Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jeffery Krueger died following a traffic stop in Oklahoma initiated by Wagoner County Sheriff’s Office deputies. The stop began when deputies suspected Mr. Krueger of minor traffic violations and possible intoxication. After Mr. Krueger stopped his car in a turn lane, deputies forcibly removed him from his vehicle, allegedly pulling him by his hair, slamming his head on the pavement, and repeatedly using tasers as they attempted to handcuff him. Additional law enforcement officers arrived and, according to the plaintiffs, either participated directly or failed to intervene as Mr. Krueger, now handcuffed and prone, was further restrained with leg shackles and a hobble tie. Mr. Krueger stopped breathing at the scene and was later pronounced dead at a hospital.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma reviewed the case after the plaintiffs, Mr. Krueger’s parents and estate representatives, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants, including deputies and police officers, moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment for most defendants, finding that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there were sufficient grounds to show clearly established constitutional violations. The court found material disputes regarding the amount and duration of force used, including the number of taser applications and the nature of the prone restraint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find the defendants used excessive force both in the initial removal and restraint of Mr. Krueger and in the prolonged prone restraint after he was subdued. The court also held that the failure to intervene in the use of excessive force was clearly established as a constitutional violation. The district court’s orders denying summary judgment were affirmed. View "Krueger v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Liberty Global, a U.S. corporation, sold its controlling interest in a Japanese company for approximately $3.9 billion, realizing a gain of $3.2 billion. On its 2010 tax return, Liberty Global characterized $438 million of the gain as a foreign-source dividend and $2.8 billion as foreign-source capital gain. Of the capital gain, $474 million was re-sourced to the United States to recapture prior overall foreign losses, while the remaining $2.3 billion was treated as foreign-source capital gain, making Liberty Global eligible for a $240 million foreign tax credit.The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, asserting that the $2.3 billion in excess of the overall foreign loss account was U.S.-sourced, not foreign-sourced, and therefore Liberty Global was not entitled to the claimed tax credit. Liberty Global challenged this determination in the United States Tax Court, which reviewed the case on a stipulated record. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, holding that only the portion of gain equal to the overall foreign loss balance could be treated as foreign-sourced under Internal Revenue Code § 904(f)(3), and the excess gain was U.S.-sourced.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s decision de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that under the plain language of the Tax Code, specifically § 904(f)(3)(A)(i), only the lesser of the gain from the sale or the remaining overall foreign loss balance is treated as foreign-sourced income. The excess gain above the overall foreign loss balance is U.S.-sourced under § 865(a). The court rejected Liberty Global’s arguments based on statutory interpretation and Treasury regulations, affirming the Tax Court’s judgment and denying Liberty Global’s claim to the $240 million foreign tax credit. View "Liberty Global v. CIR" on Justia Law

A government agency responsible for marketing hydroelectric power operated a warehouse in Colorado, where an employee, Jared Newman, orchestrated a fraudulent procurement scheme from 2014 to 2017. Newman arranged for the agency to purchase supplies from vendors owned by friends and family, including the defendant, who owned two such companies. The vendors submitted invoices for goods that were never delivered, received payments from the agency, and then funneled most of the money back to Newman, keeping a portion as a commission. The defendant received nearly $180,000 through 59 fraudulent payments, writing checks back to Newman and taking steps to conceal the scheme.A grand jury indicted the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on six counts of wire fraud, each corresponding to a specific transfer, and sought forfeiture of all proceeds. At trial, the government introduced evidence of a co-participant’s guilty plea and the district court instructed the jury that it could infer the defendant’s knowledge of the fraud if he was deliberately ignorant. The defendant was convicted on all counts. The district court limited forfeiture to the six charged transfers, totaling about $20,000, but ordered restitution for the full amount received, for which the defendant and Newman were jointly and severally liable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the co-participant’s guilty plea, as it was used to assess credibility and not as substantive evidence of guilt, and the jury was properly instructed on its limited use. The court also held that, because there was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s actual knowledge, any error in the deliberate ignorance instruction did not warrant reversal. On the government’s cross-appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that forfeiture should include all proceeds obtained through the fraudulent scheme, not just the charged transactions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Cline" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the defendant’s residence in Kansas as part of an investigation into stolen construction equipment. During the search, officers discovered methamphetamine, heroin, forty-four firearms (including two machine guns), and ammunition. The defendant was arrested at the scene, and after waiving his Miranda rights, admitted to being a daily user of heroin.