Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After years of litigation, Plaintiff-Appellant Derma Pen, LLC (“Derma Pen”) was granted a permanent injunction against Stene Marshall and three related corporations that he had formed. Shortly thereafter, Derma Pen moved for a contempt order against Marshall, alleging that he had violated the injunction. Derma Pen also sought a contempt order against Marshall’s brother and sister- in-law, Joel and Sasha Marshall, and DP Derm, LLC, a corporation Joel and Sasha owned (collectively, the “Related Parties”). Movant-Appellant Derma Pen IP Holdings LLC (“DPIPH”), Derma Pen’s successor in interest, joined Derma Pen’s motion shortly before the contempt hearing. In its motion, Derma Pen asserted that the Related Parties had acted in concert with Marshall to violate the injunction. The Related Parties prevailed in the contempt proceeding and subsequently moved for attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1117(a). The court granted the motion for fees, and Derma Pen and DPIPH appealed that award. The Tenth Circuit found that in its award of attorney’s fees to the Related Parties, the trial court relied upon a statutory provision in the Patent Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014). The issue presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review was whether the term “exceptional case” in the Patent Act differed in meaning from the same term used in the Lanham Act to a degree that required reversal. The Court concluded the exceptional case standard in the Lanham Act paralleled the standard in the Patent Act and affirmed. View "Derma Pen, LLC v. 4EverYoung Limited" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Conrad Truman sued state prosecutor Craig Johnson and various Orem City police officers for violating his civil rights by fabricating evidence that was used against him in a murder prosecution. Truman was prosecuted twice for the murder of his wife. According to the complaint, the prosecution knowingly falsified measurements of the murder scene to rule out the possibility of suicide or a self-inflicted accidental wound. As a result, the state medical examiner deemed Mrs. Truman’s death a homicide and Mr. Truman was indicted and successfully prosecuted for murder. After his conviction, he learned of the mismeasurements and the state court granted him a new trial. In the second trial where proper room measurements were admitted into evidence, Truman was acquitted. These events led Truman to file a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the prosecutor and the police. The district court found that the prosecutor was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law and the claims against the police officers were barred by previous holdings in state court. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court that the prosecutor was entitled to qualified immunity at this stage in the proceedings. But summary judgment was appropriate as to the police officers because Truman forfeited his argument regarding issue preclusion in state court and did not argue for plain error review on appeal. View "Truman v. Orem City" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2016, a large fire, later known as the Dog Head Fire, engulfed Isleta Pueblo and United States Forest Service land in the Manzano Mountains of New Mexico. The fire resulted from forest-thinning work performed by Pueblo crewmembers under an agreement with the Forest Service. Insurance companies and several owners of destroyed property (collectively, “Appellants”) sued the government, alleging negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and, alternatively, for summary judgment on that same basis. The district court granted the government summary judgment, concluding: (1) the Pueblo crewmembers had acted as independent contractors of the government, and thus, the government wasn’t subject to FTCA liability based on the Pueblo crewmembers’ negligence; and (2) Appellants’ claims premised on the Forest Service employees’ own negligence, under the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception, were barred. On appeal, Appellants contended the district court erred in ruling that the FTCA jurisdictionally barred their claims. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Ohlsen v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Christopher Dominguez appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This case arose from Defendant’s involvement in a series of robberies in New Mexico and Wyoming. In 2016, Defendant was arrested along with two other suspects, for the armed robbery of the Medicine Shoppe Pharmacy in Raton, New Mexico. Prior to the robbery, the robbers had stolen a vehicle, which they used during the robbery and abandoned thereafter. During the robbery, the robbers wore face coverings, displayed firearms, and ordered the pharmacy employees to load certain drugs into black trash bags that the robbers supplied. The robbers identified the requested drugs by name, namely Oxycontin and Oxycodone. After seeing the Raton Police Department Facebook information, a Medicap pharmacist in Wyoming alerted law enforcement, which began investigating whether the suspects in the New Mexico robbery had also committed a prior Wyoming robbery, under similar circumstances. Defendant would ultimately strike a plea agreement for the charges arising out of the two robberies. On the day of his change-of-plea hearing, the law changed: on December 21, 2018, the President signed into law the First Step Act, a wide-ranging package of criminal justice reform measures that had passed both houses of Congress only days prior. Pertinent here, the First Step Act altered the “stacking” provision of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), which had “significant implications” for Defendant’s potential sentencing exposure. On appeal of his ultimate conviction, Defendant contended his plea was invalid for two reasons: (1) he did not knowingly and intelligently plead guilty; and (2) he did not receive the requisite “close assistance” of counsel in making his plea. Despite his arguments to the contrary, the Tenth Circuit concluded Defendant was unconvincing unknowingly and unintelligently pleaded guilty or that he did not receive “close assistance” of counsel. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a road rage incident at the corner of a crosswalk in Colorado Springs: a pedestrian wanted to cross the street, the driver of a vehicle wanted to turn right. Words were exchanged, the driver pulled out a gun and took a shot at the pedestrian. The bullet didn’t strike anyone. The vehicle sped off, and the pedestrian called 911. Law enforcement focused their investigation on Defendant Perry Suggs. Warrants were issued, Defendant’s home was searched, and incriminating evidence was discovered. A federal grand jury charged Defendant with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during sequential searches of his home and an SUV parked under his carport, arguing that the warrant to search his home violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and that officers would not have found the evidence used against him but for the invalid warrant. The district court disagreed and denied the motion. Defendant appealed that decision. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court erred when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. “Because the residential search warrant failed to meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and cannot be saved by the severability doctrine, we vacate the order denying Defendant’s suppression motion.” Yet the question remained whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule saved the incriminating evidence from suppression. The case was remanded for the district court to resolve underlying factual disputes and consider that remedial question in light of the Tenth Circuit’s holding. View "United States v. Suggs" on Justia Law

Before the Tenth Circuit in this matter was a product liability case involving a rifle manufactured by Remington Arms Company, LLC. The rifle allegedly misfired (without anyone pulling the trigger) and injured Joann Harris. Harris and her husband sued Remington, attributing the injury to a defect in the rifle. In support, the Harrises proffered testimony by an expert witness who had explained how the rifle could have fired without anyone pulling the trigger. Remington argued the Harrises’ expert’s testimony was inadmissible because it conflicted with undisputed evidence. To counter this, the Harrises disclosed that their expert had changed his explanation. But by the time of this disclosure, discover had already closed. The district court excluded the expert testimony, and granted summary judgment to Remington. On appeal, the Harrises challenged the exclusion of the expert testimony and the award of summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit rejected both challenges, finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony, and the Harrises didn’t argue in district court that they could survive summary judgment even without expert testimony. So the award of summary judgment to Remington was affirmed. View "Harris v. Remington Arms Company" on Justia Law

Two decades ago, Wallace Crooks was charged with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. He was convicted at a bench trial in which the district court found the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Crooks personally possessed with intent to distribute and did distribute 567 grams of crack cocaine. At the time of Crooks’ crime and sentencing, the quantity of crack cocaine he was convicted of conspiring to distribute (50 grams or more) triggered 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). This enhanced penalty provision subjected Crooks to a mandatory statutory penalty of 10 years to life imprisonment. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated an offense level of 38 based on the quantity of drugs involved in the entire conspiracy, between 1,701 and 2,126 grams, and a criminal history category of VI. The PSR also concluded Crooks qualified as a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, treating the instant charge for conspiracy as a controlled substance offense. Crooks did not object to the PSR which recommended a sentence of 360 months. Crooks filed a motion for sentence reduction under the First Step Act in 2019, requesting a reduction of his 360-month sentence to time-served, which at the time was about 260 months. In support, Crooks argued he was eligible for First Step Act relief because his offense of conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841 was modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. He then asked the district court to correctly calculate his guidelines range without the career offender enhancement because a federal drug conspiracy was not a “controlled substance offense” under the career offender guideline. The district court denied relief; the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding Crooks was eligible to have his designation as a career offender re-reviewed. View "United States v. Crooks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Thomas Standish was injured when his right ski struck a six-and-a-half-foot stump covered with freshly fallen snow skiing in an ungroomed area at Jackson Hole Mountain Resort. stump covered with freshly fallen snow. Standish and his wife brought a negligence lawsuit against Jackson Hole to recover for his injuries. Jackson Hole moved for summary judgment, contending the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act (WRSA) limited Jackson Hole’s liability because Standish’s injury was a result of an “inherent risk” of alpine skiing. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that a tree stump covered by fresh snow was an inherent risk of skiing for which the WRSA precluded liability. To this, the Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed the district court’s conclusion. View "Standish v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort" on Justia Law

Responding to a call to the sheriff’s office that the occupant was intoxicated and possibly suicidal, Deputy Kyle Wilson drove to the home of Shane Bridges. Within seconds of his arrival at the home, Wilson had fired 13 rounds from his semiautomatic handgun at Bridges, hitting him twice and killing him. The shooting led to claims by Plaintiff Janelle Bridges, special administrator of Shane. Bridges’ estate, against Deputy Wilson and the Board of County Commissioners of Mayes County. She sued Wilson under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly violating Mr. Bridges’ constitutional rights by using unreasonable force, and sued the Board under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (OGTCA) based on alleged negligence by Deputy Wilson. The district court granted the Board summary judgment on the ground that the OGTCA did not waive the Board’s immunity from suit because Wilson was acting “as a protector, not as a law enforcer.” The section 1983 claim against Wilson was then tried to a jury, which ruled in Wilson’s favor. At trial Plaintiff contended that when Wilson drove up, Mr. Bridges had briefly opened the door to his home to look outside and had never fired a weapon, but that Wilson began firing at him after he had closed the door and gone inside, where he was hit by shots that pierced the door. Wilson’s account was that Mr. Bridges began firing at him from the porch of the home after he had parked his vehicle, and that Wilson fired only in response to the shots from Mr. Bridges, who then retreated into his home and died. Plaintiff did not dispute the jury verdict on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, but she challenged the summary judgment entered in favor of the Board. After reviewing the briefs and the record, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Board on the ground suggested at oral argument (the Court did not address the immunity issue). “But on the evidence and theories of liability in this case, … a negligence claim under the OGTCA would be incompatible with the jury verdict. Plaintiff could prevail on the merits on each claim if, and only if, Mr. Bridges did not initiate the gun battle by firing at Deputy Wilson from his porch. By rendering a verdict in Wilson’s favor, the jury must have found that Mr. Bridges fired first.” View "Bridges v. Wilson" on Justia Law

As plaintiff-appellant Julie Huff was at the bank in early 2016, Cedric Norris entered, murdered the bank president, grabbed some money from tellers, and took Huff hostage, forcing her to drive the getaway vehicle. Police officers pursued the vehicle and were able to force it to crash. At first, Norris fired at the officers and fled in one direction while Huff fled away from him. She raised her arms and faced the officers. But they fired at her and she fell to the ground. Later, Norris came up behind her and used her body as a shield. Norris was killed in the shootout. Huff was shot at least 10 times. Huff later filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of her civil rights, alleging, among other things, that Oklahoma Highway Patrol Trooper Chris Reeves used excessive force against her, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. She also sued McIntosh County Sheriff Kevin Ledbetter for failure to properly train his deputies. The district court granted summary judgment to both defendants. The court found Reeves did not violate Huff’s constitutional rights because he did not shoot her intentionally. And it dismissed the claim against the sheriff on the grounds that Huff could neither demonstrate a predicate constitutional violation by one of his deputies nor identify any specific training deficiency related to the alleged violation. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Reeves and the failure-to-train claim against Sheriff Ledbetter, but reversed and remanded on the Fourth Amendment claim against Reeves. The Tenth Circuit held Huff could not invoke Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process in the circumstances of this case, and she failed to point to any additional training of Ledbetter’s personnel that could have prevented the alleged constitutional violation. But the Court concluded that Huff has presented a genuine issue of material fact on whether Reeves shot her intentionally. “And because it is clearly established in this circuit that an officer may not employ deadly force against a person who poses no threat, Reeves is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.” View "Huff v. Reeves" on Justia Law