Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Neil Hall appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (Allstate) on his claim for underinsured motorist benefits. Hall challenged the district court’s determination that Allstate successfully asserted the affirmative defense of failure to cooperate, and that his bad faith claim also failed as a result. Hall was injured in a car accident caused by underinsured motorist Teri Johnson. Johnson only carried $25,000 in liability insurance coverage. Hall carried underinsured motorist coverage through Allstate. Allstate gave Hall permission to settle with Johnson for her $25,000 limit. Hall’s counsel submitted a request for benefits to Allstate asserting that he was entitled to more than the $25,000 he had received. An Allstate claims adjuster reviewed the medical expenses in the letter and determined that the reasonable amount of expenses was $25,011.68. Allstate sent Hall’s counsel a payment of $11.68 along with a letter that stated: “I will be in contact with you to resolve the remaining components of your client’s claim.” Counsel did not respond to any of the five attempts over three months: two voicemails and three letters. Without any prior notice to Allstate, Hall filed suit against Allstate for breach of contract, statutory unreasonable delay or denial of payment of benefits, and common law bad faith. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that because the district court found the insured's failure to cooperate resulted in a material and substantial disadvantage to the insurer, the insurer properly denied coverage on this ground, and summary judgment was proper as to the insured's bad faith claim. View "Hall v. Allstate Fire" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jesus Francisco Fernandez was convicted by jury of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The methamphetamine was discovered during a search at the Albuquerque Greyhound bus terminal of luggage on a bus on which Fernandez was a passenger. On appeal, Fernandez argued: (1) his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence that the luggage was his; (2) the search of the luggage by law-enforcement officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights; and (3) he was denied due process by Greyhound’s failure to record or preserve terminal surveillance video, allegedly as the agent of law-enforcement officers. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Fernandez's conviction. View "United States v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant Angelita Benally was responsible for a head-on car crash that resulted in the death of her front seat passenger and severely injured the other driver. Benally was indicted on one count of involuntary manslaughter in Indian Country and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Benally and the government entered into a written plea agreement, under the terms of which, Benally pleaded guilty to the involuntary manslaughter charge and the government dismissed the assault charge. The agreement also provided that the district court would order restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). The district court sentenced Benally to a term of imprisonment of thirty months, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the district court ordered Benally to pay restitution pursuant to the MVRA to the deceased passenger’s family and to the other driver. Benally appealed the district court’s restitution order, arguing initially that the district court lacked authority under the MVRA to order her to pay restitution to the other driver because he was not a victim of the involuntary manslaughter offense. After the parties filed their appellate briefs, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). Benally argued that in light of Borden, the district court lacked authority to order restitution “under the MVRA at all,” and instead “may only grant restitution in its discretion under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA). The Tenth Circuit found Benally failed to establish her entitlement to plain-error relief, and accordingly affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Benally" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant-appellant Jamshid Muhtorov on three counts of conspiring and providing material support to the Islamic Jihad Union (“IJU”), a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization with ties to al-Qaeda. On appeal, he argued the foreign intelligence surveillance methods the government used to collect his communications were unconstitutional. He also questioned the district court’s refusal to disclose the classified materials the government used to secure approvals for the surveillance, the types of surveillance techniques used, and the evidence derived therefrom. Finally, defendant claimed his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated. After careful consideration, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Muhtorov" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Bakhtiyor Jumaev and his co-defendant Jamshid Muhtorov were convicted, after separate trials, of conspiring to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization (the Islamic Jihad Union, “IJU”), and knowingly providing or attempting to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. Both appealed, and, with the parties’ consent, the Tenth Circuit procedurally consolidated the cases. In an opinion issued concurrently with this one, the Court rejected Muhtorov’s claims, including his Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, and affirmed his convictions. In this decision, the Court addressed Jumaev’s claims: (1) his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated; (2) the district court abused its discretion by declining to severely sanction the government for its discovery conduct; and (3) the extraterritorial search warrants for his home, phone, and computer were issued in violation of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit concluded that each of Jumaev’s claims failed, therefore affirming judgment. View "United States v. Jumaev" on Justia Law

