Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' review was one of first impression in the circuit: whether extended overdraft charges made to a checking account were “interest” charges governed by 12 C.F.R. 7.4001, or “non-interest charges and fees” for “deposit account services” governed by 12 C.F.R. 7.4002. Petitioner Berkley Walker held a checking account at the national bank BOKF, National Association, d/b/a Bank of Albuquerque, N.A. (“BOKF”). He filed a putative class action challenging BOKF’s “Extended Overdraft Fees,” claiming they were in violation of the interest rate limit set by the National Bank Act of 1864 (“NBA”). BOKF charged Walker Extended Overdraft Fees after he overdrew his checking account, BOKF elected to pay the overdraft, and then Walker failed to timely pay BOKF for covering the overdraft. Walker alleges that when he overdrew his account and BOKF paid his overdraft, BOKF was extending him credit and this extension of credit was akin to a loan. Walker argues that the Extended Overdraft Fees of $6.50 he was charged for each business day his account remained negative after a grace period constituted “interest” upon this extension of credit and were in excess of the interest rate limit set by the NBA. The district court concluded that BOKF’s Extended Overdraft Fees were fees for “deposit account services” and were not “interest” under the NBA. The district court granted BOKF’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and dismissed Walker’s action for failure to state a claim. Finding no reversible error in the district court judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Walker v. BOKF National Assoc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a jail fight that started when an inmate learned that another inmate “snitched.” Based on the fight, the government charged two inmates, Derrick Segue and Klawaun Sutton, with conspiring to tamper with a witness in a federal proceeding. Defendants moved for acquittal, arguing the evidence was insufficient as to their contemplation of a legal proceeding that was likely to be federal. The motion was denied and they were convicted. The Tenth Circuit reversed, however, finding that Sutton and Segue intended to interfere with a state proceeding. "There was nothing to suggest [they] had contemplated the witness' participation in a possible federal proceeding or a proceeding reasonably likely to become federal." View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant-appellant Tony Burris pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and the district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison, the low end of his sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. After Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which addressed sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine, and made those changes retroactive in the First Step Act of 2018, Burris moved for a reduced sentence. The government opposed the motion, arguing that Burris’s Guidelines range remained the same because the calculation should have been based on the larger quantity of crack cocaine attributed to Burris in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) rather than the smaller amount charged in the indictment. Recognizing that the parties raised an issue that had not yet been addressed by the Tenth Circuit, the district court declined to resolve it, instead exercising its discretion to deny relief regardless of the correct Guidelines calculation. The Tenth Circuit held the district court was obligated to calculate Burris’s revised Guidelines range before exercising its discretion to deny relief, and that the error was not harmless. Judgment was therefore reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Burris" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Charles Chavez was accused of attempting to force two individuals to withdraw their money from a bank automated teller machine (“ATM”) at gunpoint. The district court dismissed these charges, reasoning that, had the accountholders completed the withdrawal as intended, Chavez would have taken the money from them, as opposed to from the bank that operated the ATM. The Tenth Circuit found the district court’s decision aligned with the Fifth Circuit’s approach to this issue, but conflicted with the Seventh Circuit’s. The Tenth Circuit sided with the Seventh Circuit: "Using force to induce a bank customer to withdraw money from an ATM is federal bank robbery, so Chavez cannot show that the government is incapable of proving that his specific conduct amounted to attempted federal bank robbery." Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kelly Gonzalez Aguilar was a transgender woman from Honduras. She came to the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal. In support, Kelly claimed she had been persecuted by family, feared further persecution from pervasive discrimination and violence against transgender women in Honduras, and would likely be tortured if she returned to Honduras. In denying asylum, an immigration judge found no pattern or practice of persecution. Kelly appealed the denial of each application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dismissal led Kelly to petition for judicial review to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which granted the petition. "On the asylum claim, any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find a pattern or practice of persecution against transgender women in Honduras." View "Gonzalez Aguilar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Gregory Heard sued Denver Police Officer Greg Dulayev and the City and County of Denver (“the City”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 (collectively, “defendants”). Heard claimed Dulayev used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment during an event that took place in June 2016. Heard further claimed this alleged constitutional violation was a foreseeable consequence of the City’s alleged failure to train, supervise, and discipline its employees, including Dulayev, with respect to the use of force. Dulayev and the City moved for summary judgment on Heard’s two claims. The district court denied defendants’ motion, and defendants appealed. Finding