Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Tiffany Litzsinger worked for the Adams County Coroner’s Office from 2013 until she was terminated in 2018. During her time there, Litzsinger suffered from anxiety and depression, both of which worsened in the months leading up to her termination. After an anxiety episode, Adams County granted Litzsinger temporary leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). When Litzsinger returned from her FMLA leave, the Coroner placed Litzsinger on probation for myriad violations of workplace policies. Shortly after Litzsinger’s probation began, the Coroner terminated Litzsinger for violating the terms of her probation. Litzsinger sued the Coroner’s Office under the FMLA and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming the Coroner terminated her in retaliation for exercising her rights under both statutes. The district court granted summary judgment for the Coroner’s Office because Litzsinger failed to demonstrate that the Coroner’s reason for terminating her was pretextual. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding a rational jury could not find that the Coroner’s proffered reason for firing Litzsinger was pretextual. View "Litzsinger v. Adams County Coroner's Office" on Justia Law

A group of pet owners brought a class action against Champion Petfoods USA, Inc., alleging representations on Champion’s packaging on its Acana and Orijen brands of dog food were false and misleading. Champion’s dog food packaging contained a number of claims about the product, advertising the food as “Biologically Appropriate,” “Trusted Everywhere,” using “Fresh and Regional Ingredients,” and containing “Ingredients We Love [From] People We Trust.” The district court dismissed the claims as either unactionable puffery or overly subjective and therefore not materially misleading to a reasonable consumer. To this, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, finding Plaintiffs’ claims failed to allege materially false or misleading statements on Champion’s packaging because the phrases failed to deceive or mislead reasonable consumers on any material fact. View "Renfro, et al. v. Champion Petfoods USA, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from a claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits by Plaintiff-Appellant Melinda Eckard (insured) against her insurer, Defendant-Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). On summary judgment, the district court held that Eckard’s suit was time barred by Colorado Revised Statutes section13-80-107.5(1)(b). The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the district court granted summary judgment to State Farm because it incorrectly found as a matter of law that Eckard “received payment of the settlement” when her lawyer received the settlement agreement and check on October 11, 2019. As was explained, Eckard actually “received payment of the settlement” when she executed the settlement agreement and authorized the check on November 7, 2019. As a result, section 13-80-107.5(1)(b) did not bar Eckard’s UIM claim against State Farm. View "Eckard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile" on Justia Law

In July 2018, defendant Anthony Cordova was convicted by jury of two felonies associated with the murder of Shane Dix: (1) committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering activity (“VICAR murder”); and (2) in the course of that crime, causing the death of Dix through use or possession of a firearm. Cordova challenged the district court’s pretrial ruling denying his motion to exclude a mostly unintelligible one-minute recorded portion of a conversation with a cooperating witness. In addition, Cordova contended the district court abused its discretion in denying his two motions for a new trial: one alleging insufficiency of evidence and government misconduct, and the other alleging newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "United States v. Cordova" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Ahmad Ajaj, a practicing Muslim, was a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmate serving a 114-year sentence for terrorist acts connected with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ajaj sued to obtain injunctive relief against BOP and damages from BOP officials on several grounds, including violations of his rights to free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed his claims, and Ajaj appealed, contending the district court erred by holding: (1) his claim against the BOP for denial of his right to group prayer was moot; and (2) that RFRA did not provide a claim for damages against government officials in their individual capacities. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Ajaj and reversed the challenged rulings. The Court found the mootness ruling was based on a misconception of the evidence of Ajaj’s prison conditions. And the Supreme Court ruled in Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020), that damages claims were permissible under RFRA. The Court rejected Ajaj’s contention that the doctrine of qualified immunity was inapplicable to RFRA claims, but declined to resolve whether the individual defendants in this case showed entitlement to qualified immunity, leaving that matter to the district court in the first instance. View "Ajaj v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al." on Justia Law

