Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Over four years, Plaintiffs-Appellants Eighteen Seventy, LP and the Marie Kennedy Foundation (the “Kennedy Entities” or “Entities”) lost more than $10 million they invested in CRUPE Pte. Ltd. (“CRUPE”) and its subsidiaries. CRUPE was a foreign company organized under the laws of Singapore and managed in Zurich, Switzerland. Believing that CRUPE’s co-founder and CFO, Defendant-Appellee Richard Jayson, induced their investment losses through misrepresentations and material omissions, the Kennedy Entities sued Jayson for gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming. The Entities, both of which had their principal place of business in Wyoming, averred that Jayson surreptitiously used their financial support to compensate himself and another company co-founder while failing to provide the Kennedy Entities with information about CRUPE’s viability and the true nature of their investments. Jayson, a domiciliary and resident of the United Kingdom, moved to dismiss the Kennedy Entities’ suit, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The district court agreed with Jayson and dismissed the complaint. The Kennedy Entities appealed appeal, claiming the district court erred when it held Jayson lacked the requisite minimum contacts with Wyoming to afford the court personal jurisdiction. They contended Jayson purposefully directed activities at Wyoming by preparing investment documents that encouraged the Kennedy Entities’ investments and by communicating with the Entities’ owners about the investments. These contentions notwithstanding, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of this case for want of personal jurisdiction. “Although the Kennedy Entities meet the first prong of the purposeful direction test, they fail to satisfy the second: that is, they fail to show that Mr. Jayson expressly aimed his conduct at Wyoming.” View "Eighteen Seventy, et al. v. Jayson" on Justia Law

A confidential informant visited defendant-appellant Gaspar Leal and asked about buying drugs. Leal put the confidential informant in touch with several individuals, and the informant ultimately purchased methamphetamine twice from a third party (Daniel Carmona). These purchases led to Leal’s conviction for conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced to a thirty-year prison term. Leal appealed his conviction and sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding: (1) the jury could reasonably find that Leal had known that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of methamphetamine; (2) Leal did not establish that the government’s conduct was clearly and obviously outrageous; and (3) the sentence was not substantively unreasonable: Leal’s crime carried a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison, and the district court reasonably considered Leal’s status as a career offender and his mental illnesses. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Holzer was arrested and criminally charged after federal undercover agents determined that Holzer had taken substantial steps towards bombing a synagogue in Pueblo, Colorado. Holzer subsequently pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of intentionally attempting to obstruct persons in the enjoyment of their free exercise of religious beliefs through force, and one count of maliciously attempting to damage and destroy, by means of fire and explosives, a synagogue. The district court sentenced Holzer to a term of imprisonment of 235 months, to be followed by a fifteen-year term of supervised release. The district court also ordered Holzer to comply with eleven special conditions of supervised release, including Special Condition Nine, that prohibited him from acquiring, possessing, or using any material depicting support for or association with antisemitism or white supremacy. Holzer appealed, arguing that the district court erred in imposing Special Condition Nine. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Holzer’s challenge to Special Condition Nine was barred by the appellate waiver provision of his plea agreement. Consequently, his appeal was dismissed. View "United States v. Holzer" on Justia Law

Three out of four defendants in consolidated cases identified as minorities, and two were illegal immigrants. They claimed the district court abused its discretion in failing to ask the potential jurors whether they harbored racist views. One defendant posited that if “America as an institution harbors racial prejudice in the context of immigration law, it stands to reason that some members of that same institution also harbor similar views.” But the Supreme Court had long held that no constitutional presumption of juror bias existed for or against members of any particular racial or ethnic groups. The Tenth Circuit declined to create such a presumption in these cases, finding that without any substantial indication that racial or ethnic prejudice likely affected the jurors, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ requests to directly examine the jurors about the subject. View "United States v. Murry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank filed a statutory-interpleader action after facing conflicting demands for access to the checking account of Mesh Suture, Inc. Mark Schwartz, an attorney who founded Mesh Suture with Dr. Gregory Dumanian, was named as a claimant-defendant in the interpleader complaint but was later dismissed from the case after the district court determined that he had disclaimed all interest in the checking account. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to Dr. Dumanian as the sole remaining claimant to the bank account, thereby awarding him control over the funds that remained. Schwartz appealed, arguing: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case because (a) there was not diversity of citizenship between him and Dr. Dumanian and (b) the funds in the checking account were not deposited into the court registry; (2) he did not disclaim his fiduciary interest in the checking account, and (3) the award of funds to Dr. Dumanian violated various rights of Mesh Suture. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. Mesh Suture, et al." on Justia Law

