Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While investigating the overdose death of plaintiff Walter Shrum’s wife, law enforcement officers searched Shrum’s home and discovered drugs, firearms, and ammunition. He was charged with various crimes in federal court. Before trial he argued the officers had illegally searched his home, and that the evidence discovered could not be used against him at trial. The district court disagreed, and Shrum entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal the suppression order. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the search violated the Constitution, and any resulting evidence should have been excluded. Without this evidence, the government dismissed its prosecution. Shrum then sued various state and federal law enforcement officials for civil rights violations arising from the illegal search and subsequent prosecution. The district court dismissed the action as time-barred and insufficiently pled. To this, the Tenth Circuit agreed: (1) Shrum failed to prove he was entitled to equitable tolling under Kansas or federal law; and (2) Shrum’s complaint inadequately alleged all of the requirements for a malicious prosecution claim against the City and County defendants. View "Shrum v. Cooke, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Ian Batara-Molina appealed the denial of his motion to suppress methamphetamine found in a car he was driving. The methamphetamine was discovered after Molina was stopped for speeding on his way to Sioux Falls, South Dakota. During this traffic stop, two deputies deployed a drug-sniffing dog around the perimeter of the car and were alerted to the presence of contraband. The car was searched, and methamphetamine was found in the trunk. Molina moved to suppress the methamphetamine on the basis that his traffic stop was delayed for the dog sniff and that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for this delay. After the district court denied this motion, Molina pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Molina maintained his traffic stop was delayed for the dog sniff and that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for this delay. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion, so it affirmed the district court’s denial of Molina’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Batara-Molina" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Asael Linares was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after an attempted carjacking. He pled guilty, but objected to a sentencing enhancement and the failure to apply a sentencing decrease proposed by the government, arguing that he did not complete an attempted carjacking, nor did he meet the required mental state for the carjacking enhancement. Finding that Linares was about to complete a carjacking while possessing an AK-47, the district court overruled Linares’s objections and sentenced him to 63 months. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the district court did not err in concluding that the facts—the presence of a rifle while confronting a car owner, demanding the keys, approaching the car, threatening the car owner and her family while they were calling 911, and leaving the scene when the victims continued calling 911—met the Sentencing Guideline requirements for carjacking. View "United States v. Linares" on Justia Law

In July 2021 defendant-appellant Anthony Prestel entered into a plea agreement with the government under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) providing that he would plead guilty to sexual abuse in Indian country, and would receive a term of imprisonment of 300 months. The agreement did not specify the term or conditions of Prestel’s supervised release. But under the heading “MAXIMUM POSSIBLE IMPRISONMENT AND/OR FINE,” the agreement stated, “The defendant understands that the maximum possible penalty for Sexual Abuse in Indian Country is imprisonment for a period of Life and/or a fine of $250,000.00, a term of supervised release of at least 5 years up to a lifetime term to be determined by the Court, and a special assessment in the amount of $100.00 and up to $5,100.” Arguing that the district court unlawfully imposed three special conditions of supervised release as part of his sentence Prestel appealed the imposition of those conditions. The Tenth Circuit concluded Prestel waived his right to appeal the three conditions. View "United States v. Prestel" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joseph Chatwin appealed the district court’s denial and dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. In 2013, Chatwin pleaded guilty to two counts: (1) bank fraud and (2) using or carrying (and brandishing) a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). As part of the plea agreement, the government recommended dismissal of seven other charged counts, and Chatwin waived any right to collaterally attack his sentence (though not his convictions). In 2016, Chatwin filed a pro se § 2255 motion challenging his conviction and sentencing as unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2016). As “supporting facts,” Chatwin simply wrote that “police chase not a violent crime.” In 2020, by then represented by counsel, Chatwin moved to amend his motion after the issuance of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). Though neither the plea agreement nor the plea colloquy stated whether the court based the § 924(c) conviction on § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause, § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause, or both, Chatwin contended that the district court relied solely on the residual clause (a question not yet resolved by the district court). From that, he argued under Davis that the district court needed to vacate his § 924(c) conviction and resentence him. In response, the government repeated its argument that Chatwin’s collateral-attack waiver in the plea agreement defeated any § 2255 claim, including one based on Davis. The district court agreed with the government’s collateral-attack-waiver argument and dismissed Chatwin’s § 2255 motion. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding Chatwin showed plain error, and that the error affected his substantial rights. "Absent plainly erring on the waiver’s scope, the district court could not have dismissed on that ground." View "United States v. Chatwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roxanne Torres appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Janice Madrid and Richard Williamson, agents of the New Mexico State Police Investigations Bureau. The encounter between Torres and Defendants lasted only 14 seconds: Torres was sitting in her vehicle, backed into a spot in front of a suspect’s apartment and cars parked on either side. The vehicle’s engine was running and the doors were locked. Defendants approached Torres’s vehicle and Agent Williamson attempted to open the driver’s door. Defendants shouted commands at Torres to open her door, but they did not announce themselves as police officers. Torres stepped on the gas and headed forward across the parking lot. Both Defendants fired at Torres. Neither Defendant was struck as Torres drove past. Five bullets were fired at the rear of Torres’s vehicle, one of them striking her in the back. Torres ultimately entered a no-contest plea to: (1) aggravated flight from a law- enforcement officer; and (2) assault upon a peace officer. Torres filed a civil-rights suit against Defendants alleging they used excessive force. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that because Torres had successfully fled the scene, she was not seized. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. After remand from the Supreme Court the district court again granted Defendants summary judgment, finding: (1) Torres’s claims were barred because her claims against Defendants were inconsistent with her no-contest pleas to charges of aggravated flight from a law-enforcement officer and assault upon a peace officer; and (2) Torres’s claims were barred on the ground that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding: (1) Torres' pleas were not inconsistent with her claims that the officers used excessive force by firing at her after she had driven past them and no longer posed a threat; and (2) because Defendants did not know Torres would escape when they shot at her, and facts unknown to officers at the moment they use force were not relevant to the qualified-immunity analysis. The Court remanded for further proceedings on the remaining issues raised by Defendant's arguments on appeal. View "Torres v. Madrid, et al." on Justia Law

