Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While defendant-appellant Laquan Shakespeare was serving the supervised-release portion of his sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. sections 1153 and 2243(a) (the “2018 conviction”), he sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl. Based on the events underlying that sexual assault, Shakespeare pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. sections 1153 and 2244(a)(5) (the “2020 conviction”). The government then moved to revoke Shakespeare’s supervised release. The district court set a combined (1) sentencing hearing on the 2020 conviction and (2) revocation hearing on Shakespeare’s supervised release. At that hearing, the district court first sentenced Shakespeare to a term of imprisonment of 293 months on the 2020 conviction. The district court then recessed the completed proceedings relating to the 2020 conviction and turned to the question whether Shakespeare’s supervised release on the 2018 conviction should be revoked. Acting pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3583(k), the district court concluded it was obligated to revoke Shakespeare’s supervised release and to impose a mandatory-minimum five-year term of imprisonment. For the first time on appeal, Shakespeare argued the district court’s application of § 3583(k) violated: (1) his jury-trial rights, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; and (2) his Fifth Amendment right to be free of double jeopardy. Finding no reversible error, however, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Shakespeare" on Justia Law

This case arose from a long-running irrigation-water dispute between Plaintiff Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation and Defendant Gregory McKee, who was not a member of the Tribe. Defendant owned non-Indian fee land within the Ute reservation’s exterior boundaries and used water from two irrigation canals flowing through his property. Plaintiff claimed the water belonged to the United States in trust for the Tribe. Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Ute tribal court, alleging that Defendant had been diverting the Tribe’s water for years, and won. Plaintiff then petitioned the district court to recognize and enforce the tribal-court judgment. But the district court dismissed the case after holding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to enter its judgment. Because the Tenth Circuit also concluded the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s dispute with a nonmember of the Tribe arising on non-Indian fee lands, it affirmed. View "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. McKee, et al." on Justia Law

In late 2017, someone sent anonymous letters containing personal and derogatory information about appellant Bryan Seale to his acquaintances. In December 2018, Seale discovered that someone had accessed his real estate business software account without authorization. Seale brought this action asserting claims against: (1) his ex-husband and ex-employee, Gary Peacock, for accessing his real estate business account without authorization; and (2) unnamed defendants for sending the anonymous letters. The magistrate judge dismissed the claims in two separate orders: (1) granting with prejudice Peacock’s motion to dismiss the claims alleged against him for failure to state a claim; and (2) denying Seale’s motion to amend the complaint to substitute Peacock for the unnamed defendants and dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice. Seale appealed both orders. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the magistrate court's order. Specifically, the Court affirmed dismissal of Seale’s Stored Communications Act (SCA) claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the statutory civil theft claim. The Court reversed and remanded the dismissal with prejudice of the SCA claim and the invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness claim and instructed the magistrate court to dismiss these claims without prejudice. View "Seale v. Peacock" on Justia Law

Appellants Darren Herrera and Paula Garcia purchased a home in the City of Espanola, New Mexico (the “City”). At the time Appellants purchased the home, the existing owner, Charlotte Miera, was not current on her water and sewer bill. Although the City initially provided water service to Appellants, it discontinued service in February 2017, and declined to recommence it until someone paid the water and sewer bill. In June 2020, Appellants filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (“NMTCA”) based on the City’s refusal to provide them water service unless someone paid Miera’s bill. The City filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, arguing the statute of limitations had elapsed before Appellants filed their action. Although Appellants conceded a three-year statute of limitations governed their section 1983 claims, and a two-year statute of limitations governed their NMTCA claim, they argued the limitations period had not expired on their claims because the City repeatedly denied their requests for water service between February 2017 and February 2020. They expressly relied on the continuing violation doctrine to extend the limitations period, and also argued facts consistent with the related repeated violations doctrine. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the district court that Appellants’ action first accrued no later than March 2017. Further, although it held the continuing violation doctrine was available within the section 1983 context, the Court concurred with the district court that it did not save Appellants’ claims against the City or their NMTCA claim. The Court found Appellants’ claims premised on the City’s alleged policy of conditioning water service to new property owners on the payment of bills owed by prior property owners was not time-barred under the repeated violation doctrine and Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 924 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2019). View "Herrera, et al. v. City of Espanola, et al." on Justia Law

