Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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A 56-year-old man from Kansas City, Missouri, responded to an online advertisement posted by a law enforcement officer posing as a 17-year-old girl seeking money. The man offered $500 for a weekend of sexual activity, but testified that he did not believe the ad was genuine and that his response was intended as a joke, based on a coworker’s suggestion. The two exchanged messages, with the officer repeatedly referencing her age and the man continuing the conversation, often using internet slang that could indicate joking. Eventually, the officer persuaded the man to drive to Kansas to meet, but when he arrived, he did not have the promised money or whiskey.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the trial. The defendant asserted an entrapment defense, arguing he lacked predisposition to commit the offense and was induced by the government. The district court, however, refused to instruct the jury on entrapment, finding the evidence insufficient to support such a defense. The jury convicted the defendant of crossing state lines with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying de novo review and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, the court held that a reasonable jury could have found both a lack of predisposition and government inducement, entitling the defendant to an entrapment instruction. The court found the district court’s failure to give the instruction was not harmless error. However, the appellate court also determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, so retrial is permitted. The Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded for new proceedings. View "United States v. Spradley" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The City of Fort Collins contracted with Open International, LLC, for software services, which led to mutual breach-of-contract claims. The City also alleged that Open's precontractual statements were negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations. A jury found that Open fraudulently induced the City to enter the contract. The City elected to rescind the contract, and the district court held a bench trial on restitution, ordering a judgment of nearly $20 million against Open.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Open's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which argued that the City’s tort claims were barred by the economic-loss rule and the contract’s merger clause. The court also denied Open's motion to require the City to elect a remedy before trial. The jury found in favor of the City on the fraudulent inducement claim, and the City chose rescission, leading to the dismissal of the jury and a bench trial on restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings and the jury’s verdict. The court held that the City’s tort claims were not barred by the economic-loss rule or the contract’s merger clause. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of fraud, particularly regarding Open’s grading of the functionality matrix and the use of a different software portal. The court also upheld the finding that the City did not waive its right to rescind the contract, as there was conflicting evidence about when the City discovered the fraud. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Open’s Rule 50(b) motion, which argued that Open Investments could not be liable for rescission. View "City of Fort Collins v. Open International" on Justia Law

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Jasvir Singh, a native and citizen of India, entered the United States without authorization in August 2018. He claimed he faced political violence in India due to his membership in the Mann Party, a rival political group. Singh was apprehended in New Mexico and processed for expedited removal. He conceded removability but requested asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. While detained, Singh went on a 74-day hunger strike to protest his detention conditions, resuming eating three weeks before his asylum hearing. Singh requested a continuance, claiming he lacked the competency to participate due to his hunger strike, but the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the request, finding Singh appeared healthy and competent. Singh then refused to sign his asylum application, resulting in an order of removal.Singh appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ's decision. The BIA found that the IJ properly assessed Singh's competency and that there was no good cause for a continuance, given the time Singh had to prepare and his representation by counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Singh did not exhibit sufficient indicia of mental incompetency. The court noted that Singh was responsive to questions, appeared healthy, and had resumed eating three weeks before the hearing. The court also found that the IJ correctly assessed Singh's competency and that the BIA did not err in affirming the denial of the continuance. The court concluded that Singh had ample time to prepare for his hearing and lacked good cause for a continuance. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA's decision and denied Singh's petition for review. View "Singh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Christopher Fucci and over 50 other individuals and family entities (Plaintiffs) purchased interests in real estate development projects in Florida and Ohio. Each sale was documented in a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) containing an arbitration clause. However, none of the projects were completed, and Plaintiffs sued First American Title Insurance Company (First American) and its employee Kirsten Parkin (FA Defendants), who acted as the escrow agent in the closing of each sale. Although the FA Defendants were not signatories to the PSAs, they moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clauses in the agreements.The United States District Court for the District of Utah denied the motion to compel arbitration. The FA Defendants argued on appeal that they could enforce the arbitration clauses because they were parties to the PSAs, third-party beneficiaries, agents of a party to the PSAs, and that Plaintiffs were equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration. The district court had previously denied the motion without prejudice, waiting for a related case ruling. After the related case was decided, the FA Defendants filed a renewed motion to compel arbitration, which was denied by a magistrate judge. The district court overruled the FA Defendants' objections and adopted the magistrate judge's order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FA Defendants were not parties to the PSAs, were not third-party beneficiaries, and could not compel arbitration as agents because Rockwell, the principal, had waived the arbitration provision. Additionally, the court ruled that equitable estoppel could not be invoked to expand the scope of the arbitration clause to include disputes between Plaintiffs and the FA Defendants. View "Fucci v. First American Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The case involves a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding for debtors Theodore William White, Jr., and Porscha Shiroma. White and Lynn E. Wardley had previously started a business that failed. The Chapter 7 Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against Wardley, alleging a constructively fraudulent obligation and transfer under federal bankruptcy statutes and the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). The Trustee sought to avoid a $750,000 obligation and transfer made by White to Wardley.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah granted summary judgment in favor of Wardley, rejecting the Trustee’s claims. The court found that White received reasonably equivalent value for both the guaranty obligation and the $750,000 transfer. The Trustee appealed to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment orders, agreeing that White received reasonably equivalent value for the guaranty obligation and the $750,000 transfer. The court found that White’s benefits, including employment, a 15% equity stake in the business, cash and equity incentives, and a business opportunity, were approximately equivalent to the value of the debt he took on. The court also held that the guaranty obligation was unconditional, making the $750,000 transfer a dollar-for-dollar exchange that constituted reasonably equivalent value. View "White v. Wardley" on Justia Law