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted a license to Interim Storage Partners to store spent nuclear fuel near the New Mexico border. New Mexico challenged the grant of this license, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act. The Commission moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Objecting to the motion, New Mexico invoked jurisdiction under the combination of the Hobbs Act, and the Atomic Energy Act. The Tenth Circuit determined these statutes could combine to trigger jurisdiction only when the petitioner was an aggrieved party in the licensing proceeding. This limitation applied here because New Mexico didn’t participate in the licensing proceeding or qualify as an aggrieved party. "New Mexico just commented to the Commission about its draft environmental impact statement. Commenting on the environmental impact statement didn’t create status as an aggrieved party, so jurisdiction isn’t triggered under the combination of the Hobbs Act and Atomic Energy Act." The Court found the Nuclear Waste Policy Act governed the establishment of a federal repository for permanent, not temporary storage by private parties like Interim Storage. And even when an agency acts ultra vires, the Court lacked jurisdiction when the petitioner had other available remedies: New Mexico had other available remedies by seeking intervention in the Commission’s proceedings. So the Commission’s motion to dismiss the petition was granted for lack of jurisdiction. View "Balderas, et al. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Harrison, a participant in a defined contribution retirement plan established by his former employer, filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against the fiduciaries of the plan alleging that they breached their duties towards, and caused damages to, the plan. Harrison sought various forms of relief, including a declaration that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties, the removal of the current plan trustee, the appointment of a new fiduciary to manage the plan, an order directing the current trustee to restore all losses to the plan that resulted from the fiduciary breaches, and an order directing Defendants to disgorge the profits they obtained from their fiduciary breaches. Defendants moved to compel arbitration, citing a provision of the plan document. The district court denied that motion, concluding that enforcing the arbitration provision of the plan would prevent Harrison from effectively vindicating the statutory remedies sought in his complaint. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the district court’s ruling and affirmed. View "Harrison v. Envision Management Holding, Inc. Board, et al." on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) employed Darren Markley as Vice President and Managing Director of Private Wealth Management at its Denver, Colorado location. Markley managed a team of wealth managers and private bankers, including Bob Provencher and Dave Crittendon, when issues arose in mid-2017. In violation of U.S. Bank policy, Markey provided Provencher a personal loan. Markley allegedly prevented Crittendon from “sandbagging” an investment. And members of Markley’s team, including Crittendon, accused Markley of giving Provencher commission credits for sales on which Provencher did not participate and had not met the clients. After an investigation, a disciplinary committee unanimously voted to terminate Markley’s employment. At no time during the investigation did Markley suggest the allegations against him were motivated by his age, but over a year later, Markley filed suit advancing a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and a wrongful discharge claim under Colorado law. U.S. Bank moved for summary judgment. As to the ADEA claim at issue in this appeal, the district court concluded Markley did not sustain his burden of producing evidence capable of establishing that U.S. Bank’s reason for terminating his employment was pretext for age discrimination. On appeal, Markley contended U.S. Bank conducted a “sham” investigation, and this established pretext. For two reasons, the Tenth Circuit rejected Markley’s assertion: (1) while an imperfect investigation may help support an inference of pretext, there must be some other indicator of protected-class-based discrimination for investigatory flaws to be capable of establishing pretext; and (2) even if deficiencies in an investigation alone could support a finding of pretext, Markley’s criticisms of the investigation were unpersuasive and insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find U.S. Bank’s reasons for termination pretextual. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Markley v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

After a shoplifting incident at a Colorado Kmart and a shootout two days later, the federal and state governments both indicted Defendant Joshua Garcia. The federal government waited nearly twenty-three months to prosecute Defendant, while the state prosecution ran its course. The district court held the delay violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and dismissed the federal indictment against him. "Violating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right compels a severe remedy: dismissing the indictment with prejudice. But a defendant cannot avail himself of that protection when he did not diligently assert that right." The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held the delay in this case did not violate Defendant’s speedy-trial right and the district court improperly dismissed his indictment. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law