rights because we conclude there is no reasonable probability that his sentence would have been shorter had the court not erred.” Accordinlgly, the Court affirmed Booker’s twenty-four-month sentence. View "United States v. Booker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs wereconsumers who sued Defendant Security Benefit Life Insurance Company under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and state law, alleging Security Benefit developed a fraudulent scheme to design and market certain annuity products. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review centered on whether the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint without prejudice for lack of particularity and plausibility in pleading fraud. Because the Tenth Circuit concluded Plaintiffs alleged facially plausible fraud claims with the particularity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the district court erred in granting Security Benefit’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). View "Clinton, et al. v. Security Benefit Life" on Justia Law

Defendant Dominic Hunt appealed his convictions on two charges of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The ammunition was used in two shootings in early 2019. Investigators found three spent cartridges at the scene of one shooting and one spent cartridge at the other. A firearms expert testified that all four cartridges were fired from the same (undiscovered) weapon. Defendant’s sole issue raised on appeal was that the expert testimony should not have been admitted at trial: the expert’s field of firearm toolmark examination was not scientifically valid, and that the district court failed to perform its gatekeeping role in examining the admissibility of expert testimony because it relied on prior judicial opinions rather than the most up-to-date empirical evidence when it denied his pretrial motion to exclude the testimony without conducting a hearing. The Tenth Circuit held only that the district court adequately performed its gatekeeping role and did not err in admitting the testimony in light of the material presented on the pretrial motion and the expert testimony at trial. View "United States v. Hunt" on Justia Law

The Pueblo of Jemez filed a quiet title action against the United States relating to lands comprising the Valles Caldera National Preserve (“Valles Caldera”), which the United States purchased from private landowners in 2000. In an earlier appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court’s ruling dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court reversed and remanded, finding that an 1860 federal grant of title to private landowners would not extinguish the Jemez Pueblo’s claimed aboriginal title. Upon remand, the Jemez Pueblo could establish that it once and still had aboriginal title to the lands at issue. After a twenty-one-day trial, the district court ruled that the Jemez Pueblo failed to establish ever having aboriginal title to the entire lands of the Valles Caldera, failing to show that it ever used the entire claimed land to the exclusion of other Indian groups. The Jemez Pueblo moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). But rather than seek reconsideration of its complaint’s QTA claim to the entire Valles Caldera, the Jemez Pueblo shrunk its QTA claim into claims of title to four discrete subareas within the Valles Caldera: (1) Banco Bonito, (2) the Paramount Shrine Lands, (3) Valle San Antonio, and (4) the Redondo Meadows. The district court declined to reconsider all but Banco Bonito, on grounds that the Jemez Pueblo hadn’t earlier provided the government notice of these claims. Even so, being thorough, the court later considered and rejected those three claims on the merits. Of the issues raised by the Jemez Pueblo on appeal, we primarily address its challenge to the district court’s ruling that the Jemez Pueblo lost aboriginal title to Banco Bonito. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erroneously interpreted "Jemez I" in ruling that the Jemez Pueblo lost aboriginal title to Banco Bonito. So in accordance with longstanding Supreme Court precedent, and by the district court’s findings, the Court held the Jemez Pueblo still had aboriginal title to Banco Bonito. The Court reversed in part the denial of the Jemez Pueblo’s motion for reconsideration, and vacated in part and remanded with instructions to the district court. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Brenda Evers Andrew, an Oklahoma state prisoner convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court’s denial of her habeas petition seeking a new trial or resentencing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Andrew was convicted of the 2001 shooting death of her husband Robert. A jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, two aggravating factors that warranted the death penalty: (1) Andrew committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration; and (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Andrew a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) on ten issues. Taking each in turn, but finding no reversible error in the denial of habeas relief, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the federal district court. View "Andrew v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Wyo-Ben, Inc., (“Wyo-Ben”) appealed a district court’s dismissal of its complaint against the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (the “Secretary”) and the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM;” collectively, “Respondents”) asserting a single claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). In 1993, Wyo-Ben filed a mineral patent application with BLM. While that application was pending, in 1994, Congress enacted a moratorium on processing mineral patent applications. In the same legislation, Congress also enacted an exemption to the moratorium: if a patent application was still pending by September 30, 1994, and it otherwise complied with certain conditions, the patent application was not subject to the moratorium and the Secretary was required to process the application. On October 3, 1994, BLM—not the Secretary—determined that Wyo-Ben’s mineral patent application did not qualify for the exemption. Congress thereafter reenacted the 1995 Act (including the moratorium and exemption) annually through 2019. In 2019, Wyo-Ben filed suit alleging that, pursuant to § 706(1) of the APA, the Secretary “unlawfully withheld” and “unreasonably delayed” agency action by failing to review Wyo-Ben’s pending application to determine whether it was exempt from the moratorium. The court found that Wyo-Ben’s claim was statutorily barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), reasoning that Wyo-Ben’s § 706(1) claim first accrued on the date BLM determined that Wyo-Ben’s patent application was not exempt (i.e., October 3, 1994) and that the limitations period expired six years later (i.e., October 3, 2000). On appeal, Wyo-Ben contended the district court misconstrued its § 706(1) claim by characterizing the allegedly unlawful conduct as BLM’s decision that Wyo- Ben’s application falls within the moratorium. Respondents maintained: (1) Wyo-Ben submitted an incomplete application in that BLM rejected its tender of the purchase price before the moratorium took effect; and (2) BLM properly determined in 1994, pursuant to authority the Secretary lawfully delegated to BLM, Wyo-Ben’s application fell within the moratorium. The district court did not resolve either of the foregoing two issues in dismissing Wyo-Ben’s claim. And, specifically as to the second issue, the court did not determine whether the lawful effect of any such delegation from the Secretary was that BLM properly stood in the shoes of the Secretary for purposes of determining that Wyo-Ben’s application was subject to the moratorium. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded the action to the district court for further proceedings. View "Wyo-Ben Inc. v. Haaland, et al." on Justia Law