Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A family from Mexico fled their home after a criminal cartel murdered one of their members and issued repeated threats demanding that the family abandon their land and leave the area. The threats continued even after the family relocated within Mexico, ultimately leading them to enter the United States without valid documents. The family sought asylum and withholding of removal, arguing that they were persecuted because of their membership in a particular social group—namely, their family.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the family members credible but denied their applications, concluding that the asserted social groups were not cognizable and that, even if they were, the evidence did not show that family membership was a central reason for the persecution. The IJ found that the cartel’s primary motive was to control the land, not to target the family because of their familial ties. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal, upholding the IJ’s finding that there was no sufficient nexus between the persecution and the protected ground of family membership. The BIA stated that if a persecutor targets a family as a means to achieve an unrelated goal, family membership is only incidental or subordinate and not a central reason for the harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed only the BIA’s decision. The court held that the BIA applied an erroneous legal standard for determining whether family membership was “at least one central reason” for the persecution, as required by the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Tenth Circuit found that the BIA’s categorical rule improperly excluded mixed-motive claims where both protected and unprotected grounds may be central reasons for persecution. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "O.C.V. v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Three former members of a religious organization alleged that the organization intentionally misrepresented its history and the use of member tithing payments. They claimed that, had they known the true facts, they would not have joined or contributed financially. The plaintiffs asserted two main theories under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): first, that the organization’s leaders made fraudulent statements about the group’s history and beliefs that they did not sincerely hold; and second, that the organization misrepresented how tithing funds would be used, including using them for commercial purposes contrary to representations.The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially dismissed the complaint, finding that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses and the church autonomy doctrine barred adjudication of claims requiring inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. After amendments to the complaint, the district court allowed a RICO claim based on the tithing theory to proceed, viewing it as a secular dispute. However, after further amendments and additional plaintiffs, the district court ultimately dismissed all claims, holding that the church autonomy doctrine barred claims based on religious misrepresentations and that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead reliance or a pattern of predicate acts for the tithing-based RICO claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that the church autonomy doctrine bars civil RICO claims premised on alleged misrepresentations about religious history or doctrine, as such claims would require courts to adjudicate ecclesiastical questions. Regarding the tithing theory, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege a causal link between the organization’s statements about tithing and their own financial contributions, as required for a civil RICO claim. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "Gaddy v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus" on Justia Law

A man was accused of picking up a woman in El Paso, Texas, under the pretense of giving her a ride, then driving her across state lines to his home in Anthony, New Mexico, where he violently sexually assaulted her. The woman testified that she was handcuffed, physically assaulted, and raped multiple times before escaping at a stoplight in El Paso and seeking help. The defendant’s adopted daughter also testified that he had sexually assaulted her repeatedly when she was a minor and again as an adult.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico indicted the defendant for kidnapping and transporting an individual across state lines with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity. At trial, the defendant argued that the encounter with the woman was consensual and related to commercial sex, and he sought to introduce evidence of her prior prostitution to support his consent defense. The district court excluded this evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, finding it irrelevant to consent. The court also allowed the adopted daughter’s testimony under Rule 413, concluding that her allegations of prior sexual assault by the defendant were admissible and not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The court held that excluding evidence of the victim’s prior prostitution did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights, as such evidence is not probative of consent under established precedent. The court also affirmed the admission of the adopted daughter’s testimony, holding that Rule 413 applies based on the conduct underlying the charges, not the statutory elements, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403. The court further found that the defendant had waived arguments regarding limitations on cross-examination of the adopted daughter. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Clay" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of bank fraud and bank robbery. The key facts involve two separate crimes: first, a violent home invasion in which the defendant’s father-in-law was severely beaten and forced to write a $23,000 check, which the defendant later cashed; and second, a bank robbery in which the defendant threatened a teller with death, claiming cartel affiliation, and used a handwritten note. Law enforcement found a note resembling the robbery note during a search of a car registered to the defendant’s wife, which became a central issue in the case.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico heard the case. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, arguing that his wife lacked authority to consent to the search. The district court found that the wife had actual authority over the car and denied the motion. After conviction, the district court imposed a 312-month sentence, a significant upward variance from the guideline range of 46 to 57 months, citing the brutality of the crimes and the defendant’s history of dishonesty. The defendant appealed, challenging both the search and the reasonableness of the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the wife had actual authority to consent to the car search, making the search constitutional. The court also found that the district court had properly considered the statutory sentencing factors, including the avoidance of unwarranted disparities, and that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings and the sentence. View "United States v. Candelaria" on Justia Law

