Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Animal rights organization Friends of Animals served a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) seeking disclosure of form 3-177s submitted by wildlife hunters and traders seeking to import elephant and giraffe parts. FWS disclosed the forms with redactions. Most relevant here, it withheld the names of the individual submitters under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), which prevent disclosure of information when a privacy interest in withholding outweighs the public interest in disclosure, as well as information on one Form 3-177 under Exemption 4, which prevents the disclosure of material that is commercial and confidential. Friends of Animals challenged these redactions in the district court, which granted summary judgment in favor of FWS, upholding the redactions. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of FWS as to the withholdings in the Elephant Request under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) and as to the withholdings under Exemption 4. The Court affirmed summary judgment as to the withholdings in the Giraffe Request. View "Friends of Animals v. Bernhardt, et al." on Justia Law

Over 300 call-center representatives (CCRs) who worked at call centers operated by Nelnet Diversified Solutions, LLC (Nelnet) alleged Nelnet failed to pay them for time devoted to booting up their work computers and launching certain software before they clock in. The district court concluded these activities were integral and indispensable to the CCRs’ principal activities of servicing student loans by communicating and interacting with borrowers over the phone and by email and therefore constitute compensable work under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938. But it nevertheless denied the CCRs’ claim, finding that the de minimis doctrine applied to excuse Nelnet’s obligation to pay the CCRs for this work. After granting summary judgment to Nelnet, the district court awarded costs to Nelnet as the prevailing party. The CCRs appealed the district court’s de minimis ruling, and separately appealed the district court’s order awarding prevailing-party costs to Nelnet. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the CCRs’ preshift activities were compensable work under the FLSA. But its application of the three-factor de minimis doctrine leads it to a different result: the Tenth Circuit concluded that although the CCRs’ individual and total aggregate claims were relatively small, Nelnet failed to establish the practical administrative difficulty of estimating the time at issue, which occured with "exceeding regularity." Therefore, in Appeal No. 19-1348, the district court’s order awarding summary judgment to Nelnet was reversed. And because the Court reversed on the merits, Nelnet was no longer the prevailing party. Accordingly, in Appeal No. 20-1217, the district court's order awarding costs to Nelnet was reversed, and CCR's costs appeal was dismissed as moot. View "Peterson v. Nelnet Diversified Solutions" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Adam Hemmelgarn moved for compassionate release, based on an outbreak of COVID-19 at FCI Lompoc. The district court denied his motion, as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding Hemmelgarn had not established extraordinary and compelling reasons in support of a sentence reduction because of his health conditions or the risk of exposure to COVID-19. View "United States v. Hemmelgarn" on Justia Law

Appellants, seventy-six Chapter 11 debtors associated with John Q. Hammons Hotels & Resorts (Debtors), argued they incurred more than $2.5 million of quarterly Chapter 11 disbursement fees from January 2018 through December 2020. Debtors faulted the bankruptcy court’s statutory interpretation, arguing that it applied the quarterly fees retroactively to pending cases against Congress’s intent. Alternatively, Debtors faulted Congress, arguing that charging different Chapter 11 disbursement fees depending on the location of the bankruptcy filing violated the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const. art I, sec. 8, cl. 4. The Tenth Circuit concluded the presumption against retroactivity did not apply here, because Congress increased the quarterly bankruptcy fees prospectively. On Debtors' second point, the Court concluded that Debtors had to prevail: the 2017 Amendment’s fee disparities failed under the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. The Amendment imposed higher quarterly fees on large debtors in Trustee districts. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a determination of Debtors' quarterly Chapter 11 fees and a refund of overpayment. View "In re: John Q. Hammons Fall, et al." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case stemmed from an insurance claim filed by Bonbeck Parker, LLC and BonBeck HL, LC (collectively, BonBeck) for hail damage. The Travelers Indemnity Company of America (Travelers) acknowledged that some of the claimed damage to BonBeck’s property was caused by a covered hailstorm, but argued the remaining damage was caused by uncovered events such as wear and tear. BonBeck requested an appraisal to determine how much damage occurred, but Travelers refused this request unless BonBeck agreed the appraisers would not decide whether the hailstorm in fact caused the disputed damage. When BonBeck rejected this condition, Travelers filed suit, seeking a declaration that the appraisal procedure in BonBeck’s policy did not allow appraisers to decide the causation issue. The district court disagreed, ruling that the relevant policy language allowed appraisers to decide causation. After the appraisal occurred, the district court granted summary judgment to BonBeck on its breach of contract counterclaim, concluding that Travelers breached the policy’s appraisal provision. Travelers appealed. Applying Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed: the disputed policy provision allowed either party to request an appraisal on “the amount of loss,” a phrase with an ordinary meaning in the insurance context that unambiguously encompassed causation disputes like the one here. "And contrary to Travelers’ view, giving effect to this meaning aligns both with other related policy language and with the appraisal provision’s purpose of avoiding costly litigation. For these reasons, the district court appropriately allowed the appraisers to resolve the parties’ causation dispute and granted summary judgment for BonBeck on its breach of contract claim." View "BonBeck Parker, et al. v. Travelers Indemnity" on Justia Law