Petitioner Gabriel Villegas-Castro was a Mexican citizen who entered the United States without being admitted or paroled. The government sought removal, and Villegas-Castro requested asylum, cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals ordered removal, rejecting all of Villegas-Castro’s requests. In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed three issues involving: (1) the scope of the immigration judge’s authority when the Board orders a remand; (2) the Board’s failure to apply the clear-error standard to the immigration judge’s factual findings; and (3) the immigration judge’s discretion to reconsider eligibility for withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The Court found: the immigration judge properly considered petitioner's second application for asylum but the Board's reasoning did not support its denial of asylum; and the Board erred in failing to apply the clear-error standard. With regard to the Convention Against Torture, the Court found the immigration judge abated consideration of these applications, but the Board sua sponte rejected the applications, concluding that Villegas-Castro couldn’t obtain relief because the immigration judge had earlier deemed Villegas-Castro ineligible for withholding of removal under federal law and the Convention Against Torture. The Tenth Circuit found the immigration judge had discretion to revisit these conclusions. "Until the immigration judge entered a final decision on removal, the Board had no basis to sua sponte deny withholding of removal or deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture." The Court granted the petition for judicial review, and remanded the matter for the Board to reconsider Villegas-Castro’s application for asylum, to apply the clear-error standard to the immigration judge’s credibility findings, and to reconsider the applications for withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. View "Villegas-Castro v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edgar Tarango-Delgado appealed the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his two motions to reopen his removal proceedings. Tarango-Delgado, a Mexican citizen, came to the United States in 1977, when he was seven months old. He became a lawful permanent resident at age ten. And for almost four decades, he lived in the U.S. with his parents, siblings, wife, and children. In 2015, state police arrested Tarango-Delgado and charged him with aggravated animal cruelty, a felony. He pleaded guilty to that charge. But, before entering his plea, his counsel failed to advise him that pleading guilty would have deportation consequences because aggravated animal cruelty was a crime of moral turpitude. A few months after he pleaded guilty, the government commenced removal proceedings. Tarango-Delgado moved for post-conviction relief in state court, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. This was ultimately denied, and Tarango-Delgado was removed in 2017. Almost a year after his removal, a Colorado state court ruled on Tarango-Delgado’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel motion, concluding that Tarango-Delgado had not “knowingly and voluntarily” pleaded guilty to the aggravated-animal-cruelty charge, and vacated his conviction and reinstated the original aggravated-animal-cruelty charge. In January 2019, Tarango-Delgado filed his first motion to reopen his immigration proceedings before an IJ. The IJ denied Tarango-Delgado’s motion to reopen. In late February or early March 2019, a few days after the IJ denied Tarango-Delgado’s first motion to reopen, he reentered this country without authorization. And a few weeks later, after the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) learned about the illegal reentry, it reinstated Tarango-Delgado’s prior removal order. Tarango-Delgado applied for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). An asylum officer found that Tarango-Delgado credibly feared returning to Mexico and referred his petition to an IJ. But the IJ denied his petition for CAT relief. The BIA affirmed. Tarango-Delgado pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor animal-cruelty charge, which by definition would no longer qualify as a crime of moral turpitude. Tarango-Delgado then filed a second motion to reopen his immigration proceedings. The government raised a new argument: Tarango-Delgado's motion could not be considered because he had illegally reentered the U.S. after being removed. Tarango-Delgado appeals the BIA’s denial of his two motions to reopen. Because the Tenth Circuit concluded that 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) barred the reopening of his removal proceedings, the BIA’s denials were affirmed. View "Tarango-Delgado v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Viktorya Reznik appealed the district court’s dismissal of her Title VII retaliation action against her former employer, Defendant-Appellee inContact, Inc. (inContact). From January 2018 to May 2019, Reznik worked as a Director of Project Management for inContact, a Utah-based corporation offering cloud-based services to companies using call centers. In April 2019, Reznik received internal complaints about racial slurs in the workplace from two native Filipino employees who worked in the company’s Manila, Philippines office. They claimed that an inContact manager, Scott Mendenhall, had repeatedly subjected them and other native Filipino employees to racial slurs, calling them “monkeys” and “not human.” Mendenhall worked in the same Salt Lake County facility as Reznik. Weeks after Reznik reported the harassment to company management, she was terminated as "not a good culture fit" and "not a good fit." Following Reznik’s termination and administrative exhaustion, she filed her Title VII complaint in federal district court. inContact moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. According to the district court, Reznik failed to state a claim because she did not show an objectively reasonable belief that she opposed conduct unlawful under Title VII. Finding Reznik's belief she was opposing conduct unlawful under Title VII was objectively reasonable, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal. View "Reznik v. inContact" on Justia Law

The City of Albuquerque, New Mexico (“Albuquerque” or “the City”) enacted a city-wide ordinance that, in pertinent part, prohibited pedestrians from: (1) congregating within six feet of a highway entrance or exit ramp; (2) occupying any median deemed unsuitable for pedestrian use; and (3) engaging in any kind of exchange with occupants of a vehicle in a travel lane. Plaintiffs-Appellees, residents of Albuquerque who engaged in a variety of expressive activities (like panhandling, protesting, or passing out items to the needy), sued the City in federal court, alleging that the Ordinance impermissibly burdened the exercise of their First Amendment rights. The City argued the Ordinance was necessary to address persistent and troubling pedestrian safety concerns stemming from high rates of vehicular accidents throughout Albuquerque, and, in relation to this pressing interest, the Ordinance was narrowly tailored and did not burden substantially more speech than necessary. The district court disagreed, finding that those provisions of the Ordinance violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights because they were not narrowly tailored to the City’s interest in increasing pedestrian safety and, more specifically, reducing pedestrian-vehicle collisions. On appeal, the City argued the district court erred in concluding the Ordinance did not pass First Amendment muster, and it specifically focused on the question of narrow tailoring, arguing that the City did, indeed, appropriately tailor the Ordinance. After review, the Tenth Circuit rejected the City’s position, holding that the Ordinance was not narrowly tailored and, therefore, violated the First Amendment. View "Martin, et al. v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

In early 2019, a group of individuals called the United Constitutional Patriots (UCP) began camping along a 52-mile stretch of the U.S.-Mexico border along the eastern edge of New Mexico, near El Paso, Texas. Defendant-Appellant James Benvie met this group and subsequently began posting videos on Facebook of the group’s attempts to capture aliens they contended were illegally crossing the border. While filming, Benvie was usually accompanied by members of the UCP who were often dressed in camouflage fatigues and carried firearms. In June 2019, Benvie was indicted based on two encounters with aliens that were captured on video, specifically, impersonating a government employee, for which he was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment and a year of supervised release. On appeal, Benvie argued the district court erred by: (1) instructing the jury that “U.S. Border Patrol” and “Border Patrol” were synonymous; (2) imposing five special conditions of supervised release without adequate explanation; and (3) imposing a mandatory condition of supervised release (drug testing) in the judgment and commitment order. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction but remanded for reconsideration of the conditions of supervised release and removal of the mandatory condition of drug testing. View "United States v. Benvie" on Justia Law