Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant David Ansberry attempted to detonate a bomb in front of the Nederland, Colorado police station. He pled guilty to use or attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction against a person or property in the United States. At sentencing, the parties disputed the application of three provisions contained in the United States Sentencing Guidelines: (1) whether Ansberry knowingly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person (which under section 2K1.4(a)(1) would create a base offense level of twenty-four); (2) whether the individual officers who came into contact with the bomb were victims (which under section 3A1.2(a) would increase Ansberry’s offense level by three); and (3) whether Ansberry’s offense involved a federal crime of terrorism because it was calculated to retaliate against government conduct (which under section 3A1.4 would increase his offense level by twelve and convert his criminal history category from I to VI). The district court sided with the government on all three provisions and sentenced Ansberry to 324 months in prison. Ansberry challenged application of each of the three guidelines provisions. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in applying the section 2K1.4(a)(1) base offense level because the court found that Ansberry actually created a risk of death or serious bodily injury, and this finding was not clearly erroneous. But the Court agreed with Ansberry that the court erred in applying: the section 3A1.2(a) enhancement because the court impermissibly relied on relevant conduct rather than on the facts immediately related to his offense of conviction; and the section 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement, because the district court expressly refused to determine whether the conduct Ansberry retaliated against was objectively government conduct. Ansberry’s sentence was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Ansberry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Aubrey worked for the Weld County, Colorado, Clerk and Recorder’s office. She became unable to work for a time due to posterior reversible encephalopathy syndrome (“PRES”), a rare condition characterized by fluctuating blood pressure that causes swelling in the brain, coma and sometimes death. Eventually Aubrey’s PRES resolved and she began to recover. The County allowed her to take several months off but eventually terminated her employment. By that time, Aubrey contended, she recovered sufficiently to be able to return to her job, with reasonable accommodation for her disability. Aubrey sued the County under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and several related statutes. The district court granted the County summary judgment on all claims. The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, finding Aubrey presented sufficient evidence that a jury could have found the County failed to engage in the collaborative interactive process that the ADA called for between an employer and an employee in order to determine whether there was a reasonable accommodation that would have permitted Aubrey to perform the essential functions of her job. In light of that evidence, Aubrey’s failure-to-accommodate and disability discrimination claims were sufficient to survive summary judgment. Summary judgment for the County was affirmed on Aubrey’s retaliation claims because she failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the County terminated her employment in retaliation for her asking for an accommodation. View "Aubrey v. Koppes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Dana Fedor appealed a district court’s order compelling her to arbitrate employment-related claims she brought against her former employer, UnitedHealthcare, Inc. (UHC), and United Healthcare Services, Inc. Fedor argued the district court impermissibly compelled arbitration before first finding that she and UHC had indeed formed the arbitration agreement underlying the district court’s decision. To this, the Tenth Circuit agreed, concluding that the issue of whether an arbitration agreement was formed in the first instance had to be determined by the court, even where there has been a failure to specifically challenge provisions within the agreement delegating certain decisions to an arbitrator. Judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Fedor v. United Healthcare" on Justia Law

Brittney Brown brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Roger Flowers, who at the time was a jailer at the Pontotoc County Justice Center; she alleged he raped her while she was a pretrial detainee. Flowers moved for summary judgment, arguing that sex between him and Brown was consensual and that, regardless, he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court determined that a jury could have found that Flowers had coercive, nonconsensual sex with Brown and that such conduct would have violated her clearly established rights. Accordingly, it denied Flowers’s motion. Flowers appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in finding that the question of consent and coercion was a jury question and that it therefore erred in finding a constitutional violation; and (2) clearly established law did not put him on notice that the sex was coercive or nonconsensual. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction with respect to Flowers' first contention, "on this interlocutory appeal, we generally must accept the facts as the district court found them." With respect to his second, the Court determined existing caselaw on the sexual abuse of inmates clearly established the contours of Brown’s rights, and affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. View "Brown v. Flowers" on Justia Law

The class’s version of events painted the Hutchenses as cunning con artists who "puppeteered" a advance-fee loan scam from afar. Defendants Sandy Hutchens, Tanya Hutchens, and Jennifer Hutchens, a three-member family who purportedly orchestrated a loan scam, challenged a district court’s rulings to avoid paying all or part of the judgment against them brought pursuant to a class action suit. The Tenth Circuit concluded almost all of those challenges failed, including their challenges to the jury’s verdict, class certification, proximate causation, and the application of the equitable unclean hands defense. However, the Court agreed with the Hutchenses’ position on the district court’s imposition of a constructive trust on some real property allegedly bought with the swindled fees. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court for entry of a revised judgment. View "CGC Holding Company v. Hutchens" on Justia Law

