Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Michael and Sonja Saltman sold a vacant lot in Park City, Utah, to Curt Marcantel. Marcantel pushed to close the deal quickly, but at the time of the sale, the Saltmans knew something that Marcantel didn’t: a ten-foot wide sewer easement (including a sewer pipe within it) ran under a portion of the property, rendering infeasible Marcantel's plans to redevelop the property. The Saltmans did not tell Marcantel about the pipe, and the company Marcantel hired discover the easement did not find it. Because of an indexing error by the county recorder, at least three different title companies on four separate occasions failed to find and note the sewer easement on the property. Marcantel first heard about the easement when his prospective buyer alerted him to it; that buyer fortuitously learned of the easement from a neighboring property owner. The prospective buyer then balked at Marcantel’s asking price. Marcantel eventually sold the lot at a significant loss. Marcantel sued the Saltmans for, among other things, fraudulent nondisclosure and breach of the parties’ real estate purchase contract, arguing the Saltmans’ silence breached their contractual and common-law duties to disclose the easement. The Saltmans claimed they had assumed Marcantel knew about the easement, and in any event, Marcantel had constructive notice of the easement because it was publicly recorded. The district court granted the Saltmans summary judgment on all Marcantel’s claims. On appeal, Marcantel argued the district court repeatedly misapplied Utah law and disregarded summary-judgment procedure that required it to draw inferences in Marcantel’s favor. To this, the Tenth Circuit agreed, reversing in part the trial court's grant of summary judgment, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Marcantel v. Michael & Sonja Saltman Family" on Justia Law

Petitioners Ana Orellana-Recinos and her son, Kevin Rosales-Orellana, natives and citizens of El Salvador, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order dismissing their appeal of an immigration judge's (IJ) dismissal of their applications for asylum. They contended they were persecuted because of their membership in a particular social group: namely, Kevin’s immediate family. Even assuming that Kevin’s immediate family qualified as a particular social group under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the BIA properly found that Petitioners were not persecuted “on account of” their membership in that group. In addition, the Court rejected the government’s argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction to review Petitioners’ challenge to the BIA’s decision. View "Orellana-Recinos v. Barr" on Justia Law

“Talk Big” was Defendant Jalil Robinson’s handle on a dating website, and his strategy for recruiting seventeen-year-old Nikki from Colorado to work for him as a prostitute on the same site. Promising a life of luxury, Defendant convinced Nikki, who originally represented herself as eighteen-year-old Brooke, to come join him as his “business partner” in California. Little did he know he was communicating with an undercover officer posing as Nikki. Defendant’s actions led to a jury convicting him of attempted sex trafficking of a minor. Defendant claimed on appeal that the government produced insufficient evidence to find him guilty of attempted sex trafficking of a minor. The Tenth Circuit determined the trial court record established the contrary, and affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In August 2008, 20-year-old defendant Kepa Maumau participated in armed robberies of a clothing store and two restaurants. Maumau was indicted for his role in those robberies and ultimately convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to commit a racketeering offense, two counts of committing violent crimes in aid of racketeering, one count of Hobbs Act robbery, and three counts of using a gun during a crime of violence. At the time of Maumau’s convictions, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) included a “stacking” provision that required a district court to impose consecutive sentences of twenty-five years’ imprisonment for second or subsequent convictions of the statute, even if those convictions occurred at the same time as a defendant’s first conviction under the statute. As a result of that “stacking” provision, Maumau was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 55 years. In December 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018 (First Step Act), 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Three provisions of the First Step Act were relevant to this appeal. In October 2019, Maumau moved to reduce his sentence, arguing that that extraordinary and compelling reasons, including the First Step Act’s elimination of section 924(c)’s stacking provision, justified a reduction. The district court granted Maumau’s motion and reduced Maumau’s sentence to time served, plus a three-year term of supervised release. The government appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Maumau’s motion. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Maumau" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Santa Fe Alliance for Public Health & Safety, Arthur Firstenberg, and Monika Steinhoff (collectively the “Alliance”) brought a number of claims under Section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TCA”), New Mexico’s Wireless Consumer Advanced Infrastructure Investment Act (“WCAIIA”), the Amendments to Chapter 27 of the Santa Fe City City Code, and Santa Fe mayor proclamations. The Alliance alleged the statutes and proclamations violated due process, the Takings Clause, and the First Amendment. Through its amended complaint, the Alliance contended the installation of telecommunications facilities, primarily cellular towers and antennas, on public rights-of-way exposed its members to dangerous levels of radiation. The Alliance further contended these legislative and executive acts prevented it from effectively speaking out against the installation of new telecommunications facilities. The United States moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and (b)(6), and the City of Santa Fe moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court concluded that while the Alliance pled sufficient facts to establish standing to assert its constitutional claims, the Alliance failed to allege facts stating any constitutional claim upon which relief could be granted, thus dismissing claims against all defendants, including New Mexico Attorney General Hector Balderas. The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Alliance's constitutional claims, finding apart from the district court, that the Alliance lacked standing to raise its takings and due process claims not premised on an alleged denial of notice. Furthermore, the Court held that while the Alliance satisfied the threshold for standing as to its First Amendment and procedural due process claims (premised on the WCAIIA and Chapter 27 Amendments), the district court properly dismissed these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). View "Santa Fe Alliance v. City of Santa Fe" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Abiel Perez-Perez pled guilty to being an alien in possession of a firearm. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s failure to advise him of two elements of that offense: (1) the alien was illegally or unlawfully present in the United States; and (2) the alien knew that he was illegally or unlawfully present. The government conceded that the omission of these elements constituted error that was now plain on appeal. The only dispute was whether Perez satisfied the third and fourth prongs of plain-error review. The Tenth Circuit concluded Perez could not satisfy the third prong because he could not show that the error affected his substantial rights. "Although Perez has a credible claim that, at the time of the offense, he did not know he was unlawfully present in the United States, he has failed to show a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty but for the district court’s error. This is because the context of Perez’s guilty plea makes clear that he pled guilty to avoid mandatory minimum sentences attached to charges the government dismissed in exchange for the guilty plea. Perez fails to show how the district court’s error impacted that choice, and he thus fails to satisfy the third plain-error prong." View "United States v. Perez-Perez" on Justia Law