In 2016, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service exercised its authority under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to designate nearly 14,000 acres of riparian land in New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona as critical habitat for the New Mexico Meadow Jumping Mouse. Two New Mexico ranching associations whose members graze cattle on the designated land challenged the Service’s critical habitat determination. The district court rejected each argument and upheld the Service’s critical habitat designation. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding: (1) the Service’s method for assessing the economic impacts of critical habitat designation complied with the ESA; (2) the Service adequately considered the effects of designation on the ranching association members’ water rights; and (3) the Service reasonably supported its decision not to exclude certain areas from the critical habitat designation. View "Northern New Mexico Stockman, et al. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, et al." on Justia Law

In deciding defendant-appellant Ira Wilkins' sentence for unlawfully possessing a firearm, the district court considered the effect of Wilkins’ prior conviction in Texas for aggravated robbery. The district court characterized this offense as a “crime of violence” under the sentencing guidelines, which increased the base-offense level. Wilkins appealed, arguing for the first time that the district court shouldn’t have considered aggravated robbery as a crime of violence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. View "United States v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

Following Susanne Burgaz’s suicide in a County Detention Facility, her children and estate sued two individual Sheriff’s deputies on duty the night she died, and various other County officials. They argued the deputies were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs and the County and sheriff negligently operated the jail. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted the motion. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that both individual deputies were entitled to qualified immunity because the Estate failed to allege either deputy violated Ms. Burgaz’s constitutional rights. The "Monell" claim against the sheriff was also properly dismissed. And because all the claims arising under federal law were properly dismissed, the district court correctly dismissed the remaining state-law claims. View "Estate of Susanne Burgaz, et al. v. Board of County Commissioners, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Antoine Frazier appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a roadside search of his vehicle in 2019. A Utah state trooper pulled defendant over for speeding. The trooper did not begin the standard procedures necessary to issue a citation. Instead, he immediately began trying to contact a canine handler with the local sheriff’s office, so he could come to the scene and perform a dog sniff of the vehicle. At first, the trooper tried contacting the deputy via the instant-messaging system on his vehicle’s computer. When the deputy failed to respond to several messages, the trooper tried callling him on the radio. When the deputy again failed to respond, the trooper asked dispatch to locate him and send him to the scene. Approximately thirty minutes from the initial stop did the canine search defendant's vehicle, alerting to potential contraband. In this time, a records check from dispatch revealed defendant had pled guilty in 2006 to manslaughter; a pat-down search revealed defendant had a .22 caliber pistol in his pants pocket. Defendant was ultimately arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and for possession of fentanyl and cocaine with the intent to distribute. Defendant argued the evidence obtained from that search was inadmissible because the trooper improperly prolonged the traffic stop to facilitate a dog sniff and thereby obtain probable cause to search his vehicle. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the trooper departed from the traffic-based mission of the stop by arranging the dog sniff, "an investigative detour that was unsupported by reasonable suspicion and that added time to the stop. ...The trooper’s consultation of the DEA database, a second investigative detour, only aggravated that ongoing violation. Accordingly, the evidence discovered because of that seizure is tainted by its unlawfulness and is inadmissible." View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

At defendant-appellant Jamaryus Moore’s initial sentencing hearing, the court offered him a choice: (1) an immediate 51-month sentence of imprisonment; or (2) a 48-month sentence of probation, subject to at least 84 months’ imprisonment for any future probation violation. Moore took the second option, and for over a year, upheld his end of the bargain. Moore admitted to some conditions of his probation, and the district court made good on its promise to sentence him to 84 months’ imprisonment. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court’s sentencing bargain was procedurally unreasonable. After review, the Court held that it was: when revoking probation and resentencing under section 3565(a)(2), the Sentencing Guidelines and United States v. Kelley (359 F.3d 1302) (10th Cir. 2004) required district courts to undertake a two-step analysis. The Court determined nothing in the district court's record suggested either the trial court nor the parties undertook the needed two-step analysis. "We are left to guess as to how the district court arrived at its 84-month sentence." The Court ultimately found Moore showed the district court plainly erred when it sentenced him, making the sentence-in-advance feature procedurally unreasonable. The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law