Posted in: Bankruptcy
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A thirteen-year-old girl, D.C., reported to her stepmother that her stepfather, Edgar Rene Garcia-Limon, had sexually abused her over several years, beginning when she was about four and continuing until she was eleven. During the investigation, D.C. described multiple incidents of abuse, and Garcia-Limon admitted to law enforcement and his wife that he had sexually touched D.C. on several occasions. Law enforcement also found firearms in the home, leading to additional charges.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted Garcia-Limon on four counts: felon in possession of a firearm, aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country, abusive sexual contact in Indian Country, and illegal reentry. Garcia-Limon challenged the sufficiency of the indictment for the sexual abuse counts, arguing that the eight-year date range was too broad and that the counts improperly charged a scheme rather than specific acts. The district court denied his motions, finding that the indictment properly charged a scheme of abuse and that the counts were not constitutionally defective or duplicitous. At trial, the jury found Garcia-Limon guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to concurrent terms, including life sentences for the sexual abuse counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the indictment was constitutionally sufficient, whether the statutes allowed charging a scheme of abuse, whether the indictment was duplicitous, and whether there was a constructive amendment at trial. The court held that the indictment met constitutional requirements, that the statutes permitted charging a scheme of repeated, similar acts in a single count, and that there was no unconstitutional duplicity or constructive amendment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Garcia-Limon’s convictions on the challenged counts. View "United States v. Garcia-Limon" on Justia Law

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Bethany Scheer was employed by Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health System, Inc. (SCL) from 2014 to 2019. During her employment, Scheer faced performance issues and was placed on a performance improvement plan (PIP) that included mandatory counseling through SCL’s employee assistance program (EAP). Scheer initially agreed to the PIP but later refused to sign a form authorizing the disclosure of her counseling attendance and compliance, leading to her termination. Scheer sued SCL under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging discrimination based on a perceived disability.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of SCL. The court concluded that the mandatory referral to counseling did not constitute an adverse employment action because it did not cause a significant change in Scheer’s employment status, as required by precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis rejected the significance test previously used and established a new standard requiring plaintiffs to show they suffered "some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment." The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the new standard set forth in Muldrow. The district court must now determine if Scheer suffered "some harm" as a result of SCL’s actions. View "Scheer v. Sisters of Charity" on Justia Law

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David Jenny, an employee of L3Harris Technologies, Inc., suffered from recurring cellulitis, which was aggravated by frequent international travel required by his job. He requested and was granted an accommodation to book seats with extra legroom on long flights. However, within three months of this accommodation, Jenny was denied permission to travel for routine business, removed from his leadership role, and ultimately discharged. Jenny sued L3Harris for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the District of Utah acknowledged that Jenny established a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation and produced sufficient evidence that L3Harris’s explanation for his discharge was pretextual. Despite this, the district court granted summary judgment to L3Harris, citing the exception set out in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., concluding that Jenny’s evidence did not sufficiently link his discharge to any discriminatory or retaliatory motive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court improperly applied the Reeves exception. The Tenth Circuit held that Jenny had indeed met the requirements of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Jenny, did not meet the requirements for invoking the Reeves exception. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to L3Harris and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jenny v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

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Michael Kay was convicted after pleading guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the district court found that Kay had hidden the firearm in the trunk of his vehicle before his arrest and imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, despite the defense's objection. Kay was sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Kay challenged the imposition of the § 3C1.1 enhancement, arguing that his pre-investigative conduct was not "likely to thwart" the investigation of the offense, as required by application note 1 in the commentary to § 3C1.1.The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially reviewed the case. The court found that Kay's act of hiding the firearm in the trunk was sufficient to warrant the obstruction of justice enhancement. The court noted that Kay's conduct was purposefully calculated to obstruct justice and that the firearm was hidden in a manner that was likely to thwart the investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Kay's conduct was likely to thwart the investigation. The Tenth Circuit noted that the firearm was hidden behind multiple barriers in the trunk, and the officers only discovered it after Kay's son directed them to the trunk. The court concluded that the district court's finding was plausible and permissible in light of the entire record, and thus, the obstruction enhancement under § 3C1.1 was appropriately applied. View "United States v. Kay" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages wild horse herds in southern Wyoming under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. This Act mandates the protection and management of wild horses on public lands. The land in question is a checkerboard pattern of alternating public and private ownership. Since 1979, BLM managed these herds with the consent of private landowners. However, in 2010, private landowners revoked their consent, making it difficult for BLM to maintain the herds. In 2022, BLM amended its Regional Management Plan (RMP) to change two Herd Management Areas (HMAs) to Herd Areas (HAs), reducing the wild horse population goal to zero in two areas and significantly reducing it in another.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming reviewed the case and ruled in favor of BLM, finding that the agency had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in amending the RMP. The court held that any challenge to BLM’s decision to remove horses was unripe and that BLM had complied with the relevant statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that BLM failed to consider whether its decision would achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance, as required by the Wild Horse Act. The court held that BLM’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not base its decision on this statutory requirement. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy, considering the practical consequences of vacatur and the potential for BLM to substantiate its decision on remand. View "American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby" on Justia Law