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas indicted the defendant on two counts: possession of a machine gun and possession of a firearm as an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance, specifically heroin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The defendant moved to dismiss the firearm charge, arguing that while possession of heroin is illegal, neither federal nor Kansas law explicitly criminalizes the use of heroin, and therefore he could not be considered an “unlawful user” under the statute. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that use of a controlled substance necessarily involves possession, which is unlawful for heroin. The defendant then pleaded guilty to both counts, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation of “unlawful user” de novo. The court held that the term “unlawful user” in § 922(g)(3) includes individuals who regularly use a controlled substance that has no lawful use, such as heroin, because use necessarily entails unlawful possession. The court rejected the argument that the absence of a specific prohibition on use precludes conviction, finding that the illegality of possession suffices. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and the defendant’s conviction under § 922(g)(3). View "United States v. Davey" on Justia Law

The debtor in this case voluntarily filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed his anticipated 2021 federal and state income tax refunds as assets, asserting that they were fully exempt from the bankruptcy estate under Colorado law. The debtor and his spouse, who did not join the bankruptcy petition, filed joint tax returns. The returns showed a federal refund of $1,455 and a state refund of $554, with the federal refund paid to the bankruptcy trustee and the state refund paid to the debtor. The parties stipulated that the debtor would file his tax returns and turn over any refunds to the trustee, who would return any exempt portion to the debtor.After receiving the refunds, the trustee moved to compel turnover of the non-exempt portion of the federal tax refund, arguing that only a portion of the refund was exempt and that a pro-rata calculation should be used to determine the exempt amount. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado denied the trustee’s motion, concluding that the entire federal refund was exempt because it was caused by a refundable child tax credit. The trustee appealed, and the United States District Court for the District of Colorado affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that, under Colorado law, the phrase “attributed to” in the relevant exemption statute means “caused by,” and that the full amount of a federal income tax refund is exempt if it would not have occurred but for the refundable child tax credit. The court rejected the trustee’s argument for a pro-rata method and emphasized that Colorado law requires liberal construction of exemption statutes in favor of debtors. View "In re: Garcia-Morales" on Justia Law

In 2024, New Mexico enacted a law requiring a mandatory seven-day waiting period for nearly all consumer firearm purchases, regardless of the buyer’s circumstances or urgency. The law applies even to individuals who have already passed background checks or possess security clearances, and it does not allow for waivers based on personal danger. Exemptions exist for certain categories, such as law enforcement, concealed carry permit holders, and immediate family transfers, but the law broadly prohibits the transfer of firearms before the waiting period ends, with violations constituting misdemeanors.After the law took effect, two individuals, both of whom promptly passed background checks when attempting to purchase firearms, were forced to wait the full seven days solely due to the new statute. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the law on Second and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The district court denied their request for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that the right to keep and bear arms did not encompass the right to acquire arms, that waiting periods were longstanding and presumptively constitutional, and that the law fit within historical traditions of firearm regulation. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not meet the other requirements for injunctive relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Tenth Circuit held that the waiting period burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment, as the right to keep and bear arms necessarily includes the right to acquire them. The court found that such cooling-off periods are not supported by historical tradition or longstanding regulatory exceptions and that the law imposes an unconstitutional burden. The court concluded that the plaintiffs met all requirements for a preliminary injunction and directed the district court to enter injunctive relief consistent with its opinion. View "Ortega v. Grisham" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm after police officers in Oklahoma City pursued a stolen vehicle he was driving. During the chase, the defendant fled on foot and was apprehended near an alleyway, where a loaded pistol was found within arm’s reach of his arrest location. The firearm was dry and free of debris despite rainy conditions, suggesting it had been recently discarded. The defendant had two prior felony convictions: one for distribution of marijuana and another for being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, he stipulated to his status as a felon and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce, but denied knowingly possessing the gun.