Jeffery Krueger died following a traffic stop in Oklahoma initiated by Wagoner County Sheriff’s Office deputies. The stop began when deputies suspected Mr. Krueger of minor traffic violations and possible intoxication. After Mr. Krueger stopped his car in a turn lane, deputies forcibly removed him from his vehicle, allegedly pulling him by his hair, slamming his head on the pavement, and repeatedly using tasers as they attempted to handcuff him. Additional law enforcement officers arrived and, according to the plaintiffs, either participated directly or failed to intervene as Mr. Krueger, now handcuffed and prone, was further restrained with leg shackles and a hobble tie. Mr. Krueger stopped breathing at the scene and was later pronounced dead at a hospital.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma reviewed the case after the plaintiffs, Mr. Krueger’s parents and estate representatives, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants, including deputies and police officers, moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment for most defendants, finding that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there were sufficient grounds to show clearly established constitutional violations. The court found material disputes regarding the amount and duration of force used, including the number of taser applications and the nature of the prone restraint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find the defendants used excessive force both in the initial removal and restraint of Mr. Krueger and in the prolonged prone restraint after he was subdued. The court also held that the failure to intervene in the use of excessive force was clearly established as a constitutional violation. The district court’s orders denying summary judgment were affirmed. View "Krueger v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Liberty Global, a U.S. corporation, sold its controlling interest in a Japanese company for approximately $3.9 billion, realizing a gain of $3.2 billion. On its 2010 tax return, Liberty Global characterized $438 million of the gain as a foreign-source dividend and $2.8 billion as foreign-source capital gain. Of the capital gain, $474 million was re-sourced to the United States to recapture prior overall foreign losses, while the remaining $2.3 billion was treated as foreign-source capital gain, making Liberty Global eligible for a $240 million foreign tax credit.The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, asserting that the $2.3 billion in excess of the overall foreign loss account was U.S.-sourced, not foreign-sourced, and therefore Liberty Global was not entitled to the claimed tax credit. Liberty Global challenged this determination in the United States Tax Court, which reviewed the case on a stipulated record. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, holding that only the portion of gain equal to the overall foreign loss balance could be treated as foreign-sourced under Internal Revenue Code § 904(f)(3), and the excess gain was U.S.-sourced.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s decision de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that under the plain language of the Tax Code, specifically § 904(f)(3)(A)(i), only the lesser of the gain from the sale or the remaining overall foreign loss balance is treated as foreign-sourced income. The excess gain above the overall foreign loss balance is U.S.-sourced under § 865(a). The court rejected Liberty Global’s arguments based on statutory interpretation and Treasury regulations, affirming the Tax Court’s judgment and denying Liberty Global’s claim to the $240 million foreign tax credit. View "Liberty Global v. CIR" on Justia Law

