Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Metropolitan State University of Denver (MSU) student Rowan Thompson had a classroom dispute with her chemistry professor that ultimately prompted Thompson to drop the professor’s class. But when Thompson emailed her former classmates to express her displeasure with the professor and to suggest that her classmates leave “honest” end-of-term evaluations. Thomas Ragland, MSU’s Associate Director for Student Conduct, allegedly prohibited Thompson from further contacting the professor or even discussing the professor with any students taking any of the professor’s classes. Thompson sued Ragland under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that he violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Ragland had not violated clearly established law and therefore was entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed. "Because one can infer from the allegations in the complaint that there was no proper justification for Ragland’s actions, the complaint states a violation of clearly established law governing the regulation of student speech." View "Thompson v. Ragland" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Marvin Ellis was convicted by jury of, among other things, conspiring to manufacture, distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. Ellis was sentenced to a term of 303 months' imprisonment, to be followed by 13 years of supervised release. Ellis appealed the sentence, arguing: (1) district court misapplied the United States Sentencing Guidelines by failing to make particularized findings regarding the scope of his jointly undertaken criminal activity with his coconspirator Ataven Tatum; and (2) the evidence did not support a judicial finding that he agreed to participate in jointly undertaken criminal activity with Tatum, therefore the drug quantities associated with Tatum’s purchases of cocaine should not have been attributed to him for sentencing purposes. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Ellis' sentence. View "United States v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Debtors Julio Barrera and Maria de La Luz Moro filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code hoping to reorganize their assets and finances. Instead of selling most of their assets to obtain an immediate discharge of their debts, they opted to keep their assets, try a reorganization plan to repay creditors, and receive a discharge later. For some time they continued to meet the terms of their reorganization plan. But they changed their minds following the sale of their home, which had appreciated in value significantly since they filed for bankruptcy. Barrera and Moro converted their Chapter 13 bankruptcy to a liquidation of their estate under Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 trustee (Trustee) claimed a right to a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the home, including the appreciation that occurred after their Chapter 13 petition was filed. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' review centered on who was entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the home. Specifically, did the sale proceeds from the real property of the estate belong to the Chapter 7 estate or to the debtors? The Court concluded that under 11 U.S.C. 348(f)(1)(A), the sale proceeds from the home belonged to the debtors. View "Rodriguez v. Barrera, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Monty Englehart pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) and was sentenced to time served and five years of supervised release. The conditions of his supervised release prohibited him from viewing sexually explicit materials. Englehart violated the conditions of his supervised release on three occasions by viewing legal, adult pornography. After a hearing, the district court amended the sexual material restriction and added additional conditions to Englehart’s supervised release, including: (1) psychosexual evaluation and treatment; and (2) mental health treatment. Englehart appealed, arguing the district court failed to make particularized findings of compelling circumstances to justify the revised Sexual Material Prohibition and failed to give even a generalized statement of reasons to justify the Mental Health Condition. The Tenth Circuit agreed, vacated those conditions, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Court affirmed affirm the Psychosexual Evaluation and Treatment Condition because the district court provided an adequate generalized statement of reasons and did not improperly delegate sentencing authority to Englehart’s probation officer. View "United States v. Englehart" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Curtis Anthony was convicted of child-sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit child-sex trafficking. He was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay restitution to R.W. and M.M. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal recognized that Anthony’s conduct was reprehensible, but vacated the restitution order as to R.W. because the district court failed to apply but-for causation to determine restitution as required by 18 U.S.C. 1593. In doing so, the Court rejected the Government’s argument that the statute permitted restitution based on a sufficient-causation theory. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to recalculate restitution based on actual losses resulting directly from Anthony’s offenses. On remand, the Government sought restitution under the sufficient-causation theory previously rejected. The district court denied the Government’s request for Anthony to pay $1,143,000 in restitution to R.W., finding that the Government’s expert report failed to determine which losses compensable by restitution she would not have suffered but for Anthony’s conduct. The Government appealed. Although the parties agreed that R.W. suffered trauma from Anthony and was thus potentially entitled to restitution from him, under the prior decision, Anthony I, the Government had to show he was the but-for cause of the loss that a restitution award would compensate. "And although this showing should be attainable in many instances and likely could have been made here, the Government failed to make it on remand." Accordingly, the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Municipal authorities in Oklahoma fined Plaintiff BNSF Railway Company for violating its Blocked Crossing Statute—setting up a preemption challenge between the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) and the Blocked Crossing Statute. Defendants argued the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), not the ICCTA, applied to Oklahoma’s statute and did not preempt it. The district court held that the ICCTA preempted Oklahoma’s Blocked Crossing Statute because it regulated railroad operations. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the federal district court and affirmed its decision. View "BNSF Railway v. City of Edmond, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Victor Sanchez entered a blind plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court varied downward from Defendant’s advisory guideline range of 110 to 120 months and sentenced him to 96 months in prison. Defendant challenged the district court’s calculation of his base offense level for the purpose of determining his advisory guideline range, particularly the court’s decision to increase his base offense level by four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2018). On appeal, Defendant renewed his objection to the district court’s four-level increase. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that "All § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) requires under our precedents is that Defendant’s possession of the firearm had the potential to facilitate his possession of the stolen vehicle. The district court was well within its authority to find it did." View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Nkemchap Nelvis Takwi sought review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from a removal order entered by an Immigration Judge (IJ) and denying his motion to remand. Mr. Takwi was a 36-year-old native and citizen of Cameroon. In August 2019, he came to the United States without authorization and claimed he would be persecuted if returned to Cameroon. An asylum officer conducted an interview and found Mr. Takwi had a “credible fear of persecution.” Shortly thereafter, the government charged Mr. Takwi as “subject to removal” because he was a noncitizen who attempted to enter the United States without valid entry documents. The Tenth Circuit granted the petition and remanded this matter to the BIA because the IJ did not make an explicit adverse credibility determination, and the BIA did not afford Mr. Takwi the required rebuttable presumption of credibility. View "Takwi v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Camille Sturdivant sued her former coach on a high school dance team, Carley Fine, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, and alleging race discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Fine moved for summary judgment, urging qualified immunity based on the absence of: (1) an act under color of state law; and (2) a denial of equal protection. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a reasonable factfinder could infer that Fine had acted as head coach and “intentionally deprived [Camille] of educational benefits based on [her] race.” Fine appealed, presenting two alternative arguments for qualified immunity: (1) She did not act under color of state law because she was no longer employed as the head coach when she allegedly violated Camille’s rights; and (2) She did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider Fines first argument; the Court's jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal did not extend to the applicability of section 1983. Thus, this portion of the appeal was dismissed. The Court did have jurisdiction on Fine's section argument, and found that a reasonable factfinder could find the violation of a clearly established right to equal protection. So the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "Sturdivant v. Fine, et al." on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury found Johnny Warren guilty of trafficking crack cocaine and unlawfully possessing a firearm. The court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 which prospectively ameliorated excessive sentences for crack cocaine offenses. With the passage of the First Step Act in 2018, Congress made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive to the extent it granted judges the discretion to impose reduced sentences for crack cocaine offenders who were sentenced before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act. In 2019, Warren moved for a reduced sentence; Warren’s original sentence included a downward variance from the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines range. He therefore asked for the same percentage variance from the Guidelines range that would have been generated had the Fair Sentencing Act applied to his original sentencing. The district court denied Warren’s motion. Seven months later, Warren moved for reconsideration. Although the motion was untimely, the Government agreed to waive any procedural or timeliness bars. In his motion, Warren primarily argued he had been improperly designated a career offender by the sentencing court, which resulted in an inappropriately inflated Guidelines range. Warren also presented other arguments, including that the COVID-19 pandemic should be considered as part of the sentencing factors. The district court denied Warren’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Warren challenged only the district court’s denial of his motion to reconsider, arguing the district court erred: (1) in applying the legal standard for reconsideration despite the Government’s waiver; (2) in holding he could have raised COVID-19 in his initial motion for sentence reduction; and (3) by failing to make an alternative holding anchored in the proper Guidelines calculation. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Warren" on Justia Law