Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mark Lantis set off on a day hike in Yellowstone National Park to search for buried treasure. He would get lost in the wilderness and was rescued by helicopter late the next day. Based on these events, a magistrate judge found Lantis guilty of a misdemeanor: reckless disorderly conduct under 36 C.F.R. 2.34(a)(4). Lantis appealed, arguing that the magistrate judge applied an objective standard for reckless conduct, without also assuring that the subjective component of recklessness was met. To this, the Tenth Circuit disagreed: "the magistrate judge did not apply only an objective standard; he simply relied on circumstantial evidence of Lantis’s state of mind and the obviousness of the risk to conclude that Lantis behaved recklessly by consciously disregarding a risk that he was aware of. Accordingly, we affirm." View "United States v. Lantis" on Justia Law

The United States and four states sued DISH Network, LLC (“DISH”) for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). DISH submitted a claim for defense and indemnity to its insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“National Union”). National Union denied the claim and filed suit in Colorado federal court seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify DISH in the underlying TCPA lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment to National Union, relying on the Tenth Circuit's decision in ACE American Insurance Co. v. DISH Network, LLC, 883 F.3d 881 (10th Cir. 2018). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. Further, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of DISH’s request for further discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). And we deny DISH’s motion to certify a question of state law to the Colorado Supreme Court. View "National Union Fire Insurance v. Dish Network" on Justia Law

This case arose from the fatal shooting of Logan Simpson by Jon Little, a patrol officer for the City of Bixby, Oklahoma. Tiffany Simpson, Logan Simpson’s mother and personal representative of his estate, sued Officer Little in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for excessive force in violation of Simpson’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Officer Little moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion. Officer Little appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding: (1) the Court lacked interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s conclusion that a jury could find a constitutional violation because Officer Little challenged the factual basis for the court’s determination; (2) the Court also lacked jurisdiction to consider some of Officer Little’s arguments regarding clearly established law; and (3) the Court found his remaining arguments lack merit. View "Simpson v. Little, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from the tragic death of Dillon Taylor, who was shot and killed by Salt Lake City Police Officer Bron Cruz. Officer Cruz and two fellow officers were following up on a 9-1-1 call reporting that a man had flashed a gun. The caller described the man and noted that he was accompanied by another male whom the caller also described. The officers attempted to stop Taylor and two male companions because two of the three men matched the caller’s descriptions. While Taylor’s companions immediately complied with the responding officers’ commands to stop and show their hands, Taylor did not. Instead, he made a 180-turn and walked away. Firearms in hand, but not pointed at Taylor, Officer Cruz and another responding officer followed Taylor. At some point, Taylor turned to face Officer Cruz, continuing to walk backwards with his hands in his waistband, "appeared to be digging there, as if Mr. Taylor was manipulating something." Then, without any verbal warning, Taylor quickly lifted his shirt with his left hand - exposing his lower torso -and virtually simultaneously withdrew his right hand from his waistband. The motion took less than one second and was consistent with the drawing of a gun. Reacting to Taylor’s rapid movement, Officer Cruz shot Taylor twice—firing in quick succession. Taylor died at the scene. When he was searched, Taylor was unarmed; in particular, he did not have a gun. Taylor’s estate and family members (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting claims against Salt Lake City and Officer Cruz (and others). The question this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether Officer Cruz’s decision to shoot Taylor was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. Concluding that it was, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Estate of Dillon Taylor, et al. v. Salt Lake City, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nicholas Roberts appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants James Winder, Rosie Rivera (solely in her official capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff), and the Unified Police Department of Greater Salt Lake (“UPD”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on Roberts’ 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims. All of his claims arose from his removal as Range Master-Firearms Instructor (“Range Master”). On March 1, 2017, at Winder’s request, Undersheriff Scott Carver and Chief Deputy Shane Hudson met with Roberts and informed him that the Range Master position was being eliminated. Hudson told Roberts he would be reassigned to patrol duties and his pay would be reduced. On March 9, Roberts, through counsel, sent a letter to Winder objecting to his removal, reassignment, and pay reduction. Winder treated Roberts’ letter as a grievance and rejected the grievance, explaining that the Range Master was subject to transfer under Merit Commission Policy 3140, Range Master was a specialist position, and Roberts’ merit rank was “sergeant.” The UPD Board later ratified Winder’s decision to remove Roberts as Range Master and reassign him to patrol duties as a sergeant. Winder later assigned Todd Griffiths, a merit rank Lieutenant four years younger than Roberts, to oversee the shooting range. Roberts did not appeal his grievance, and instead filed this complaint in the district court. In June 2017, after Roberts initiated this lawsuit, the UPD conducted two investigations of Roberts’ management of the Range. Both investigations described failures in Roberts’ performance as Range Master. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Defendants on Roberts’ declaratory judgment and due process claims, finding that Roberts did not have a property interest in his position as Range Master, and thus his reassignment did not violate due process. Alternatively, the district court held that Roberts waived his due process claims by failing to appeal Winder’s decision to the Merit Commission. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Roberts v. Winder, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant John Tompkins worked as a physician at the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for thirty years. From 2012 through 2016, he served as Chief of Surgery. In 2017, he was terminated from his position as a physician based on administrative deficiencies during his tenure as Chief of Surgery. After exhausting the VA’s administrative remedies, Tompkins filed suit claiming entitlement to: (1) review under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”); and (2) relief under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Tompkins appealed a district court order dismissing his complaint without prejudice based on his failure to identify an applicable waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no error in the district court's dismissal of Tompkins' complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and affirmed. View "Tompkins v. DOVA, et al." on Justia Law