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma initially excluded evidence of the defendant’s prior felon-in-possession conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), finding its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. However, during trial, the defendant testified about his criminal history, emphasizing that his prior conviction was only for marijuana. The government then sought, and was granted, permission to impeach the defendant with his prior felon-in-possession conviction, arguing that he had created a misleading impression of his criminal background. The district court allowed limited questioning on this conviction and issued a jury instruction to consider it only for impeachment purposes. The jury convicted the defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the prior conviction for impeachment. The appellate court held that, although such evidence can be prejudicial, its probative value increased after the defendant minimized his criminal history. The court found no abuse of discretion, concluded any error would have been harmless given the evidence, and affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Two Albuquerque police officers stopped a vehicle driven by the defendant after hearing excessive noise, suspecting a violation of city ordinances regarding vehicle mufflers. Upon stopping the car, the officers discovered the defendant had two outstanding misdemeanor bench warrants, which allowed for release upon posting bond. The officers arrested the defendant, citing both the warrants and a concern about possible illegal items in the car after observing ammunition. The defendant requested to pay the bond or have his mother retrieve the car, but the officers proceeded to impound the vehicle, citing its improper parking across two metered spots and concerns about public safety. During an inventory search prior to towing, officers found firearms, cash, and drugs.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the car. The court found that the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, that the impoundment was justified under community-caretaking functions despite mixed motives, and that the inventory search, though imperfectly documented, largely conformed to department policy. The defendant pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. The appellate court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop, that the impoundment was permissible under the community-caretaking exception even with mixed motives, and that the inventory search was reasonable despite incomplete documentation, as it was conducted pursuant to standard procedures and not solely for investigatory purposes. The court concluded that none of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated and affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Ulibarri" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on three federal charges related to the sexual abuse of a minor family member, with the alleged conduct spanning several years. The charges carried varying statutory penalties, with one count carrying a potential life sentence. The parties negotiated three separate plea agreements. The first agreement involved the defendant pleading guilty to the most serious count in exchange for dismissal of the other two, with a stipulated sentence of thirteen to fifteen years. The second agreement had the defendant pleading guilty to the two lesser counts, with the most serious count dismissed and no agreement as to sentence. The third agreement involved guilty pleas to all counts and a stipulated maximum sentence of 235 months. The victim and her family supported the plea agreements to avoid the trauma of trial.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma rejected the first plea agreement, finding the stipulated sentence insufficient given the seriousness and duration of the abuse. After the parties’ motion to reconsider was denied, they entered the second plea agreement. The district court also rejected this agreement, reasoning that it improperly limited the court’s sentencing discretion by dismissing the count with the greatest sentencing exposure. The court accepted the third plea agreement and imposed a 235-month sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion in rejecting the first two agreements. The government agreed that the court erred in rejecting the second agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court acted within its discretion in rejecting the first, hybrid plea agreement, but abused its discretion in rejecting the second, which was a charge bargain. The appellate court found that the district court failed to show proper deference to prosecutorial discretion in charge bargains. The court vacated the convictions and sentence, remanding for reconsideration of the second plea agreement, but declined to reassign the case to a different judge. View "United States v. Papke" on Justia Law

Police in Cheyenne, Wyoming, responded to a call about an unconscious man in a vehicle and arrested Derek Ascherin after finding drug paraphernalia and nearly 24 grams of suspected fentanyl pills. During the investigation, law enforcement suspected that Traquevis Dewayne Hardy was supplying fentanyl to Ascherin. Officers obtained a warrant to search Hardy’s Facebook messages, which revealed communications about fentanyl transactions. Hardy was later arrested in April 2023 with nine fentanyl pills in his possession.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming indicted Hardy for conspiracy to distribute at least 40 grams of fentanyl between July and December 2022. After a three-day trial, a jury found Hardy guilty. At sentencing, the district court attributed 1,773 grams of fentanyl to Hardy, relying in part on statements from a confidential source, and sentenced him to 168 months in prison. Hardy objected to the drug quantity calculation, arguing it was based on unreliable hearsay, but the district court overruled his objection. Hardy appealed his conviction and sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed three issues: whether Hardy’s absence from an in-chambers evidentiary ruling violated due process, whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of his later possession of fentanyl under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and whether the sentencing court erred in relying on uncorroborated hearsay to determine drug quantity. The Tenth Circuit held that Hardy’s absence from the in-chambers conference did not violate due process and that any error in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence did not affect the verdict. However, the court found clear error in the sentencing court’s reliance on uncorroborated hearsay for drug quantity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Hardy’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Hardy" on Justia Law