Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Hunt, et al. v. Montano, et al.
Ariza Barreras, T.B., and F.B. (“the children”) were siblings. In May 2017, the children were transferred to the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department's (“CYFD”) custody. At the time, Barreras was four months old, T.B. was two years old, and F.B. was one year old. CYFD employees Michelle Hill and Lora Valdez placed the children with foster parents Vanessa Dominguez and Justin Romero without evaluating whether Barreras and T.B., who were exposed to drugs in utero, “should have been treated and cared for as ‘special needs’ children and placed with foster parents who had received . . . additional training.” Dominguez and Romero had no experience as full-time foster parents for multiple children under the age of three with special needs. Hill and Valdez allegedly made this full-time placement even though Dominguez and Romero were licensed only as respite care providers. This case arose from allegations of abuse of T.B. and F.B., and the death of Ariza. The specific issue was whether the "special relationship" doctrine exposed five CYFD employees from liability when they all asserted qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the children’s representatives’ allegations stated a plausible claim that two of the CYFD employees—Leah Montano and Gwendolyn Griffin—violated the children’s substantive due process rights. However, the district court erred by concluding that the other three employees—Kim Chavez-Buie, Michelle Hill, and Lora Valdez—committed a constitutional violation. The district court also erred by finding that the clearly established prong of qualified immunity had been waived for purposes of this motion. The Court therefore reversed as to Chavez-Buie, Hill, and Valdez on the constitutional violation prong of qualified immunity because the complaint failed to allege liability under the special relationship doctrine. Chavez-Buie, Hill, and Valdez were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The Court reversed as to Montano and Griffin on the clearly established prong of qualified immunity because, even though it agreed with the district court that the allegations state a claim under the special relationship doctrine, the Court found the district court incorrectly deemed the clearly established prong waived. The case was remanded for a determination whether Montano and Griffin violated clearly established law. View "Hunt, et al. v. Montano, et al." on Justia Law
Finch, et al. v. Rapp
After Wichita police received a seemingly legitimate call, officers had to make a split-second decision based on fraudulent threats and reports of violence. Unfortunately, that "swatting" call and the subsequent reaction from police resulted in an innocent man’s death. Officers rushed to Andrew Finch's house, where the caller claimed a deranged man who had just killed his father and was holding the rest of his family hostage at gunpoint. Finch had not committed any crime and had no way of knowing why police were surrounding his home. As Finch exited the house, multiple officers yelled different commands. Ten seconds later, one officer thought he saw Finch reaching for a weapon and shot him in the chest. Finch's estate brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and other constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgement in favor of some of the responding officers and the City of Wichita, but denied summary judgment as to the officer who fired the fatal shots. Finch appealed the grant of summary judgment to one officer and the City; the officer appealed the denial of qualified immunity. The district court held that a reasonable jury could have found that Finch was unarmed and unthreatening. The Tenth Circuit concluded it was bound by those findings for the purposes of this appeal. Thus, the claims against Officer Rapp could go forward. The Court found the claims against the City were properly resolved. In addition, the Court concluded the district court correctly found that Finch did not put forth sufficient evidence to prevail on his municipal liability claim against the City. View "Finch, et al. v. Rapp" on Justia Law
GeoMetWatch, et al. v. Behunin, et al.
Plaintiff-Appellant GeoMetWatch Corporation, (“GMW”) appealed several district court orders granting summary judgment to Defendant-Appellees Alan Hall, Erin Housley, Brent Keller, Mark Hurst, Debbie Wade, Island Park Investments, and Tempus Global Data, Inc. (collectively, the “Hall Defendants”); Utah State University Advanced Weather Systems Foundation (“AWSF”) and Scott Jensen (collectively, the “AWSF Defendants”); and Utah State University Research Foundation (“USURF”), Robert Behunin, and Curtis Roberts (collectively, the “USURF Defendants”). The underlying suit arose from the collapse of a venture GMW entered into, created for the purpose of constructing and deploying a satellite-hosted weather sensor system. GMW alleged that all Defendants, led by Hall, conspired to drive GMW out of business on the eve of the venture by stealing its confidential and trade secret information, forming a competing business, and pulling out of agreements that Hall made with GMW. The district court granted summary judgment to the Hall Defendants primarily because of an overarching deficiency in GMW’s case, and in particular, a lack of non-speculative and sufficiently probative evidence of a causal nexus between Defendants’ alleged bad acts and GMW’s asserted damages. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of USURF, AWSF, and Roberts because they were allegedly immune from lawsuit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (“UGIA”). The district court granted summary judgment to Jensen and Behunin on all claims, concluding generally that GMW’s showing of causation also was deficient as to them. The court likewise awarded partial summary judgment to AWSF on its breach-of-contract counterclaim against GMW, effectively denying GMW’s cross-motion for summary judgment and affirmative defenses. GMW avers that the district court’s decisions were all made in error. Finding no error, however, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grants of summary judgment. View "GeoMetWatch, et al. v. Behunin, et al." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law, Civil Procedure
United States v. Armajo
In his trial for assaulting his uncle with a knife, defendant-appellant Shayne Armajo sought to introduce evidence of his uncle’s assaults in order to bolster a self-defense claim. The issue defendant’s appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit’s consideration was whether the district court abused its discretion when it ruled that this was a permissible use under Rule 404(b) but nevertheless excluded most of the proffered evidence under Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. Evidence of a victim’s prior violent acts may be admissible in a self-defense case to prove the defendant’s state of mind, but it is subject to Rule 403’s balancing test. As applied here, the Court found the district court reasonably concluded that the probative value of the victim’s alleged assaults was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Consequently, the Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the contested evidence. View "United States v. Armajo" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
United States v. Biggs Farley
Defendant-Appellant Connor Biggs Farley appeals the 630-month (52.5-year) sentence he received after pleading guilty to three counts of producing child pornography. In imposing this sentence, the district court rejected the sentence of 20 to 40 years (240 to 480 months) that was stipulated in Farley’s plea agreement with the government, but the court also varied downward from the 1080-month (90-year) sentence recommended by the presentence report, which corresponded to the statutory maximum sentence of 30 years (360 months) on each count, run consecutively. On appeal, Farley argued the district court’s selection of his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court’s method for determining Farley’s sentence involved plain errors of law, rendering the sentence procedurally unreasonable. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded resentencing. View "United States v. Biggs Farley" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Examination Board, et al. v. International Association, et al.