A government agency responsible for marketing hydroelectric power operated a warehouse in Colorado, where an employee, Jared Newman, orchestrated a fraudulent procurement scheme from 2014 to 2017. Newman arranged for the agency to purchase supplies from vendors owned by friends and family, including the defendant, who owned two such companies. The vendors submitted invoices for goods that were never delivered, received payments from the agency, and then funneled most of the money back to Newman, keeping a portion as a commission. The defendant received nearly $180,000 through 59 fraudulent payments, writing checks back to Newman and taking steps to conceal the scheme.A grand jury indicted the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on six counts of wire fraud, each corresponding to a specific transfer, and sought forfeiture of all proceeds. At trial, the government introduced evidence of a co-participant’s guilty plea and the district court instructed the jury that it could infer the defendant’s knowledge of the fraud if he was deliberately ignorant. The defendant was convicted on all counts. The district court limited forfeiture to the six charged transfers, totaling about $20,000, but ordered restitution for the full amount received, for which the defendant and Newman were jointly and severally liable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the co-participant’s guilty plea, as it was used to assess credibility and not as substantive evidence of guilt, and the jury was properly instructed on its limited use. The court also held that, because there was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s actual knowledge, any error in the deliberate ignorance instruction did not warrant reversal. On the government’s cross-appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that forfeiture should include all proceeds obtained through the fraudulent scheme, not just the charged transactions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Cline" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the defendant’s residence in Kansas as part of an investigation into stolen construction equipment. During the search, officers discovered methamphetamine, heroin, forty-four firearms (including two machine guns), and ammunition. The defendant was arrested at the scene, and after waiving his Miranda rights, admitted to being a daily user of heroin.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas indicted the defendant on two counts: possession of a machine gun and possession of a firearm as an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance, specifically heroin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The defendant moved to dismiss the firearm charge, arguing that while possession of heroin is illegal, neither federal nor Kansas law explicitly criminalizes the use of heroin, and therefore he could not be considered an “unlawful user” under the statute. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that use of a controlled substance necessarily involves possession, which is unlawful for heroin. The defendant then pleaded guilty to both counts, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation of “unlawful user” de novo. The court held that the term “unlawful user” in § 922(g)(3) includes individuals who regularly use a controlled substance that has no lawful use, such as heroin, because use necessarily entails unlawful possession. The court rejected the argument that the absence of a specific prohibition on use precludes conviction, finding that the illegality of possession suffices. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and the defendant’s conviction under § 922(g)(3). View "United States v. Davey" on Justia Law

The debtor in this case voluntarily filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed his anticipated 2021 federal and state income tax refunds as assets, asserting that they were fully exempt from the bankruptcy estate under Colorado law. The debtor and his spouse, who did not join the bankruptcy petition, filed joint tax returns. The returns showed a federal refund of $1,455 and a state refund of $554, with the federal refund paid to the bankruptcy trustee and the state refund paid to the debtor. The parties stipulated that the debtor would file his tax returns and turn over any refunds to the trustee, who would return any exempt portion to the debtor.After receiving the refunds, the trustee moved to compel turnover of the non-exempt portion of the federal tax refund, arguing that only a portion of the refund was exempt and that a pro-rata calculation should be used to determine the exempt amount. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado denied the trustee’s motion, concluding that the entire federal refund was exempt because it was caused by a refundable child tax credit. The trustee appealed, and the United States District Court for the District of Colorado affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that, under Colorado law, the phrase “attributed to” in the relevant exemption statute means “caused by,” and that the full amount of a federal income tax refund is exempt if it would not have occurred but for the refundable child tax credit. The court rejected the trustee’s argument for a pro-rata method and emphasized that Colorado law requires liberal construction of exemption statutes in favor of debtors. View "In re: Garcia-Morales" on Justia Law

In 2024, New Mexico enacted a law requiring a mandatory seven-day waiting period for nearly all consumer firearm purchases, regardless of the buyer’s circumstances or urgency. The law applies even to individuals who have already passed background checks or possess security clearances, and it does not allow for waivers based on personal danger. Exemptions exist for certain categories, such as law enforcement, concealed carry permit holders, and immediate family transfers, but the law broadly prohibits the transfer of firearms before the waiting period ends, with violations constituting misdemeanors.After the law took effect, two individuals, both of whom promptly passed background checks when attempting to purchase firearms, were forced to wait the full seven days solely due to the new statute. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the law on Second and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The district court denied their request for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that the right to keep and bear arms did not encompass the right to acquire arms, that waiting periods were longstanding and presumptively constitutional, and that the law fit within historical traditions of firearm regulation. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not meet the other requirements for injunctive relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Tenth Circuit held that the waiting period burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment, as the right to keep and bear arms necessarily includes the right to acquire them. The court found that such cooling-off periods are not supported by historical tradition or longstanding regulatory exceptions and that the law imposes an unconstitutional burden. The court concluded that the plaintiffs met all requirements for a preliminary injunction and directed the district court to enter injunctive relief consistent with its opinion. View "Ortega v. Grisham" on Justia Law