Taj Jerry Mahabub, founder and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of GenAudio, Inc. (“GenAudio”; collectively referred to as “Appellants”) attempted to secure a software licensing deal with Apple, Inc. (“Apple”). Mahabub intended to integrate GenAudio’s three-dimensional audio software, “AstoundSound,” into Apple’s products. While Appellants were pursuing that collaboration, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) commenced an investigation into Mr. Mahabub’s conduct: Mahabub was suspected of defrauding investors by fabricating statements about Apple’s interest in GenAudio’s software and violating registration provisions of the securities laws in connection with sales of GenAudio securities. The district court found Mahabub defrauded investors and violated the securities laws. The court determined that Appellants were liable for knowingly or recklessly making six fraudulent misstatements in connection with two offerings of GenAudio’s securities in violation of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. Appellants appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the SEC. View "SEC v. GenAudio Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Over four years, Plaintiffs-Appellants Eighteen Seventy, LP and the Marie Kennedy Foundation (the “Kennedy Entities” or “Entities”) lost more than $10 million they invested in CRUPE Pte. Ltd. (“CRUPE”) and its subsidiaries. CRUPE was a foreign company organized under the laws of Singapore and managed in Zurich, Switzerland. Believing that CRUPE’s co-founder and CFO, Defendant-Appellee Richard Jayson, induced their investment losses through misrepresentations and material omissions, the Kennedy Entities sued Jayson for gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming. The Entities, both of which had their principal place of business in Wyoming, averred that Jayson surreptitiously used their financial support to compensate himself and another company co-founder while failing to provide the Kennedy Entities with information about CRUPE’s viability and the true nature of their investments. Jayson, a domiciliary and resident of the United Kingdom, moved to dismiss the Kennedy Entities’ suit, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The district court agreed with Jayson and dismissed the complaint. The Kennedy Entities appealed appeal, claiming the district court erred when it held Jayson lacked the requisite minimum contacts with Wyoming to afford the court personal jurisdiction. They contended Jayson purposefully directed activities at Wyoming by preparing investment documents that encouraged the Kennedy Entities’ investments and by communicating with the Entities’ owners about the investments. These contentions notwithstanding, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of this case for want of personal jurisdiction. “Although the Kennedy Entities meet the first prong of the purposeful direction test, they fail to satisfy the second: that is, they fail to show that Mr. Jayson expressly aimed his conduct at Wyoming.” View "Eighteen Seventy, et al. v. Jayson" on Justia Law

A confidential informant visited defendant-appellant Gaspar Leal and asked about buying drugs. Leal put the confidential informant in touch with several individuals, and the informant ultimately purchased methamphetamine twice from a third party (Daniel Carmona). These purchases led to Leal’s conviction for conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced to a thirty-year prison term. Leal appealed his conviction and sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding: (1) the jury could reasonably find that Leal had known that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of methamphetamine; (2) Leal did not establish that the government’s conduct was clearly and obviously outrageous; and (3) the sentence was not substantively unreasonable: Leal’s crime carried a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison, and the district court reasonably considered Leal’s status as a career offender and his mental illnesses. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Holzer was arrested and criminally charged after federal undercover agents determined that Holzer had taken substantial steps towards bombing a synagogue in Pueblo, Colorado. Holzer subsequently pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of intentionally attempting to obstruct persons in the enjoyment of their free exercise of religious beliefs through force, and one count of maliciously attempting to damage and destroy, by means of fire and explosives, a synagogue. The district court sentenced Holzer to a term of imprisonment of 235 months, to be followed by a fifteen-year term of supervised release. The district court also ordered Holzer to comply with eleven special conditions of supervised release, including Special Condition Nine, that prohibited him from acquiring, possessing, or using any material depicting support for or association with antisemitism or white supremacy. Holzer appealed, arguing that the district court erred in imposing Special Condition Nine. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Holzer’s challenge to Special Condition Nine was barred by the appellate waiver provision of his plea agreement. Consequently, his appeal was dismissed. View "United States v. Holzer" on Justia Law

Three out of four defendants in consolidated cases identified as minorities, and two were illegal immigrants. They claimed the district court abused its discretion in failing to ask the potential jurors whether they harbored racist views. One defendant posited that if “America as an institution harbors racial prejudice in the context of immigration law, it stands to reason that some members of that same institution also harbor similar views.” But the Supreme Court had long held that no constitutional presumption of juror bias existed for or against members of any particular racial or ethnic groups. The Tenth Circuit declined to create such a presumption in these cases, finding that without any substantial indication that racial or ethnic prejudice likely affected the jurors, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ requests to directly examine the jurors about the subject. View "United States v. Murry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank filed a statutory-interpleader action after facing conflicting demands for access to the checking account of Mesh Suture, Inc. Mark Schwartz, an attorney who founded Mesh Suture with Dr. Gregory Dumanian, was named as a claimant-defendant in the interpleader complaint but was later dismissed from the case after the district court determined that he had disclaimed all interest in the checking account. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to Dr. Dumanian as the sole remaining claimant to the bank account, thereby awarding him control over the funds that remained. Schwartz appealed, arguing: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case because (a) there was not diversity of citizenship between him and Dr. Dumanian and (b) the funds in the checking account were not deposited into the court registry; (2) he did not disclaim his fiduciary interest in the checking account, and (3) the award of funds to Dr. Dumanian violated various rights of Mesh Suture. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. Mesh Suture, et al." on Justia Law