Competing trade associations offered memberships to home inspectors, who typically inspect homes prior to home sales. Benefits of membership in the International Association of Certified Home Inspectors (InterNACHI) and the American Society of Home Inspectors (ASHI) included online advertising to home buyers, educational resources, online training, and free services such as logo design. From 2015 to 2020, ASHI featured the slogan “American Society of Home Inspectors. Educated. Tested. Verified. Certified” on its website. Contending that tagline mislead consumers, InterNACHI sued ASHI under the federal Lanham Act, claiming the line constituted false advertising because it inaccurately portrayed ASHI’s entire membership as being educated, tested, verified, and certified, even though its membership includes so-called “novice” inspectors who had yet to complete training or become certified. InterNACHI argued this misleading advertising and ASHI’s willingness to promote novice inspectors to the public caused InterNACHI to lose potential members and dues revenues. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ASHI, concluding no reasonable jury could find that InterNACHI was injured by ASHI’s allegedly false commercial advertising. To this, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred: because InterNACHI did not present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that InterNACHI was injured by ASHI’s slogan, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for ASHI. View "Examination Board, et al. v. International Association, et al." on Justia Law
United States v. Shamo
Defendant Aaron Shamo was convicted by jury on 12 charges arising from his distribution of controlled substances, including fake oxycodone pills laced with fentanyl. He received a mandatory life sentence on his conviction of being a principal leader of a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE). On appeal, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of evidence of his guilt of the CCE charge because: (1) the government failed to prove that the drug he was distributing was the chemical designated in the criminal statute; and (2) the government failed to prove that he knew he was distributing a controlled substance. He also challenged the admissibility: (a) of screenshots of his illicit online storefront to prove the quantity of drugs distributed; and (b) of testimony by an expert witness who allegedly opined on the meaning of certain language in the CCE statute. He also raised allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in suggesting that he was responsible for uncharged overdose deaths and should be punished because of the social costs of unlawful narcotics. After careful consideration of defendant's arguments, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Shamo" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel Int’l.
Faith Bible Chapel International operated a school, Faith Christian Academy (“Faith Christian”). Plaintiff Gregory Tucker, a former high school teacher and administrator/chaplain, alleged Faith Christian fired him in violation of Title VII (and Colorado common law) for opposing alleged race discrimination at the school. As a religious employer, Faith Christian generally had to comply with anti-discrimination employment laws. But under the affirmative “ministerial exception” defense, those anti-discrimination laws do not apply to employment disputes between a religious employer and its ministers. Here, Faith Christian defended against Tucker’s race discrimination claims by asserting that he was a “minister” for purposes of the exception. After permitting limited discovery on only the “ministerial exception,” the district court ruled that, because there are genuinely disputed material facts, a jury would have to resolve whether Tucker was a “minister.” Summary judgment for Faith Christian, therefore, was not warranted. Faith Christian immediately appealed that decision, seeking to invoke the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal: the category of orders at issue here could be adequately reviewed at the conclusion of litigation. The appeal was thus dismissed. View "Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel Int'l." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights
Bear Creek Trail, et al. v. BOKF, et al.
Bear Creek Trail, LLC, filed for Chapter 11 reorganization. The bankruptcy court granted a motion to convert the proceeding to a Chapter 7 liquidation and appointed a trustee. Bear Creek’s attorney in the bankruptcy proceedings asked the district court to review the bankruptcy court’s conversion order. The district court dismissed, holding that only the trustee could seek review. The Tenth Circuit concluded Bear Creek's former management and the attorney lacked authority to challenge the conversion order in district court on behalf of the Debtor. Accordingly, the district court's judgment dismissing the appeal was affirmed. View "Bear Creek Trail, et al. v. BOKF, et al." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure
Shaw, et al. v. Schulte, et al.
This case stemmed from traffic stops of Blaine and Samuel Shaw and Joshua Bosire that were prolonged for K-9 sweeps. Master Trooper Doug Schulte and Technical Trooper Brandon McMillan moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in part, finding material issues of fact remained as to whether Troopers Schulte and McMillan had an arguable reasonable suspicion to extend the stops. Thus, the Court found the Shaws and Bosire could proceed on their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Trooper Schulte and Trooper McMillan, respectively. However, the Court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on: (1) the scope of the Shaws’ claim; and (2) Bosire’s claim against Trooper Schulte. View "Shaw, et al. v. Schulte, et al." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights