Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In August 2008, 20-year-old defendant Kepa Maumau participated in armed robberies of a clothing store and two restaurants. Maumau was indicted for his role in those robberies and ultimately convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to commit a racketeering offense, two counts of committing violent crimes in aid of racketeering, one count of Hobbs Act robbery, and three counts of using a gun during a crime of violence. At the time of Maumau’s convictions, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) included a “stacking” provision that required a district court to impose consecutive sentences of twenty-five years’ imprisonment for second or subsequent convictions of the statute, even if those convictions occurred at the same time as a defendant’s first conviction under the statute. As a result of that “stacking” provision, Maumau was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 55 years. In December 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018 (First Step Act), 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Three provisions of the First Step Act were relevant to this appeal. In October 2019, Maumau moved to reduce his sentence, arguing that that extraordinary and compelling reasons, including the First Step Act’s elimination of section 924(c)’s stacking provision, justified a reduction. The district court granted Maumau’s motion and reduced Maumau’s sentence to time served, plus a three-year term of supervised release. The government appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Maumau’s motion. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Maumau" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Santa Fe Alliance for Public Health & Safety, Arthur Firstenberg, and Monika Steinhoff (collectively the “Alliance”) brought a number of claims under Section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TCA”), New Mexico’s Wireless Consumer Advanced Infrastructure Investment Act (“WCAIIA”), the Amendments to Chapter 27 of the Santa Fe City City Code, and Santa Fe mayor proclamations. The Alliance alleged the statutes and proclamations violated due process, the Takings Clause, and the First Amendment. Through its amended complaint, the Alliance contended the installation of telecommunications facilities, primarily cellular towers and antennas, on public rights-of-way exposed its members to dangerous levels of radiation. The Alliance further contended these legislative and executive acts prevented it from effectively speaking out against the installation of new telecommunications facilities. The United States moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and (b)(6), and the City of Santa Fe moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court concluded that while the Alliance pled sufficient facts to establish standing to assert its constitutional claims, the Alliance failed to allege facts stating any constitutional claim upon which relief could be granted, thus dismissing claims against all defendants, including New Mexico Attorney General Hector Balderas. The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Alliance's constitutional claims, finding apart from the district court, that the Alliance lacked standing to raise its takings and due process claims not premised on an alleged denial of notice. Furthermore, the Court held that while the Alliance satisfied the threshold for standing as to its First Amendment and procedural due process claims (premised on the WCAIIA and Chapter 27 Amendments), the district court properly dismissed these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). View "Santa Fe Alliance v. City of Santa Fe" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Abiel Perez-Perez pled guilty to being an alien in possession of a firearm. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s failure to advise him of two elements of that offense: (1) the alien was illegally or unlawfully present in the United States; and (2) the alien knew that he was illegally or unlawfully present. The government conceded that the omission of these elements constituted error that was now plain on appeal. The only dispute was whether Perez satisfied the third and fourth prongs of plain-error review. The Tenth Circuit concluded Perez could not satisfy the third prong because he could not show that the error affected his substantial rights. "Although Perez has a credible claim that, at the time of the offense, he did not know he was unlawfully present in the United States, he has failed to show a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty but for the district court’s error. This is because the context of Perez’s guilty plea makes clear that he pled guilty to avoid mandatory minimum sentences attached to charges the government dismissed in exchange for the guilty plea. Perez fails to show how the district court’s error impacted that choice, and he thus fails to satisfy the third plain-error prong." View "United States v. Perez-Perez" on Justia Law

Rex Sharp, the attorney for Plaintiff Duncan Frank in a putative class-action against Crawley Petroleum Corporation, appealed a district-court order granting Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal of his claim with prejudice but placing three restrictions on Sharp’s bringing similar putative class-action claims against Crawley on behalf of other plaintiffs. Plaintiff owned a royalty interest in an oil and gas well operated by Crawley in Oklahoma. He alleged that Crawley had been underpaying the royalties owed on natural-gas production. Sharp claimed two of the three conditions were improperly imposed because the dismissal caused no legal prejudice to Crawley. Crawley moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit denied the motion to dismiss because Sharp was expressly referenced in the order and was directly bound by it. And although a nonparty, he was a proper appellant, he had standing to appeal, and the order was a final, appealable order. The Tenth Circuit also agreed with Sharp on the merits of his appeal: Crawley would not be better off in regard to class certification than it was with the dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s complaint. The matter was remanded to the district court with instructions to grant Plaintiff’s requested dismissal without the challenged conditions. View "Frank v. Crawley Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff-Appellee Levi Frasier video-recorded Denver police officers using force while arresting an uncooperative suspect in public, one of the officers followed Frasier to his car and asked him to provide a statement on what he had seen and to turn over his video of the arrest. Frasier at first denied having filmed the arrest but ultimately showed the officer the tablet computer on which he had video-recorded it. He did so after an officer, Defendant-Appellant Christopher Evans, and four other members of the Denver Police Department (the other Defendants-Appellants) surrounded him and allegedly pressured him to comply with their demand to turn over the video. Frasier contended that when he showed Officer Evans the tablet computer, the officer grabbed it from his hands and searched it for the video without his consent. Frasier sued the five officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming they violated and conspired to violate his constitutional rights under both the First and Fourth Amendments. The officers moved the district court for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, and the court granted them qualified immunity on some of Frasier’s claims but denied it to them on others. The district court, as relevant here, held that Officer Evans had reasonable suspicion to detain Frasier throughout their encounter because Frasier lied to him about filming the arrest, thereby potentially violating Colorado Revised Statutes 18-8-111. The court granted Officer Evans qualified immunity on Frasier’s claim that the officer illegally detained him in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and Frasier did not oppose granting summary judgment to the other officers on this claim. Officer Evans did not move for summary judgment on Frasier’s claim that he illegally searched Frasier’s tablet computer in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the other officers did. The court granted them summary judgment because the record did not support a finding that they personally participated in the alleged search. The district court, however, denied the officers qualified immunity on Frasier’s First Amendment retaliation claim even though it had concluded that Frasier did not have a clearly established right to film a public arrest. The officers appealed the district court’s partial denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred and reversed the partial denial of the officers' motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Frasier v. Evans" on Justia Law

Defendant Malcom McGee was convicted by a jury of three criminal counts: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of a mixture of substance containing a detectable amount of PCP; (2) causing another person to possess with intent to distribute in excess of one kilogram of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of PCP; and (3) using a communication facility to commit and facilitate the commission of a felony. Because McGee had previously been convicted in California of two felony drug offenses, the district court sentenced McGee to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Following Congress’s enactment of the First Step Act of 2018 (First Step Act) and the changes the First Step Act made to both section 841(b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), McGee moved the district court pursuant to section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) to reduce his sentence based on “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The district court denied that motion, and McGee appealed. Because the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court misunderstood the extent of its authority at both steps one and two of section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s statutory test, it reversed the district court’s decision and remanded to the district court so that it could reconsider McGee’s motion. View "United States v. McGee" on Justia Law

Brett Hendrickson worked for the New Mexico Human Services Department (“HSD”) and was a dues-paying member of the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees Council 18 (“AFSCME” or “Union”). He resigned his membership in 2018 after the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). His dues deductions stopped shortly thereafter. Despite correspondence stating his wish to withdraw, dues continued to be deducted from Hendrickson’s paycheck. On January 7, 2019, he emailed the State Personnel Office (SPO) to request the deductions be stopped, attaching the Union’s December 6 letter. The SPO responded that because it had not received his request during an opt-out window in the first two weeks of December, it would not stop deductions. Hendrickson then sent a request to the HSD to cease dues deductions. Thereafter, he filed suit to get monies returned when he originally asked for the deductions to stop. Hendrickson contended that, under Janus, the Union could not: (1) retain dues that had been deducted from his paycheck; or (2) serve as his exclusive bargaining representative. The district court dismissed these claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but remanded for the district court to amend its judgment to reflect that: (1) the dismissal of Hendrickson’s request for prospective relief on Count 1 as moot; and (2) the dismissal of Count 2 against the New Mexico Defendants based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, were both “without prejudice.” View "Hendrickson v. AFSCME Council 18" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Awuku-Asare appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision to affirmed his removal order. Awuku-Asare entered the country on a nonimmigrant F-1 visa and could lawfully remain in the United States so long as he complied with the conditions of his visa. Relevant here, maintaining an F-1 visa status requires maintaining a full course of study at an approved educational institution. But Awuku-Asare did not comply with this full-course-of-study requirement because he was incarcerated for approximately 13 months for a crime of which he was ultimately acquitted. In an issue of first impression for the Tenth Circuit, Awuku-Asare argued that “the failure to maintain status must be attributable to the nonimmigrant to render him [removable],” and that because of circumstances beyond his control caused the lapse in his status, he was not removable. The Tenth Circuit determined the plain meaning of the relevant statute did not support Awuku-Asare's interpretation, therefore his arguments were rejected and the BIA's decision affirmed. View "Awuku-Asare v. Garland" on Justia Law

Blanca Telephone Company was a rural telecommunications carrier based in Alamosa, Colorado. To be profitable, Blanca must rely in part upon subsidies from the Universal Service Fund (USF), a source of financial support governed by federal law and funded through fees on telephone customers. And in order to receive subsidies from the USF, Blanca must abide by a complex set of rules governing telecommunications carriers. The Federal Communications Commission began an investigation in 2008 into Blanca’s accounting practices, and identified overpayments Blanca had received from the USF between 2005 and 2010. According to the FCC, Blanca improperly claimed roughly $6.75 million in USF support during this period for expenses related to providing mobile cellular services both within and outside Blanca’s designated service area. Blanca was entitled only to support for “plain old telephone service,” namely land lines, and not for mobile telephone services. The FCC issued a demand letter to Blanca seeking repayment. to Blanca seeking repayment. The agency eventually used administrative offsets of payments owed to Blanca for new subsidies to begin collection of the debt. Blanca objected to the FCC’s demand letter and sought agency review of the debt collection determination. During agency proceedings, the FCC considered and rejected Blanca’s objections. Before the Tenth Circuit, Blanca challenged the FCC’s demand letter. And Blanca claimed the FCC's decision should have been set aside because: and subsequent orders on a number of grounds. Blanca claims the FCC’s decision should be set aside because: (1) it was barred by the relevant statute of limitations; (2) it violated due process; and (3) it was arbitrary and capricious. The Tenth Circuit concluded the FCC’s debt collection was not barred by any statute of limitations, Blanca was apprised of the relevant law and afforded adequate opportunity to respond to the FCC’s decision, and the FCC was not arbitrary and capricious in its justifications for the debt collection. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the FCC. View "Blanca Telephone Company v. FCC" on Justia Law

Ethiopian native, petitioner Thewodros Wolie Birhanu petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed Birhanu’s appeal of the Immigration Judge's (“IJ”) decision finding him removable. The BIA and the IJ found: (1) Birhanu was removable as an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMTs”) not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct; (2) he was not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal because his convictions qualified as particularly serious crimes; and (3) he was not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Tenth Circuit dismissed Birhanu's claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as unexhausted, and denied the balance of his petition for review on the merits. View "Birhanu v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law