In defendant-appellant Curtis Anthony’s case, the district court sentenced him to a custodial sentence shortly after trial but did not determine the restitution amount until several months later. When Anthony later filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging his conviction, the district court dismissed the motion as untimely. The court concluded Anthony’s one-year limitations period began to run when Anthony’s time to appeal the initial judgment expired even though restitution proceedings were pending on direct appeal. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a judgment of conviction is not final for section 2255 limitations purposes until the defendant’s sentence becomes final upon the conclusion of direct review. Anthony’s judgment of conviction had yet to become final because restitution was a component of his sentence and direct review of the restitution proceedings was still ongoing. Thus, the district court should not have dismissed Anthony’s section 2255 motion as untimely. View "United States v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Banner Bank (“Banner”) provided a multimillion-dollar loan to James and Loree Smith and their business entities. As collateral, James Smith pledged several properties. Banner later contracted to release Loree Smith from all actions associated with the loan. When the loan entered default, Banner named Loree in this diversity action to foreclose on the collateral, notwithstanding the release. Loree brought a successful breach of contract counterclaim and recovered attorneys’ fees through Utah’s bad-faith fee-shifting statute. Banner appealed, arguing that every prong of the bad-faith statute was not met and the fee award was unreasonable. Finding that the judgment was final, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals exercised jurisdiction, but did not reach any of Banner’s specific statutory arguments. The Court reversed the fee award because it found Section 78B-5-825 was a procedural attorneys’ fees statute, so it could not be used to recover fees when a federal court sat in diversity. View "Banner Bank v. Smith, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Darrell Black was a suspect in three robberies; two took place in Kansas, and one in Missouri. He was arrested in Missouri and indicted for robbery in both the Western District of Missouri and the District of Kansas. While in custody in Missouri, Black expressed a wish to plead guilty and asked the District of Kansas to transfer the charges to Missouri. Kansas granted Black’s request and transferred the indictment. On April 30, 2018, Black was arraigned in Missouri, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the Kansas charges. Black’s plea of not guilty triggered Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(c), which required the clerk of the transferee court to “return the papers to the court where the prosecution began” and the original court to “restore the proceeding to its docket.” On November 15, 2018, the Clerk for the Missouri court notified the Clerk for the Kansas court that the case was being transferred back for disposition. Black remained in custody in Missouri for sentencing on the Missouri charges. On December 18, 2018, Missouri accepted Black’s guilty plea on the Missouri charges, but sentencing didn’t take place until March 6, 2019. Sixteen days later, Black appeared in the District of Kansas. Black invoked the Speedy Trial Act, moving to dismiss the indictment on the Kansas robberies. The District of Kansas denied the motion, concluding that defendant’s appearance in the transferee district did not start the speedy-trial clock. To this the Tenth Circuit court of Appeals disagreed, finding that more than 70 non-excludable days passed between Black's first appearance in Missouri and his motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the district court to decide whether the charges should be dismissed with or without prejudice, considering the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances leading to dismissal, and the impact of reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and the administration of justice. View "United States v. Black" on Justia Law

The United States Supreme Court remanded these cases back to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioners Sitamipa Toki, Eric Kamahele, and Daniel Maumau filed motions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences stemming from a series of armed robberies. They made several arguments in their motions, including that their convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence were invalid because their predicate convictions were not “crime[s] of violence” as defined by the statute. The district court denied the section 2255 motions, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of its intervening decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817 (2021), which held that a crime that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) “elements” or “force” clause, section 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The parties agreed that, after Borden, offenses that could be committed recklessly were not “crime[s] of violence” under section 924(c)’s nearly identical elements clause, 924(c)(3)(A). As a result, the petitioners’ predicate assault convictions under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (“VICAR”) could not support their separate convictions under section 924(c). The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed in part the district court’s order denying petitioners’ section 2255 motions and remanded with instructions to vacate their section 924(c) convictions based on violations of VICAR. View "United States v. Toki" on Justia Law

This appeal grew out of a dispute over a program (“The Trial Lawyers College”) to train trial lawyers. The College’s board of directors splintered into two factions, known as the “Spence Group” and the “Sloan Group.” The two groups sued each other: The Spence Group sued in state court for dissolution of the College and a declaratory judgment recognizing the Spence Group’s control of the Board; the Sloan Group then sued in federal court, claiming trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Both groups sought relief in the federal case. The federal district court decided both requests in favor of the Sloan Group: The court denied the Spence Group’s request for a stay and granted the Sloan Group’s request for a preliminary injunction. The Spence Group appealed both rulings. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of a stay. After the Spence Group appealed the federal district court’s ruling, the state court resolved the dispute over Board control. So this part of the requested stay became moot. The remainder of the federal district court’s ruling on a stay did not constitute a reviewable final order. The Court determined it had jurisdiction to review the grant of a preliminary injunction. In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court found irreparable injury, restricting what the Spence Group could say about its own training program and ordering removal of sculptures bearing the College’s logo. The Spence Group challenged the finding of irreparable harm, the scope of the preliminary injunction, and the consideration of additional evidence after the evidentiary hearing. In the Tenth Circuit's view, the district court had the discretion to consider the new evidence and grant a preliminary injunction. "But the court went too far by requiring the Spence Group to remove the sculptures." View "Trial Lawyers College v. Gerry Spences Trial Lawyers, et al." on Justia Law