Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For years the parties in this case litigated the propriety of a proposed development in the Wolf Creek Ski Area—which the US Forest Service managed. The proposed development was a plan for highway access known as “the Village at Wolf Creek Access Project.” Plaintiff challenged this plan because of alleged environmental risks to the surrounding national forest. The highway-access litigation continued, but relevant here was a 2018 FOIA request Plaintiff submitted asking Defendant for “all agency records regarding the proposed Village at Wolf Creek Access Project.” Plaintiff’s request caused an enormous undertaking by Defendant. The statute instructed government agencies to use reasonable efforts to produce responsive records upon request. Beyond that, FOIA also exempted nine categories of records from public disclosure. Plaintiff requested and received voluminous records under FOIA, but claimed Defendants United States Forest Service (“USFS”) and United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) abused these statutory limitations to hide information about projects that harmed the environment. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s speculative theory and found USFS’s efforts to comply with Plaintiff’s FOIA request reasonable. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Rocky Mountain Wild v. United States Forest Service, et al." on Justia Law

Timothy Sumpter was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, attempted rape, and aggravated sexual battery, arising from his 2011 sexual assault of J.B. in Wichita, Kansas. The controlling sentence was for aggravated kidnapping, a conviction which added over 15 years to Sumpter’s sentence. Sumpter petitioned for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, claiming that his convictions were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The district court granted in part Sumpter’s petition for relief, vacating the aggravated kidnapping conviction but denied his remaining claims. Furthermore, the district court denied Sumpter’s request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) with respect to his unsuccessful claims. The State of Kansas appealed the partial grant of habeas relief; Sumpter sought to appeal the partial denial. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief, concluding—under the deference prescribed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)—that the Kansas Court of Appeals (“KCOA”) was reasonable in determining that any ineffective assistance of counsel was not prejudicial because the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated kidnapping conviction. Even if the decision was not entitled to deference, the Court concluded under de novo review, the KCOA's decision should have been upheld. The matter was remanded for entry of judgment in Kansas' favor; the Court denied Sumpter's request for a COA and dismissed his cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Sumpter v. Kansas" on Justia Law

Defendants Michael and Dawn Heath sold Plaintiff Harry Johnson a gasoline and automobile-service station in Wells, Nevada. Soon after the sale, Plaintiff allegedly discovered that the property had material, undisclosed defects and that Defendants had artificially inflated the business’s profits by scamming customers over the years. In suing them, Plaintiff asserted many state-law claims against both Defendants and a claim against Defendant Michael Heath under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s RICO claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. The issue Plaintiff's appeal raised for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether Defendants’ actions as alleged plausibly violated the federal RICO statute. Because the Court concluded they did not, it affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Heath, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Roger Harbin pled guilty to various drug and firearm offenses and was sentenced to a total of 280 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Harbin challenged his sentence, contending the district court plainly erred by enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The Tenth Circuit determined Harbin did not meet his burden of demonstrating that any error in applying the § 4B1.1 enhancement was clear or obvious. Accordingly, the district court's sentencing decision was affirmed. View "United States v. Harbin" on Justia Law

In 2018, Joseph “Tiger King” Maldonado-Passage was indicted and later convicted by jury on several counts, including two murder-for-hire schemes. He was sentenced to a 264-month term of imprisonment. He appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming, inter alia, his murder-for-hire counts should have been grouped for purposes of calculating his total offense level. The Court affirmed Maldonado-Passage’s murder-for-hire convictions, but held his 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) offenses shared a “common criminal objective” and should have been grouped under § 3D1.2(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. On remand, Maldonado-Passage moved for reconsideration of the denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss one of the two § 1958(a) counts as multiplicitous. He proposed his counts be merged and subject to a single penalty. In its denial of the motion, the district court concluded Maldonado-Passage failed to demonstrate adequate grounds for reconsideration. Furthermore, during resentencing, the district court announced it would not exercise its discretion to expand the scope of sentencing beyond the grouping error identified by the Tenth Circuit prior to the remand, Maldonado-Passage I. The district court revised Maldonado-Passages’ total offense level and advisory Guidelines sentencing range and accordingly imposed a reduced sentence of 252 months’ imprisonment. This sentence included two consecutively run 102-month terms for each murder-for-hire conviction. Maldonado-Passage appealed here claiming the text of § 1958(a) prohibited his conduct from being parsed into two offenses with consecutively run sentences. To this, the Tenth Circuit disagreed: the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting its sentencing scope and refusing to reconsider Maldonado-Passage’s previously denied motion to dismiss for multiplicity. Therefore, no vehicle to challenge the § 1958(a) components of his sentence as multiplicitous remains. Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit confirmed § 1958(a)’s “plot centric” unit of prosecution permits separate offenses and consecutive sentences when, as here, two unrelated hitmen are hired to kill the same person. View "United States v. Maldonado-Passage" on Justia Law