jurisdiction over part of Dulayev’s appeal, the Tenth Circuit denied in part Heard’s motion to dismiss. As to the substance of the appeal, the Court held Heard failed to show Dulayev’s use of the Taser violated a constitutional right clearly established at the time where Dulayev had ordered Heard to crawl, threatened to use his Taser, and repeatedly ordered Heard to stop, but where Heard still continued to approach Dulayev. The the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to Dulayev was reversed, and that issue was remanded with instructions to grant Dulayev qualified immunity and for entry of judgment in Dulayev’s favor. However, because the Court resolved the claim against Dulayev by finding that it was not clearly established that his conduct amounted to a constitutional violation, it declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the City’s appeal. View "Heard v. Dulayev, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant John Michael McIntosh pled guilty to five counts of robbery, plus three counts of brandishing a pistol during those five robberies. During the change-in-plea hearing held by the district court, however, McIntosh repeatedly expressed doubts about whether he should plead guilty and suggested that his mental capacity was impaired. After off-the-record discussions with the government, he finally went forward with the plea and the district court completed its plea colloquy. But two months after entering the plea, McIntosh moved to withdraw it, contending that the plea was neither knowing nor voluntary and therefore violated his constitutional due process rights. The district court denied the motion and accepted the plea agreement at sentencing. McIntosh appealed, arguing that the plea was constitutionally invalid, and in the alternative, that the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea was an abuse of discretion. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court failed to ensure the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, so it vacated McIntosh’s convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. (“Bimbo Bakeries”) owned, baked, and sold Grandma Sycamore’s Home-Maid Bread (“Grandma Sycamore’s”). Bimbo Bakeries alleged that United States Bakery (“U.S. Bakery”), a competitor, and Leland Sycamore (“Leland”), the baker who developed the Grandma Sycamore’s recipe, misappropriated its trade secret for making Grandma Sycamore’s. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bakery on a trade dress infringement claim. The parties went to trial on the other two claims, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Bimbo Bakeries on both. After the trial, the district court denied U.S. Bakery’s and Leland’s renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law on the trade secrets misappropriation and false advertising claims. The district court did, however, remit the jury’s damages award. All parties appealed. Bimbo Bakeries argued the district court should not have granted U.S. Bakery summary judgment on its trade dress infringement claim and should not have remitted damages for the false advertising claim. U.S. Bakery and Leland argued the district court should have granted their renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law, and Leland made additional arguments related to his personal liability. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings because the Court found all of Bimbo Bakeries’ claims failed as a matter of law. View "Bimbo Bakeries USA, et al. v. Sycamore, et al." on Justia Law

The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (“the Tribe”) temporarily banished Angelita Chegup, Tara Amboh, Mary Jenkins, and Lynda Kozlowicz (“the banished members”). The banished members did not challenge their temporary banishment in a tribal forum, but instead sought relief in federal court by filing a petition for habeas corpus. The banished members contended that, because they were excluded from the reservation by virtue of their banishment, they were “detained” within the meaning of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”). The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit without considering the Tribe’s alternative position: that the court could not consider the claims at all because the banished members failed to exhaust their tribal remedies. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with the district court: "Even though tribal exhaustion is non-jurisdictional, and courts may often choose between threshold grounds for denying relief, we think that under the unique circumstances of this case there was a right choice." Because the district court neither began its analysis with tribal exhaustion nor reached that issue in the alternative, the Tenth Circuit remanded for it to be decided in the first instance. View "Chegup, et al. v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah, et al." on Justia Law

Wayne Bowker died at the Carter County Jail on June 30, 2016, while awaiting trial for a drug possession charge. In the days and weeks preceding his death, Bowker did not receive several of his prescribed medications, experienced incontinence and catatonia, and was able to communicate with jail staff only by using strange repetitive phrases. Despite Bowker’s condition, jail officials failed to provide any medical attention in the nineteen days leading up to his death. His mother, Judy Prince, as the administrator of his estate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and other claims. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to jail nurse Kimberlee Miller in her individual capacity, and whether it properly granted summary judgment to the Sheriff of Carter County in his official capacity. The Court concluded a reasonable jury could determine Miller violated Bowker’s constitutional right by acting with deliberate indifference toward his psychosis, incontinence, and catatonia. In addition, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Carter County’s failure to medically train jail employees, adequately staff the jail, and provide timely medical attention caused Bowker’s death. The Court reversed district court’s grants of summary judgment. View "Prince v. Sheriff of Carter County, et al." on Justia Law