Jenifer Miladis Alvarado-Diaz and Magdaly Suleydy Perez-Velasquez appealed the district court’s affirmance of their convictions for entering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1). Alvarado and Perez crossed the U.S.-Mexico border into New Mexico by walking around a fence, miles away from the nearest designated port of entry. Alvarado was stopped by a border patrol agent after she made it about 180 yards past the border, and a border patrol agent saw Perez just as she walked into the country. Each was detained. Alvarado and Perez admitted to the agents that they were nationals of El Salvador and Guatemala, respectively, and had no authorization to enter the country. They contended “enter” was a term of art that required more than a physical intrusion; it also required “freedom from official restraint” and “inspection or intentional evasion of inspection.” The district court affirmed the convictions because, even assuming freedom from official restraint was required for an “entry,” the Defendants were not under official restraint. The defendants argued they were under official restraint because they had been continuously surveilled, but the court noted that continuous surveillance alone did not equate to restraint. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendants reiterated arguments made at the district court. The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Perez-Velasquez" on Justia Law

The estate of a mentally ill and intellectually disabled prisoner who committed suicide while in Utah Department of Corrections (“UDC”) custody appealed the dismissal of its lawsuit against the UDC. Brock Tucker was seventeen when he was imprisoned at the Central Utah Correctional Facility (“CUCF”). At CUCF, Tucker endured long periods of punitive isolation. CUCF officials rarely let him out of his cell, and he was often denied recreation, exercise equipment, media, commissary, visitation, and library privileges. Tucker hanged himself approximately two years after his arrival at CUCF. Plaintiff-appellant Janet Crane was Tucker’s grandmother and the administrator of his estate. She sued on his estate’s behalf: (1) making Eighth Amendment claims against four prison officials (the “CUCF Defendants”); (2) making statutory claims for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act against UDC; and (3) making a claim under the Unnecessary Rigor Clause of the Utah Constitution against both the CUCF Defendants and UDC. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, holding the CUCF Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal constitutional claims and the federal statutory claims did not survive Tucker’s death. As a result, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Crane v. Utah Department of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Patrick LaJuan Jones, Jr. contended the Sentencing Commission did not intend to include state convictions based on a controlled substance not identified in the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) to serve as predicate offenses when determining a defendant’s base-offense level under U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(a)(4). Notwithstanding Application Note 1 of section 2K2.1(a)(4) directing to section 4B1.2(b), where the Guidelines defined “controlled substance offense,” Defendant claimed the Sentencing Commission intended to only include those controlled substances identified in the CSA. Based on a plain reading of section 4B1.2(b), the district court determined that the Sentencing Commission did not limit “controlled substance” to mean only substances identified in the CSA. Finding no error in that interpretation, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant Malachi Bruley appealed the district court’s order revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to 48 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. In 2014, Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, which carried a statutory maximum sentence of 60 months and a lifetime of supervised release. He also pleaded guilty to one count of being a drug user in possession of a firearm, which was punishable by up to 120 months' imprisonment and three years of supervise release. The district court sentenced Defendant to 42 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. In addition, the district court imposed three years of supervised release on each count, to run concurrently. Since his release from prison, Defendant’s supervised release has been revoked twice. On the first revocation, the district court sentenced Defendant to 10 months’ imprisonment on both counts, to run concurrently. The district court also imposed 18 months of supervised release on both counts, to run concurrently. On the second revocation, the one at issue on appeal here, the district court sentenced Defendant to 48 months’ imprisonment: 24 months on each count, to run consecutively. The district court also imposed two years of supervised release but did not specify to which count it applied. Prior to the revocation proceedings, the U.S. Probation Office proposed a set of special conditions for the court to impose as part of Defendant’s supervised release. These included a search condition and substance abuse treatment condition - both of which were imposed during Defendant’s two previous terms of supervised release. At the hearing, the district court announced two of the four special conditions recommended by the Probation Office, but did not announce the search condition or substance abuse treatment condition. Following the hearing, the district court issued a written judgment which imposed the unannounced search condition and substance abuse treatment condition. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "United States v. Bruley" on Justia Law