Rex Sharp, the attorney for Plaintiff Duncan Frank in a putative class-action against Crawley Petroleum Corporation, appealed a district-court order granting Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal of his claim with prejudice but placing three restrictions on Sharp’s bringing similar putative class-action claims against Crawley on behalf of other plaintiffs. Plaintiff owned a royalty interest in an oil and gas well operated by Crawley in Oklahoma. He alleged that Crawley had been underpaying the royalties owed on natural-gas production. Sharp claimed two of the three conditions were improperly imposed because the dismissal caused no legal prejudice to Crawley. Crawley moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit denied the motion to dismiss because Sharp was expressly referenced in the order and was directly bound by it. And although a nonparty, he was a proper appellant, he had standing to appeal, and the order was a final, appealable order. The Tenth Circuit also agreed with Sharp on the merits of his appeal: Crawley would not be better off in regard to class certification than it was with the dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s complaint. The matter was remanded to the district court with instructions to grant Plaintiff’s requested dismissal without the challenged conditions. View "Frank v. Crawley Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff-Appellee Levi Frasier video-recorded Denver police officers using force while arresting an uncooperative suspect in public, one of the officers followed Frasier to his car and asked him to provide a statement on what he had seen and to turn over his video of the arrest. Frasier at first denied having filmed the arrest but ultimately showed the officer the tablet computer on which he had video-recorded it. He did so after an officer, Defendant-Appellant Christopher Evans, and four other members of the Denver Police Department (the other Defendants-Appellants) surrounded him and allegedly pressured him to comply with their demand to turn over the video. Frasier contended that when he showed Officer Evans the tablet computer, the officer grabbed it from his hands and searched it for the video without his consent. Frasier sued the five officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming they violated and conspired to violate his constitutional rights under both the First and Fourth Amendments. The officers moved the district court for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, and the court granted them qualified immunity on some of Frasier’s claims but denied it to them on others. The district court, as relevant here, held that Officer Evans had reasonable suspicion to detain Frasier throughout their encounter because Frasier lied to him about filming the arrest, thereby potentially violating Colorado Revised Statutes 18-8-111. The court granted Officer Evans qualified immunity on Frasier’s claim that the officer illegally detained him in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and Frasier did not oppose granting summary judgment to the other officers on this claim. Officer Evans did not move for summary judgment on Frasier’s claim that he illegally searched Frasier’s tablet computer in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the other officers did. The court granted them summary judgment because the record did not support a finding that they personally participated in the alleged search. The district court, however, denied the officers qualified immunity on Frasier’s First Amendment retaliation claim even though it had concluded that Frasier did not have a clearly established right to film a public arrest. The officers appealed the district court’s partial denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred and reversed the partial denial of the officers' motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Frasier v. Evans" on Justia Law

Defendant Malcom McGee was convicted by a jury of three criminal counts: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of a mixture of substance containing a detectable amount of PCP; (2) causing another person to possess with intent to distribute in excess of one kilogram of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of PCP; and (3) using a communication facility to commit and facilitate the commission of a felony. Because McGee had previously been convicted in California of two felony drug offenses, the district court sentenced McGee to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Following Congress’s enactment of the First Step Act of 2018 (First Step Act) and the changes the First Step Act made to both section 841(b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), McGee moved the district court pursuant to section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) to reduce his sentence based on “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The district court denied that motion, and McGee appealed. Because the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court misunderstood the extent of its authority at both steps one and two of section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s statutory test, it reversed the district court’s decision and remanded to the district court so that it could reconsider McGee’s motion. View "United States v. McGee" on Justia Law

Brett Hendrickson worked for the New Mexico Human Services Department (“HSD”) and was a dues-paying member of the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees Council 18 (“AFSCME” or “Union”). He resigned his membership in 2018 after the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). His dues deductions stopped shortly thereafter. Despite correspondence stating his wish to withdraw, dues continued to be deducted from Hendrickson’s paycheck. On January 7, 2019, he emailed the State Personnel Office (SPO) to request the deductions be stopped, attaching the Union’s December 6 letter. The SPO responded that because it had not received his request during an opt-out window in the first two weeks of December, it would not stop deductions. Hendrickson then sent a request to the HSD to cease dues deductions. Thereafter, he filed suit to get monies returned when he originally asked for the deductions to stop. Hendrickson contended that, under Janus, the Union could not: (1) retain dues that had been deducted from his paycheck; or (2) serve as his exclusive bargaining representative. The district court dismissed these claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but remanded for the district court to amend its judgment to reflect that: (1) the dismissal of Hendrickson’s request for prospective relief on Count 1 as moot; and (2) the dismissal of Count 2 against the New Mexico Defendants based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, were both “without prejudice.” View "Hendrickson v. AFSCME Council 18" on Justia Law