Defendant Christian Delgado-Lopez pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine or a mixture containing methamphetamine. He appealed the district court’s denial of a "minor-role" reduction under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual section 3B1.2(b). The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the district court did not compare Delgado-Lopez’s culpability to other participants in the enterprise, and found the court's credibility determination was wholly predicated on impermissible speculation. "We cannot say with certainty that the district court’s decision would stand if its foundation was removed. Therefore, we are compelled to remand this case to the district court for resentencing based on the proper legal standard." View "United States v. Delgado-Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Patrick Begay assaulted a man in the Navajo Nation with a baseball bat and a knife. The crime thus occurred in Indian country, within the boundaries of the reservation. Both Begay and the victim were enrolled members of the Navajo Nation. Begay was indicted in federal court on two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. He pled guilty to these charges. The Probation Office issued a Presentence Report (“PSR”) calculating Begay’s guidelines imprisonment range to be 46 to 57 months. Begay requested that the court vary from this range because significantly higher penalties are imposed on Native Americans convicted of assault in New Mexico federal court than in New Mexico state court. Defense counsel requested to submit testimony regarding this asserted sentencing disparity. The government objected, arguing that under our precedents, if the district court “even considers this argument or this train of argument in any way whatsoever, any sentence rendered by the [c]ourt becomes invalid.” The sentencing judge agreed stating that she could not consider Begay’s sentencing-disparity argument pursuant to Tenth Circuit precedent. Moreover, the judge stated should would not consider the argument because the evidence Begay offered to present lacked sufficient detail to make any comparison of his sentence to state-court sentences meaningful. Begay was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment. Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was sympathetic to Begay’s argument that but for an “an accident of history and geography,” he would have received a lighter sentence, the Court concluded its precedents foreclosed the consideration of federal/state sentencing disparities under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Begay" on Justia Law

Defendant Dymond Brown appealed an amended judgment reducing his sentence pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. At his original sentencing in 2007, the district court sentenced Brown as a career offender under the 2006 United States Sentencing Guidelines based on two predicate state convictions for crimes of violence: (1) feloniously pointing a firearm and (2) shooting with intent to kill. The district court did not differentiate between the elements clause, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1), or the residual clause, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2), in holding that these two convictions were crimes of violence under the Guidelines. On appeal, Brown argued that at his First Step Act sentencing, the district court should have used the Guidelines in effect when Congress passed the First Step Act, the 2018 Guidelines. Furthermore, he argued the district court should have revisited his career offender status. After Brown’s conviction, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and held that the feloniously pointing a firearm was not a violent felony as defined by the ACCA because it did not necessarily have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another[.]” The Court found the ACCA contained similar language to the elements clause of the 2006 Guideline definition of a crime of violence. Brown argued the district court erred by not considering his challenge to his career offender status at his First Step Act sentencing on this basis. The Tenth Circuit found the language of the First Step Act was narrow and did not authorize plenary resentencing. "But it allows a district court to at least consider Mr. Brown’s claim that sentencing him as a career offender would be error given subsequent decisional law that clarifies (not amends) the related career offender provision at issue." The Court therefore reversed Brown's sentence and remanded for further consideration and resentencing. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

A Garfield County, Utah, sheriff’s deputy, defendant Raymond Gardner, challenged the district court’s decision to deny him qualified immunity from Plaintiff Matthew Mglej’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims stemming from Gardner’s arresting Mglej in August 2011. Mglej was on a cross-country trip when his motorcycle broke down. Chuck Gurle, a mechanic in Boulder, let Mglej stay with him for a few days while Gurle waited for parts needed to repair the motorcycle. The deputy first met Mglej when he stopped Mglej for speeding on his motorcycle. A few days later, Gardner received a report from a local convenience store/gas station that $20 was missing from the store's register, and they suspected someone matching Mglej's description took the money. When the deputy asked about the missing money, Mglej denied taking it. Deputy Gardner explained to Mglej that, although Mglej denied taking the money, he still needed to complete a report, which would require some information from Mglej, the information usually contained on an ID or driver's license. When Mglej declined to give the deputy his ID before consulting with an attorney, Gardner arrested him. Deputy Gardner then handcuffed Mglej behind his back and placed him in the front seat of the deputy’s patrol car. Mglej complained that the handcuffs were too tight; when Gardner tried to loosen them, the handcuffs malfunctioned and the deputy could not loosen or remove them. Using tools from his garage, Deputy Gardner was eventually able to pry the handcuffs off Mglej’s wrists after twenty minutes of work, causing Mglej significant pain and injury in the process. Mglej was released on bail three days after he was arrested. He then had to hitchhike the ninety-five miles back to Boulder, where he found that his motorcycle had been vandalized and his possessions stolen. The charges against Mglej were later dropped. Mglej alleged that Gardner violated the Fourth Amendment when he arrested Mglej without probable cause, used excessive force in doing so, and then initiated a malicious prosecution against Mglej. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in denying Gardner qualified immunity on all of Mglej's claims. View "Mglej v. Garfield County" on Justia Law

In September 2018, petitioner Larry Baca was removed from his position in the Directorate of Public Works at the U.S. Army White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Baca sought review of this decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), asserting three affirmative defenses to his removal. The MSPB rejected all of Baca’s defenses and affirmed his removal. He appealed only the MSPB’s determination with respect to one of his affirmative defenses, that his firing was unlawful retaliation for whistleblowing in violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the MSPB's decision. View "Baca v. Department of Army" on Justia Law