Patrol Sergeant Mark Garrett seized a firearm from underneath David Samilton’s passenger seat during a vehicle stop. Based on the firearm, (1) a jury convicted Samilton of being a felon in possession; and (2) the district court revoked his supervised release in an unrelated case. On appeal in both cases, Samilton challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the firearm. Finding no reversible error in the district courts' judgments, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Samilton" on Justia Law

In the fall of 2015, D.T. enrolled as a freshman at Cherokee Trail High School in Aurora, Colorado. During his time at Cherokee Trail, he suffered from depression and a general decline in academic performance. His mother regularly communicated with school officials regarding his well-being and coordinated in-school support. During the first semester of his junior year, D.T. was reported for making a school shooting threat. As a result, he was expelled from Cherokee Trail and the Cherry Creek School District (“the District”) initiated a special education assessment. In December 2017, the District concluded D.T. suffered from a Serious Emotional Disability and approved an individualized education program (“IEP”) to assist his learning. D.T. appealed a district court's judgment finding the District did not deny him access to a free and appropriate public education as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). D.T. asked the Tenth Circuit to conclude the District violated its obligation to identify, or “child find,” students with disabilities who required supplementary academic supports. The Tenth Circuit declined D.T.'s request, finding the District acted reasonably to preserve his access to the benefit of general education. "The District’s duty to assess and provide D.T. with special education services did not begin until his emotional dysfunction manifested in the school environment by way of his shooting threat." View "D.T. v. Cherry Creek School" on Justia Law

In April 2019, police found Defendant Felipe Nevarez in possession of approximately 26 grams of methamphetamine and over $16,000 in cash. The Government sought and obtained an indictment charging Defendant with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Defendant’s case was delayed numerous times, first through a series of pre-trial continuances resulting from motions, counsel withdrawals, and plea negotiations before the onset of the COVID pandemic prompted further delay. When Defendant’s case eventually proceeded to trial in April 2021, Defendant conceded possession of methamphetamine and only put the Government to its burden of proof on the issue of intent to distribute. Unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that the Government’s investigation failed to produce many of the traditional hallmarks of drug dealing, the jury convicted Defendant as charged. Thereafter, the district court sentenced Defendant to 120 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals, asking the Tenth Circuit to reverse his conviction and dismiss the indictment based on a violation of the Speedy Trial Act or, in the alternative, remand his case for resentencing on the grounds that the district court erred by denying him an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Nevarez" on Justia Law

Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland, Inc. sent three collection letters to Elizabeth Shields over outstanding student loan debt. It used an outside mailer to send the letters. The letters did not indicate the debt balance could increase due to interest and fees from the date of the letters. Shields sued, alleging the disclosure of her debt and the misleading letters violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court dismissed because it found Shields lacked a concrete injury necessary for standing. To this the Tenth Circuit affirmed: Shields did not allege that Professional Bureau’s use of a mailer and the content of its letters sufficiently harmed her. View "Shields v. Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 clearly established Defendant Utah Highway Patrolman Blaine Robbins violated Heather Leyva’s Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment rights by pulling her over without reasonable suspicion to do so and by sending her flirtatious texts about the administration of a commercial towing relationship between her employer and the Utah Highway Patrol. Leyva served as the liaison between the Utah Highway Patrol (“UHP”) and West Coast Towing (“WCT”)—one of three towing companies in the Heavy Duty Towing Rotation (“HDTR”). Over time their professional relationship developed into a personal one. Defendant texted Leyva one night asking about work-related matters. In response to one question, Leyva told Defendant to “standby” because she was on the freeway. Defendant asked where and said he would pull her over. Defendant spotted her, turned on his lights, and initiated an apparent traffic stop. Leyva pulled over, not knowing Defendant was the driver of the patrol car, and got her identification ready. Defendant claimed he pulled Leyva over as “a joke between friends.” A month later, Leyva reported to her boss she felt Defendant was sexually harassing her. Her boss contacted UHP to report Leyva’s complaints of sexual harassment. As a result, UHP conducted an investigation. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the investigation found Defendant did not improperly administer the HDTR but concluded his conduct revealed his desire to further his personal relationship with Leyva. It also determined that Defendant lacked reasonable suspicion when he stopped Leyva. The district court found that Defendant did not violate clearly established law. Defendant did not dispute for purposes of this appeal that he violated Leyva’s constitutional rights. He argued only that the district court correctly determined the law was not clearly established for either alleged violation. Plaintiff alleged, and the district court found, that a jury could find Defendant violated Leyva’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred by granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims insofar as they related to Defendant’s traffic stop of Leyva. But the Court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights arising in connection with the administration of HDTR, were not clearly established at the time of the violation. View "Shepherd v. Robbins" on Justia Law