In 1984, petitioner-appellant Bruce Wimberly pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault. The Colorado trial court accepted his plea and considered the sentencing options: (1) determinate prison term up to 24 years; or (2) an indeterminate term of confinement lasting anywhere from one day to life. The court chose the second option, made additional findings required by the Colorado Sex Offenders Act of 1968, and imposed an indeterminate term of confinement ranging from one day to life imprisonment. More than 24 years passed. Now Wimberly argued the Constitution required his release because he didn’t receive a new hearing at the end of the 24-year determinate term (that the trial court chose not to impose). Without a new hearing, Wimberly claimed his continued confinement violated his rights to equal protection and due process. The federal district court rejected Wimberly’s arguments, and so did the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. “The state trial court provided adequate procedural safeguards when imposing the indeterminate term of confinement, and that term could last anywhere from a single day to the rest of Mr. Wimberly’s lifetime. The State thus had no constitutional duty to provide a new round of procedural safeguards 24 years into Mr. Wimberly’s indeterminate term.” View "Wimberly v. Williams" on Justia Law

This case arose from the cancellation of long-term-care Medicaid benefits for two claimants when an Oklahoma agency concluded that the claimants’ resources exceeded the regulatory cap for eligibility. One claimant, Idabelle Schnoebelen died, mooting her claim. The eligibility of the other claimant, Nelta Rose, turned on whether her resources included a 2018 promissory note. In 2017 and 2018, Rose loaned money to her daughter-in-law in exchange for three promissory notes. The daughter-in-law provided the first two promissory notes in 2017 (before Rose applied for Medicaid benefits). The Oklahoma Department of Human Services initially approved Rose for Medicaid, declining to regard the 2017 promissory notes as resources. In 2018, the daughter-in-law provided the third promissory note. But the Department of Human Services concluded that the 2018 promissory note: (1) was a resource because the payment to the daughter-in-law did not constitute a bona fide loan; and (2) was a deferral that turned the 2017 promissory notes into resources. The extra resources put Rose over the eligibility limit for Medicaid, so the Department of Human Services cancelled Rose’s benefits. A district court concluded that the agency’s conclusion did not conflict with federal law. In the Tenth Circuit's view, however, a reasonable factfinder could disagree. Summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Baker, et al. v. Brown, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Aaron Kendall was arrested after a traffic stop; officers decided to impound his vehicle. Prior to impoundment, the officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, locating methamphetamine and heroin underneath the center console and a stolen handgun tucked within a loose panel below the glove compartment. The government charged Kendall with drug and gun crimes, and Kendall moved to suppress the physical evidence found in the vehicle, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Kendall’s motion to suppress, and Kendall appealed that decision. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Kendall’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Kendall" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Daniel David Egli twice pled guilty to possessing child pornography and has violated his subsequent conditions of supervised release on four occasions by, among other things, possessing unauthorized computers, engaging in unauthorized Internet usage, and viewing and possessing both adult and child pornography. After the second violation, the district court sentenced Egli to a lifetime of supervised release, and after the fourth violation, it imposed a special condition absolutely prohibiting him from using computers and the Internet. Egli failed to object to that special condition below but challenged it on appeal. The Tenth Circuit found no plain error in the district court’s decision for plain error. "Although this Court has previously cautioned that absolute Internet bans are generally invalid, we have left open the possibility of imposing such a ban in a case involving extreme or extraordinary circumstances. Accordingly, and in light of Egli’s lengthy history of violating less restrictive conditions of supervised release, we cannot say the district court plainly erred in imposing an absolute ban." View "United States v. Egli" on Justia Law

A United States military court-martial convicted Petitioner-Appellant Clint Lorance of murder (and a variety of lesser offenses) for actions he took while leading a platoon of soldiers in Afghanistan. After exhausting his direct appeals, Lorance filed a federal habeas petition challenging his convictions. Lorance appealed the district court’s dismissal of that petition. The sole issue, and a matter of first impression for the Tenth Circuit's consideration was whether Lorance’s acceptance of a full and unconditional presidential pardon constituted a legal confession of guilt and a waiver of his habeas rights, thus rendering his case moot. The Court concluded Lorance’s acceptance of the pardon did not have the legal effect of a confession of guilt and did not constitute a waiver of his habeas rights. Despite Lorance’s release from custody pursuant to the pardon, he sufficiently alleged ongoing collateral consequences from his convictions, creating a genuine case or controversy and rendering his habeas petition not moot. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Lorance v. Commandant" on Justia Law